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Abstract in English 
This dissertation contributes to the debate on Europeanization of citizen policy preferences. This 
form of Europeanization is defined as the support for a EU level governance instead of a national or 
sub-national governance of strategic policy domains. Using survey data from the Intune 2009 project 
and Eurobarometer surveys, this work studies how citizen support for EU policy governance is 
structured. It distinguishes a generic preference for more EU policy governance from a specific 
support for EU governance of distinct policy sectors. Moreover, this thesis analyses what influences 
the development of these two types of support for EU policy governance. 
Chapter 1 surveys the literature on macro theories of European integration and provides three 
alternative models of support for EU policy governance. These models are tested and debated in the 
proceeding of the dissertation to study the structure of support for EU policy governance.  
Chapters 2 provides a conceptual definition of EU support grounded in earlier theoretical and 
empirical works. Four dimensions of EU support are identified:  
 ‘Output legitimacy’: support as subjective utility of European integration;  
 ‘EU governance legitimacy’: support as a generic preference for EU policy governance; 
 ‘European identification’: support as identification (we-feeling) with the European political 
community; 
 ‘EU democracy’: support as political representation at the EU level.  
Chapter 3 measures these four dimensions of EU support, modelling them as latent dimensions 
using individual-level survey data. This chapter confirms that these dimensions are rather stable and 
invariant across EU member countries. 
Chapter 4 analyses the determinants of these four dimensions. Results demonstrate that ‘exclusive 
national identification’, ‘national attachment’, ‘confidence in national institutions’, and ‘political 
values’ exert a significant influence on the levels of EU support across Europe, but their effects vary 
across the four dimensions of EU support. Notably, only ‘exclusive national identification’ influences 
the generic support for EU policy governance (‘EU governance legitimacy’). This chapter also 
investigates the presence of a hierarchy among the four dimensions of EU support testing whether 
generic support for EU policy governance depends upon holding one of the other three forms of EU 
support, following some suggestions included in theories of European integration (mainly neo and 
post-functionalism) and in empirical studies on EU support. However, results demonstrate that 
‘Output legitimacy’, ‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’ do not have consistent effects 
on ‘EU governance legitimacy’ across European countries.  
Chapter 5 explores this result performing a policy by policy analysis. It emerges that ‘Output 
legitimacy’, ‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’ play a role in driving support for EU 
governance of distinct policy domains. ‘Output legitimacy’ and ‘European identification’ are the most 
  
important determinants, but their effects are strengthened (or weakened) by specific policy domain 
characteristics. ‘Output legitimacy’ has the greatest influence on support for EU governance of 
policies where the EU governance is more effective (functional interdependence explanation); 
whereas ‘European identification’ has the highest effect on policies that work as market-correcting 
policies (social-model explanation) that guarantee a EU level protection from market and 
globalisation failures.  
Further analyses show that respondents tend to prefer high-expenditure policy to be governed at 
the national level, and, ceteris paribus, they are likely to oppose further EU integration in policy 
domains where EU governance is already high. This last mechanism is telling because it shows that 
EU governance does not lead to further integration (as argued by neo-functionalists), but on the 
contrary respondents favour a retrenchment from prior agreements on EU policy competencies. 
The analyses with 2009 data do not confirm the influence of political representation (‘EU 
democracy’), but pooling data from November 2016 (Eurobarometer 86.2), respondents’ perception 
of political representation within the EU becomes a highly significant determinant of support for EU 
governance of Immigration and Foreign policies. Moreover, the number of asylum seekers within 
each country contributes to explain individual-level support. These two findings confirm the idea that 
the recent European refugees and economic crises have profoundly modified how European citizens 
look to the EU, and why they support or reject EU policy governance. 
Finally, Chapter 6 investigates the meanings of national and European identities and their influence 
on support for EU governance of specific policy domains. Using Intune 2009 data, national and 
European identities are unpacked in four constitutive components: ‘European Civility’, ‘National 
Civility’, ‘Ancestry’, and ‘Citizenship’. The results show that respondents who conceive their 
national identity as something rooted in national cultural traditions (‘National Civility’ component) 
are likely to reject EU policy governance. On the contrary, those who qualify European identity as a 
form of banal Europeanism where Europeanness is a matter of common and ordinary experiences as 
Europeans that forms a European way of life (‘European Civility’ component) are, ceteris paribus, 
more likely to support EU governance. Both pre-political (‘Ancestry’) and political (exercising 
‘Citizenship’ rights) components do not have a consistent impact on this form of EU support. Overall, 
this corroborates the idea that the more the EU is present in ordinary experiences, the greater is 
support for EU policy governance. Conversely, a respondents’ strong emphasis on national cultural 
traditions - also embedded in national laws and political institutions - hampers support for EU 
governance, since a transfer of competencies to the EU affects national laws and institutions, and, 
indirectly, national identities.  
  
Abstract in italiano 
Questa tesi contribuisce al dibattito sulla Europeizzazione delle preferenze di policy dei cittadini. 
Questa forma di Europeizzazione si sostanzia nel sostegno dei cittadini per una governance Europea 
in strategici settori di policy. Utilizzando dati di sondaggio provenienti dalla ricerca Intune 2009 e da 
Eurobarometro, questo lavoro studia la struttura del sostegno per una governance Europea, 
distinguendo tra una generica preferenza per una maggiore governance e una specifica preferenza che 
varia tra i diversi settori di policy. Inoltre, questa tesi analizza quali sono i fattori che influenzano lo 
sviluppo di questi due tipi di sostegno. 
Nel Capitolo 1 attraverso uno studio della letteratura sulle macro teorie dell’integrazione Europea 
vengono presentati tre modelli alternativi che definiscono la struttura del sostegno per una governance 
politica Europea. Questi tre modelli sono in seguito testati e dibattuti nel prosieguo della tesi.  
Il Capitolo 2 fornisce una definizione del concetto di ‘EU support’ basata su precedenti studi teorici 
e empirici. Questa definizione identifica quattro dimensioni che sottostanno al concetto di ‘EU 
support’: 
 ‘Output legitimacy’: sostegno per gli output prodotti dall’Unione Europea;  
 ‘EU governance legitimacy’: sostegno come generica propensione ad affidare le decisioni di 
policy all’Unione Europea; 
 ‘European identification’: sostegno inteso come identificazione nella comunità politica europea; 
 ‘EU democracy’: sostegno inteso come percezione di rappresentanza politica a livello europeo.  
Il Capitolo 3 misura queste quattro dimensioni attraverso un modello a dimensioni latenti sui dati 
della ricerca Intune 2009, confermando che queste dimensioni sono sufficientemente stabili e 
invarianti attraverso i diversi paesi dell’Unione Europea.  
Il Capitolo 4 affronta l’analisi delle determinanti di queste quattro dimensioni del sostegno. I 
risultati dimostrano che quattro fattori influenzano in modo significativo il sostegno all’UE: 1) 
‘identificazione nazionale esclusiva’ 2) ‘attaccamento alla nazione’ 3) ‘fiducia nelle istituzioni 
nazionali’ 4) ‘valori politici’. Questi fattori influenzano il sostegno all’UE in tutti i paesi (quindici) 
oggetto dell’indagine, ma il loro effetto varia in base a quale dimensione del sostegno si considera: 
la propensione ad affidare le decisioni di policy all’UE (‘EU governance legitimacy’) viene 
influenzata solamente dal fattore ‘identificazione nazionale esclusiva’. Inoltre, questo capitolo indaga 
anche la presenza di una gerarchia tra le quattro dimensioni del sostegno, derivando questa ipotesi 
dalle teorie neo e post-funzionaliste e da alcuni studi empirici. Tuttavia, i risultati provano che le 
dimensioni di ‘Output legitimacy’, ‘European identification’ e ‘EU democracy’ non influenzano in 
modo considerevole e diffuso quella di ‘EU governance legitimacy’.  
Partendo da questo risultato, il Capitolo 5 esplora un percorso diverso, facendo un’analisi policy 
per policy. Infatti si concentra sull’influenza di questi ed altri fattori sulla propensione ad affidare le 
  
decisioni di policy all’Unione Europea in specifici settori politici. Da questa analisi emerge che fattori 
legati all’utilità soggettiva, all’identità europea e alla rappresentanza politica giocano un ruolo 
differente nei diversi settori: ‘Output legitimacy’ e ‘European identification’ sono le più importanti 
determinanti della propensione a sostenere una governance europea, ma i loro effetti sono rafforzati 
(o depotenziati) dalle specifiche caratteristiche delle diverse aree di policy. ‘Output legitimacy’ ha 
l’influenza maggiore nelle aree dove la governance europea è più efficiente rispetto ad una nazionale 
o locale (spiegazione funzionale), mentre ‘European identification’ ha l’effetto più consistente nelle 
aree politiche dove l’azione europea può correggere gli effetti della globalizzazione (spiegazione 
modello sociale).  
Ulteriori analisi evidenziano come gli intervistati tendano a preferire il livello nazionale a quello 
europeo per le aree di policy che richiedono ingenti investimenti economici e per quelle in cui 
l’Unione Europea già possiede estese competenze. Questo ultimo meccanismo evidenzia come un 
maggiore livello di integrazione europea non porti di per sé ad una ulteriore richiesta di governance 
europea (come sostenuto dai neo-funzionalisti), ma, anzi, conduca alla richiesta di ridiscutere l’attuale 
allocazione delle competenze.  
Utilizzando dati raccolti nel 2009, queste analisi non confermano l’influenza della dimensione di 
rappresentanza politica (‘EU democracy’). Tuttavia, aggregando dati derivanti da Eurobarometro 
86.2 e raccolti nel novembre del 2016 emerge come la percezione di rappresentanza politica diventi 
una importante e significativa determinante del sostegno per una governance europea delle politiche 
di immigrazione e della politica estera.  
Inoltre, il sostegno per una governance europea di queste due aree di policy viene anche 
influenzato direttamente dal numero di richiedenti asilo ospitati da ciascun paese. Infatti, maggiore è 
il numero di richiedenti asilo, maggiore è la richiesta di un’iniziativa politica europea che affronti 
questo tema. Considerando insieme questi due risultati (aumento dell’influenza della rappresentanza 
politica e del numero dei richiedenti asilo) viene confermata l’idea che le recenti crisi Europee 
(economica e dei migranti) abbiano profondamente modificato il modo attraverso cui i cittadini 
guardano all’Unione europea, e i motivi per cui sostengano o rifiutino una (maggiore) governance 
europea. 
In conclusione, il Capitolo 6 indaga i significati di identità nazionale ed europea per scoprire come 
questi influenzino il supporto per una governance europea di specifiche aree di policy. Utilizzando 
dati della ricerca Intune 2009, l’identità nazionale ed europea viene scomposta in quattro componenti 
costitutive: ‘European Civility’, ‘National Civility’, ‘Ancestry’, e ‘Citizenship’. I risultati dimostrano 
come gli intervistati che ricostruiscono la propria identità nazionale sulla base delle specifiche 
tradizioni culturali nazionali (componente di ‘National Civility’) siano portati a rifiutare una 
governance europea. All'opposto, il sostegno per una governance europea è più probabile per quelli 
  
che qualificano l’identità europea come una forma di europeismo ‘banale’, dove il significato di 
europeismo discende dalla condivisione delle esperienze quotidiane ed ordinarie come cittadini 
dell’Europa (componente di ‘European Civility’). Le analisi mostrano l’assenza di influenza sul 
sostegno da parte sia della componente pre-politica (‘Ancestry’) dell’identità nazionale ed europea, 
sia di quella politica (‘Citizenship’ intesa come esercitare i diritti di cittadinanza).  
Complessivamente, questi risultati corroborano l’idea che più l’Unione Europea è percepita come 
presente all’interno dell’ordinaria esperienza di vita dei cittadini, più probabile è il supporto per una 
maggiore integrazione politica. Tuttavia, a parità di condizioni, i significati di identità nazionale 
esercitano una decisa influenza sul sostegno. Infatti, maggiore è l’enfasi sulle tradizioni culturali 
nazionali e sul loro ruolo nella definizione di identità nazionale, minore è il sostegno per una 
governance europea. Questo è determinato dal fatto che le tradizioni culturali sono incorporate anche 
nelle leggi e nelle istituzioni politiche nazionali, ed un trasferimento di competenze all’Unione 
Europea ridurrebbe il ruolo e l’importanza di tali istituzioni, influenzando indirettamente l’identità 
nazionale. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The economic crisis started in the US in late 2007 and severely hit the European economy leading to 
a huge Eurozone crisis. Many national economies within the EU faced extensive economic instability 
and implemented austerity measures - in some cases directly suggested by European institutions - to 
cope with the economic downturn. Several EU Member states (Ireland, Spain, and Greece) needed a 
bailout from the EU and international institutions, due to a rise in the cost of public borrowing. The 
condition and the managing of the Greek public debt crisis turned out far more complicated than those 
of Ireland and Spain. The Greek crisis has turned into a highly politicised debate about the underlying 
goals and meaning of European integration: what kind of union do the EU members governments and 
citizens want? What are the values for deciding EU policies? Is the EU legitimated to enact and dictate 
policies to national States, and are they required to comply?  All these questions were not new to the 
academic debate (see for a review Schmitt and Thomassen 1999; Thomassen 2009; Loveless and 
Rohrschneider 2011; Sanders et al. 2012a, 2012b), and after the passing of the Maastricht treaty 
(1992) national public opinions have also become more aware of the implications of European 
integration.  
The successive crises in recent years have contributed to keeping Europe constantly on the agenda: 
when the Economic/Eurozone crisis was nearly over, the European refugee crisis started and had a 
great impact on the already weak economies of the southern European countries. In this case, the 
solidarity mechanism within the EU was questioned by those member states more affected by the 
flow of migrants from outside Europe. The opposition to share quotas of asylum seekers among EU 
countries led to a problematic implementation1 of the program of voluntary relocation and 
resettlement started in 20152.  
While Europe was facing the migrant crisis, another event shook the stability of the Union: the UK 
voted for leaving the EU (also known as Brexit) in a popular referendum held in June 2016. As 
analyses of the campaign and surveys have shown, the ‘Leave’ vote was driven mostly by anti-
immigration and anti-establishment feelings, by concerns about preserving national identity and by a 
perception of having been left behind by globalisation processes (Hobolt 2017). The ‘Stay’ side, 
instead, concentrated most on an economic cost-benefit analysis of Brexit, which, in the end, was not 
able to convince a dissatisfied and upset population (see Hobolt 2017; Goodwin et al. 2017). 
The motives behind these crises summarise well what is at stake with the European Union. The 
European project is no longer just a trade regulation issue where an economic-instrumental rationale 
may drive integration, support, and legitimacy. From Maastricht onwards, a path towards a political 
                                                 
1 europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-218_en.pdf (checked 30/09/2017) 
2 https://goo.gl/Y5sHvE (checked 30/09/2017) 
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Union has started, since the EU policy prerogatives began to grow in other sectors than economic 
ones (Alesina and Wacziarg 1999; Magalhaes 2012a, 2012b; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 2012). 
European integration has become a highly-debated issue where parties, elites, and ordinary citizens 
have developed their positions (Sanders et al. 2012a, 2012b; Best et al. 2012). Euroscepticism started 
to increase (Taggart 1998): some spoke about post-Maastricht blues (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007), 
the end of permissive consensus and a new era of constraining dissensus (Hooghe and Marks 2009). 
The term ‘Euroscepticism’ emerged first in the British media (Harmsen and Spiering 2004, cit. in 
Vasilopolou 2009) spreading into the common language of ordinary citizens via party competition. 
Since Taggart’s seminal definition of this term in 1998, the study of ‘Euroscepticism’ has gained a 
prominent role in the study of party politics. Yet, almost twenty years after his first publication, there 
is still a debate about what kind of scepticism exists among citizens and parties (e.g. Taggart 1998; 
Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004; Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008a, 2008b). There is a vast variety of 
possible objects of scepticism, as well as an assortment of policies, norms or constitutional values 
one may endorse. The rhetoric power of this label hides the real variety existing among parties and 
citizens.  
Europeans are no longer passive with respect to integration. Many times, they claim a different 
Europe, since the EU-as-it-is-now is perceived as unable to meet citizen needs (Caiani and Guerra 
2017). There is a division between proponents of a federal Europe and intergovernmentalists, as well 
as between those that reject European intromission into national-welfare management and those who 
endorse a social Europe (della Porta and Caiani 2009), and between supporters of free trade and free 
movement within the EU and those wanting protectionism and re-establishment of national state 
borders (Kriesi et al. 2012). Overall, these divisions are mostly among those supporting more political 
and policy integration, and those who do not or desire less integration than the current one. The recent 
Rome declaration3 recognises the possibility – already included in the Lisbon Treaty – for a stronger 
integration in some policy areas for a subset of EU countries, and this is an indirect indicator that 
European countries are not inclined to follow the same path towards more integration.  
The contents of this dissertation 
This thesis studies the public legitimacy of the ongoing process of European integration, with the 
final purpose of showing why European citizens support or reject a strengthening of the union, in 
terms of more EU policy governance, distinguishing a generic preference for more EU governance 
from a specific support for EU governance of distinct policy sectors. The literature on popular support 
towards the EU is quite vast (see for a review Loveless and Rohrschneider 2011; Sanders et al. 2012a, 
2012b; Hobolt and de Vries 2015), but there is a much smaller number of studies on popular support 
                                                 
3 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/25-rome-declaration/ (checked 30/09/2017) 
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for EU governance (e.g. Eichenberg and Dalton 1993, 2007; Sinnott 1995; De Winter and 
Swyngedouw 1999; Hooghe 2003; Lubbers and Scheepers 2005, 2010; McLaren 2007; De Winter et 
al. 2009; Magalhaes 2012a, 2012b). Furthermore, among these studies, those where the unit of 
analyses are individuals (and not aggregates) are only a few (see de Winter and Swyngedouw 1999; 
Lubbers and Scheepers 2005, 2010; McLaren 2007; de Winter et al. 2009; Magalhaes 2012b). These 
studies analyse individual-level data - which is right for testing theory-based mechanisms without 
running the risk of an ecological fallacy4 - but they concentrate only on a generic form of support for 
EU governance, disregarding the presence of a policy specific support. In other words, these studies 
address the question on why individuals (within European countries) support a strengthening of 
European policy governance, but they do not study why European citizens support, for instance, EU 
governance of Immigration policy, while rejecting EU governance of Agricultural policy. This thesis 
contributes to filling this gap, studying what determines a form of generic as well as specific support 
for EU governance.  
In addition, this work contributes to conceptual clarification, identifying different - empirically 
grounded5 - dimensions of mass support for the European project. Empirical research often 
conceptualises EU support6 as a mono-dimensional concept, and this oversimplifies the concept. This 
thesis argues, on the contrary, that the concept of EU support is multidimensional, and its 
measurement needs to comply with the conceptual definition. Some scholars propose 
conceptualisations of EU support, but there is no common conceptual framework for studying this 
topic. Scholars differ both on the theoretical model they apply, as well as on the operationalisation of 
concepts and measurement strategies (e.g. Norris 1999; Fuchs and Klingemann 2011; Boomgaarden 
et al. 2011; Sanders et al. 2012a, 2012b). Often, they concentrate just on one aspect of EU support 
(i.e. trust in the EU institutions, or general support of EU membership), limiting the scope of their 
exploration (e.g. Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel 1998b; Carey 2002; McLaren 2004; Hobolt 
2012). This thesis provides - drawing upon existing theoretical and empirical analyses - a 
comprehensive conceptual framework, which is suited to study popular support for EU governance. 
The conceptual definition is grounded in Scharpf’s input-output legitimacy model (Scharpf 1999) and 
Easton’s diffuse-specific model of support (Easton 1965, 1975). Four dimensions of EU support are 
identified: (1) one related to the outputs of the EU system, called ‘Output legitimacy’, which indicates 
                                                 
4  Ecological fallacy means inferring individual level mechanisms from aggregate data. 
5 These dimensions are based on previous theoretical and empirical analyses available in the literature, but this thesis 
investigates their empirical consistence much more in detail. A strong emphasis is thus posed on the measurement 
strategy and cross-country comparability of results. Indeed, valid conclusions about the nature of EU support inevitably 
pass through a rigorous application of an appropriate method. 
6 The term EU support defines a general favourable attitude towards the European Union. EU support is defined more 
precisely in the proceeding of this dissertation, since the concept of EU support is unpacked in four constitutive 
dimensions.  
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the perceived benefit of being a EU citizen; (2) one that taps the legitimacy of the EU governance 
and the scope of EU policy governance, labelled ‘EU governance legitimacy’; (3) another one that 
defines individual identification with the European political community7, named ‘European 
identification’; (4) and the last one corresponds to an evaluation of the EU democratic process, called 
‘EU democracy’. These four dimensions cover ample spectrum of the concept of EU support:  
 ‘Output legitimacy’ is a dimension where support is a matter of subjective utility;  
 ‘EU governance legitimacy’ defines support as a generic preference for EU governance; 
 ‘European identification’ conceives support as a we-feeling; 
 ‘EU democracy’ considers support as trust in procedures and institutions that allow political 
representation at the EU level. 
This conceptual definition is necessary because it improves the comprehension of the perceived weak 
point(s) of European integration, and allows studying why European citizens develop these different 
forms of EU support8. In the literature, there are studies that link EU support with its exogenous9 
determinants (i.e. political values and confidence in national institutions; see Loveless and 
Rohrschneider 2011 for a review), but they often concentrate on one dimension per time (e.g. 
Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel 1998b; Carey 2002; McLaren 2004; Hobolt 2012) or they infer 
conclusions without checking comparability of results across European countries (e.g. Dalton 1999; 
Norris 1999; Fuchs and Klingemann 2011; Boomgarden et al. 2011; Sanders et al. 2012a, 2012b). 
This work integrates this literature proposing a model that estimates (latent) dimensions of EU 
support controlling for cross-country stability of the model (measurement invariance), and that 
concurrently measures the effect of exogenous determinants of the four dimensions of EU support.  
Furthermore, defining four dimensions means distinguishing four objects (see Easton 1965, 1975) 
of EU support: outputs, EU competencies, community, and EU institutions, and this allows theorizing 
and testing a model where the generic support for EU governance (‘EU governance legitimacy’) 
depends upon the other three endogenous components of EU support. Indeed, current theories of 
European integration maintain that a path towards more European integration (increasing EU 
governance) is decisively influenced by issues of utility (for intergovernmentalist, and neo-
functionalist scholars – see Haas 1958; Moravcsik 1993; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 2012), identity 
(for post-functionalist scholars – see Hooghe and Marks 2009; Hooghe et al. 2017), and political 
representation (for democratic deficit scholars – see Follesdal and Hix 2006; Hix 2008; Schmidt 
                                                 
7 European political community simply indicates an imagined community (Anderson 1991) of people living within the 
borders of the European Union. 
8 I use forms and not types of EU support to indicate that these forms of EU support are not mutually exclusive, as the 
term types often indicates.  
9 The term ‘exogenous’ indicates a potential determinant of EU support: it is not an indicator the concept, but, on the 
contrary, it influences the development of EU support. 
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2013). However, none of the existing individual-level studies on support for EU policy governance 
investigates the relationship among the endogenous components of the concept (with the partial 
exclusion of McLaren 2007). This thesis answers the question on to what extent support for EU 
governance is determined by subjective utility (‘Output legitimacy’), identity (‘European 
identification’), and representation (‘EU democracy’).  
However, there are two types of support for EU governance: generic or policy specific. Generic 
support is measured by the (latent) dimensions of ‘EU governance legitimacy’, and it indicates a 
latent attitude that cross-cuts policy domains. The specific support, instead, indicates a form of 
support for EU governance that varies across policy domains: it is contingent upon specific 
characteristics of the policy sectors. Moreover, endogenous (‘Output legitimacy’, ‘European 
Identification’, and ‘EU democracy’) as well as exogenous determinants of support for EU 
governance may have different effects across policies, since support may be driven, for instance, by 
‘Output legitimacy’ in some sectors, and by ‘European identification’ in others. This work 
investigates both these two forms of generic and specific support for EU policy governance.  
Finally, the role of national and European identities on specific support for EU governance is 
further analysed. National and European identities are unpacked in their constitutive components to 
address the influence of different identity meanings. Indeed, identity can be conceived in three ways: 
(1) as a self-categorisation as a group member; (2) as the strength of the attachment towards the group; 
or (3) as the set of attributes that discriminates between in-group and out-group (Citrin and Sides 
2004). Whereas chapters 2 to 5 concentrate on the first and the second definition of these collective 
identities, Chapter 6 makes use of the third conceptualisation, and it investigates the relationship 
between meanings of national and European identities and support for EU governance of eight 
specific policy domains10.  
The structure of this dissertation 
This dissertation contributes to the debate on Europeanization (Radaelli 2003; Graziano and Vink 
2007), broadly defined as the way in which European integration influences national politics and 
societies, or, more precisely, as the process of:  
“[…] (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of formal and 
informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things', and 
shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of 
EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic 
discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies.” (Radaelli 2003: 30) 
                                                 
10 Unemployment, Health care, Fighting crime, Agricultural, Environmental, Immigration, Foreign, and Tax policies. 
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In detail, the thesis studies the Europeanization of citizen policy preferences, defined as the support 
for a EU level governance instead of a national or sub-national governance of strategic policy 
domains. It does so addressing the following five research questions: 
RQ1 How is citizen support for EU policy governance structured? 
RQ2 What are the dimensions of EU support? 
RQ3 What are the determinants of these dimensions of EU support? 
RQ4 What are the determinants of support for EU governance of specific policy domains? 
RQ5 Do different meanings of national and European identity exert an influence on support for 
EU governance of specific policy domains? 
The dissertation is composed of six chapters, plus this introduction and a conclusive chapter that 
debates empirical results. Each chapter focuses mainly on one of the five research questions. This 
work relies on individual-level survey data from the Intune 2009 project (Cotta et al. 2009) and from 
the Eurobarometer 86.2 (November 2016) (European Commission 2017), in both cases with data on 
fifteen EU countries11, and on aggregate country-level data from the Eurobarometer website12 about 
all the twenty-eight EU countries. 
Chapter 1 surveys the literature on macro theories of European integration and provides three 
alternative models of support for EU policy governance. These models are tested and debated in the 
proceeding of the dissertation to address the first research question (RQ1) on the structure of support 
for EU policy governance. 
Chapters 2 provides an answer to the second research question (RQ2), developing a conceptual 
definition of EU support grounded in earlier theoretical and empirical works. Four dimensions of EU 
support are identified: ‘Output legitimacy’, ‘EU governance legitimacy’, ‘European identification’, 
and ‘EU democracy’. Moreover, Chapter 2 introduces the indicators used to measure these four 
dimensions and presents a selection of aggregate time-series data from Eurobarometer surveys (see 
note 12) to assess long-term tendencies. Although the analysis is limited to a few indicators of the 
four dimensions, it emerges that citizen evaluations of ‘EU democracy’ and ‘Output legitimacy’ 
profoundly vary through time, steadily decreasing after 2007. On the contrary, support for EU 
governance of specific policy domains13 as well as levels of ‘European identification’ is (almost) 
time-invariant. These findings support the idea that the dimensions of EU support based on subjective 
utility (‘Output legitimacy’) and political representation (‘EU democracy’) are those most affected 
by the European economic crisis.  
                                                 
11 Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, France, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Estonia, the UK, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, and Bulgaria. 
12 http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/index (checked 30/09/2017) 
13 Agricultural, Fighting crime, Environmental, Health care, Unemployment, Immigration, and Foreign policies. 
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Afterwards, Chapter 3 measures the theoretical constructs (‘Output legitimacy’, ‘EU governance 
legitimacy’, ‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’), modelling them as latent dimensions 
using individual-level survey data (Cotta et al. 2009). This measurement is rather stable and invariant 
across EU member countries, providing evidence supporting the presence of these four dimensions 
of EU support. In addition, in Appendix A different measuring methods are compared in order to 
validate the results further, and from these analyses it is evident that the separation between a political 
support (‘EU governance legitimacy’) and a utilitarian form of support (‘Output legitimacy’) is 
empirically tenable, and that the use of different statistical methods to measure these dimensions does 
not substantially influence the outcome.  
Chapter 4 answers the third research question (RQ3), assessing the influence of exogenous 
individual-level determinants on the four dimensions of EU support across European countries. 
Results demonstrate that exclusive national identification14, confidence in national institutions, 
national attachment, and political values have a significant influence on EU support. However, among 
this set of exogenous determinants, only exclusive national identification is associated with lower 
scores on the dimension of ‘EU governance legitimacy’. This means that holding exclusive national 
identity is what discriminates between supporters and rejecters of a generic EU policy governance. 
Afterwards, following some suggestions included in theories of European integration (mainly neo 
and post-functionalism) and in empirical studies on EU support, the chapter investigates the presence 
of a hierarchy among the four dimensions of EU support, where ‘Output legitimacy’, ‘European 
identification’, and ‘EU democracy’ come first in ‘causal’ chain, influencing ‘EU governance 
legitimacy’. The result of a path model demonstrates that ‘Output legitimacy’, ‘European 
identification’, and ‘EU democracy’ do not have consistent effects on the dimension of ‘EU 
governance legitimacy’ across European countries. This influence emerges in some EU countries and 
not in others, without showing any clear pattern among States (i.e. geographic location or Eurozone 
membership). This contradicts the hypothesis and poses serious doubts on the predictive power of the 
dimensions of subjective utility (‘Output legitimacy’), identity (‘European identification’), and 
political representation (‘EU democracy’). However, the reason for this result may rest on the fact 
that this dimension of ‘EU governance legitimacy’ taps a generic preference for EU policy 
governance. It follows that subjective utility, identity, and political representation may play a different 
role in driving support for EU governance of distinct policy domains.  
Chapter 5 deals with this research question (RQ4), performing a policy by policy analysis. Looking 
at separate policies it emerges that subjective utility (‘Output legitimacy’) and identity (both self-
identification and the strength of this identification) are the most important determinants of support 
                                                 
14 Exclusive national identification means self-categorising as a member of a national community without identifying also 
as European. 
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for EU governance of specific policy domains, but their effects are strengthened (or weakened) by 
policy specific characteristics. Analyses with 2009 data do not confirm the influence of political 
representation (‘EU democracy’), but they corroborate the hypotheses that ‘Output legitimacy’ and 
‘European identification’ are positively associated with support for EU policy governance of specific 
sectors. 
Moreover, additional analyses show that large part of the cross-policy differences in the level of 
support for EU governance is explained by the attributes of the policy domains: respondents tend to 
prefer high-expenditure policy to be governed at the national level, and, ceteris paribus, they are likely 
to oppose further EU governance in policy domains where the EU governance is already high. This 
last mechanism is telling because it shows that EU integration does not lead to further integration (as 
argued by neo-functionalists), but on the contrary respondents endorse a ‘spillback’ (as opposed to 
spillover, see Schmitter 2004, cit. in Niemann and Schmitter 2009: 55) from prior agreements on EU 
competencies.  
Chapter 5 concludes showing that country-level explanations are scant predictors of support for 
EU policy governance, especially in 2009. Pooling data from November 2016 (EB 86.2)15 (European 
Commission 2017) two issues become remarkably important. The first one regards the effects that 
the number of asylum seekers within EU countries exerts. It turns out to be a significant determinant 
of support for EU governance of Immigration and Foreign policies, confirming the intuition that 
respondents look to the EU for solving national problems: the EU is seen as a powerful actor able to 
deal with adverse national contingency. The second important change corresponds to the increase of 
the effect of political representation at the EU level. Indeed, far more than in 2009, political 
representation is associated with support for EU governance of Immigration and Foreign policies. 
Considered together, these findings confirm the idea that the recent European refugees and economic 
crises have profoundly modified how European citizens look to the EU, and why they support or 
rejects EU policy governance.  
The issue of EU democracy becomes salient for EU citizens after the beginning of the economic 
crisis in 2008-2009, when the consensus for Eurosceptic parties increase (see Hooghe and Marks 
2009; Hooghe et al. 2017). These parties combine identity and political representation claims with 
economic arguments to mobilise citizens against the European Union, seen as an illegitimate actor. 
Eurosceptic parties consider the EU as a threat to national cultural integrity (Usherwood and Startin 
2013; Leconte 2015) and an open door to immigration (de Vreese and Boomgarden 2005), and they 
succeeded in mobilizing EU citizens who have exclusive national identification (Hooghe and Marks 
2009; Hooghe et al. 2017; Börzel and Risse 2017).  
                                                 
15 The choice of considering data from November 2016 depends on the fact that in the period 2009-2016 three events 
occurred: 1) Eurozone crises since early 2010; 2) Refugees crisis since 2015; 3) and Brexit in June 2016. 
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To investigate the effect of identity on EU support, Chapter 6 takes a different approach. Indeed, 
using Intune 2009 survey data (Cotta et al. 2009), national and European identities are unpacked in 
their constitutive components, to understand whether different meanings16 of national and European 
identification are associated with support for EU governance of specific policy areas (RQ5). Drawing 
upon Guglielmi and Vezzoni’s (2016) conceptualisation, four components of identity are defined and 
measured: ‘European Civility’, ‘National Civility’, ‘Ancestry’, and ‘Citizenship’. The results show 
that respondents who conceive their national identity as something rooted in national cultural 
traditions (‘National Civility’ component) are likely to reject EU governance. On the contrary, those 
who qualify European identification as a form of banal Europeanism (Cram 2001) where 
Europeanness is a matter of common and ordinary experiences as Europeans - besides national 
cultural differences - (‘European Civility’ component) are, ceteris paribus, more likely to support EU 
policy governance. Both a pre-political (‘Ancestry’) and a political (exercising ‘Citizenship’ rights) 
component do not have a consistent impact on this form of EU support. Overall, this corroborates the 
idea that the more the EU is present in ordinary experiences, the higher is the support for EU 
governance. On the contrary, a strong emphasis on national cultural traditions - also embedded in 
national laws and political institutions - hampers support for EU governance, since a transfer of 
competence affects national laws and institutions, and, indirectly, their national identities. 
  
                                                 
16 ‘Meanings’ of collective identity produce ‘boundaries’ that define members and non-members. In Chapter 6 these two 
terms are considered as synonymous, since they both refer to survey questions that ask the respondents to indicate the 
importance of some attributes to be proper nationals or Europeans. 
10 
 
CHAPTER 1 - THEORIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
The role of theories in the social sciences is to provide credible accounts of why specific social 
phenomena happen. There are macro-level theories, where institutions and organised groups are at 
the core of the explanatory mechanism, and micro level theories, where, instead, individuals are the 
pillar of the explanation. European integration is undoubtedly a field for macro-level theories. Indeed, 
national governments, European institutions, and national and transnational elites are the key actors 
in this field. The process of integrating separate national states and communities within a common 
European polity started in 1957 with the Rome Treaty, which established an international organisation 
among few members that decided to share a small part of their sovereignty in a limited set of policy 
areas (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 2012). In sixty years, what was an international agreement among 
few members has become now the European Union of twenty-eight member states whose institutions 
have competencies that range from economic to social policies. Macro-level theories of European 
integration account for how and why this process happened, and they provide different predictions 
on the future of EU governance.  
However, this dissertation is not on macro theories, but it draws upon them to study the 
Europeanization (see Radaelli 2003) of citizen policy preferences. This form of Europeanization is 
defined as the support for a EU level governance instead of a national or sub-national governance of 
strategic policy domains.  Macro theories of European integration do not deal with citizen support for 
EU governance unless it constrains political choices, but three different models of support can be 
identified looking at how macro theories defines, for instance, governments’ support for EU 
governance. Indeed, these three models correspond to three different structure of preferences:  
1. Liberal intergovernmentalism (see Moravcsik 1993) stresses that each of the key actors of 
integration has an inconsistent set of preferences for EU governance since support depends 
upon intrinsic characteristics of the policy domains;  
2. Neo-functionalism (see Haas 1958), instead, maintains that actors’ support for EU governance 
cross-cuts policy domains since functional spillover automatically produces further demand 
for integration of domains not yet integrated;  
3. Post-functionalism (see Hooghe and Marks 2009) suggests that actors’ support for EU 
governance is contingent upon public opinion, which can vary across policy domains and 
constrains public choices limiting the room of manoeuvre of office-seeking politicians.  
Therefore, this chapter surveys the literature on European integration to retrieve these three models 
of support for EU governance. In the proceeding of this thesis, these models, that in macro theories 
are referred to collective actors, will be used in a context where the units of analysis are individuals. 
Indeed, this dissertation empirically tests whether these models represent how citizens structure their 
set of preferences for EU governance. 
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1 Three theories, two dichotomies, one European integration 
European integration is both a project of economic, social and political integration and a process that 
has evolved step by step during the past sixty years, facing many external and internal crises that 
shaped the current institutional architecture of the European Union. Indeed, the supranational 
European integration has resulted in a combination of elements drawn from politics within national 
states (e.g. European Parliament, Commission, and independence of European Courts) and from 
politics between states (e.g. the European Council, and the Council) (Pollack 2012).  
Two dichotomies frame European integration theories: intergovernmental vs supranational modes 
of integration, and utilitarian vs ideational motivations. Although these are ideal-typical abstractions, 
they are helpful in classifying theories of European integration. Indeed, liberal intergovernmentalism 
tend to conceive European integration as a matter of intergovernmental mode of integration and 
utility, neo-functionalism as a matter of supranationalism and utility, and post-functionalism as a field 
of intergovernmental mode and value/ideational issues. 
 The most influential theory of liberal intergovernmentalism is that of Moravcsik (1993). It focuses 
on the interstate bargaining, and defines European Community/Union as a form of international 
organisation, “an international regime for policy co-ordination, the substantive and institutional 
development of which may be explained through the sequential analysis of national preference 
formation and intergovernmental strategic interaction” (Moravcsik 1993: 480). The focus of 
Moravcsik’s theory is the instrumental rationality of national governments and the centrality of 
national state preferences, where European institutions are reactive agents of intergovernmental 
decisions (Diez and Wiener 2009b; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 2012). 
The main competing theory is neo-functionalism, which has its roots in Haas (1958) and Lindberg 
(1963) studies, and the recent influential contribution by Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (1998). The core 
of this theory relies on the idea that European integration is a product of interdependence among 
transnational economic elites. When these elites (leaders, political parties, labour and industry 
associations) believe that pursuing their self-interest requires a delegation of power to supranational 
institutions, they put pressure on their national governments to enforce integration (Sandholtz and 
Stone Sweet 1998). The essential difference between this approach and intergovernmentalism is that 
European institutions (mainly the EU Commission, the European Court of Justice, and the European 
Central Bank) are themselves actors of integration, and thus they are objects of lobbying from 
transnational actors. Again, here the focus is on the self-interest of actors but seen as supranational 
processes of preference formations. 
The third strand of theorisation on European integration is the constructivist/post-functionalistic 
perspective. Following Risse (2009), this approach is not alternative to liberal intergovernmentalism 
or neo-functionalism, but it is a rather complementary account of why actors (governments as well 
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as societal groups and elites) deviate from pure instrumental rationality when dealing with issues of 
European integration. The role of normative discourse (ideas of integration) has emerged since the 
initial process of integration, where the community building project was debated among intellectuals 
and political leaders (e.g. Deutsch, Haas, Spinelli, and Jean Monnet). The neo-functionalist 
expectations that growing transnational interactions would have increased economic 
interdependence, as well as common identification (Haas 1958) with an imagined European 
community (Anderson 1991), underestimated the persistence of national identities. Hooghe and 
Marks (2009) in their post-functionalistic theory remark upon the role of exclusive (national) identity 
in driving opposition towards the EU, limiting the room of manoeuvre of governments and elites. 
The next paragraphs report in more details these theories, drawing extensively upon Diez and 
Wiener (2009b) and Jones (et al. 2009). These theories propose an account of how European 
integration proceeds concentrating on how governments and institutions take decisions, shedding 
light on some drivers of integration operating at the meso and macro-level. Indeed, from one side, 
European integration transcends the scope of individual actions, it is a matter of national executives, 
governing parties, or organised (trans)national groups. On the other side, individuals are voters, 
consumers, and workers, and their votes count for office-seeking politicians: it follows that citizen 
support towards the EU and EU governance enters the debate in case these issues are salient for the 
public opinion. These macro approaches configure a structure of actors’ preferences for EU support 
that may not correspond with those of EU citizens. For this reason, it is necessary to link the macro 
and meso with the micro level, as suggested by post-functionalists (Hooghe and Marks 2009). The 
concepts that connect these levels are those of ‘politicisation’ (de Wilde 2011; Grande et al. 2016), 
and ‘issue entrepreneurs’ (Hobolt and de Vries 2015). Grande and his colleagues (2016) - drawing 
upon Schattschneider (1975) - define politicisation as the transfer of societal conflicts into the party 
system, while Hobolt and de Vries maintain that “[i]ssue entrepreneurship refers to a strategy by 
which parties mobilize issues that have been largely ignored in party competition and adopt a policy 
position on the issue that is substantially different from the mainstream status quo” (Hobolt and de 
Vries 2015: 1161). 
1.1 Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
Liberal intergovernmentalism conceives European integration as “an international regime for policy 
co-ordination” (Moravcsik 1993: 480), which means that international relation paradigms are the 
most appropriate to study how and why supranational integration succeeds (Graziano and Vink 2007). 
In this theory, national governments are key actors of integration, since they first aggregate and 
articulate citizens’ preferences, and then they bargain with other governments to reach national 
interests (Pollack 2012). The two phases in this model need two separate sub-theories (Moravcsik 
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1993), a theory of intra-state preference aggregation (demand side), and one regarding interstate 
bargaining on the choice for supranational institutions (supply side).  
States are conceived as rational and unitary actors, which aim to maximise the national utility of 
integration (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009). The unitary assumption needs particular attention 
because there are different types of preferences at stake (e.g. economic, geopolitical, and normative 
values) and many societal groups, which may hold different positions (e.g. producers and consumers). 
Moravcsik (1993) argues that economic interests tend to predominate over geopolitical ones and that 
normative values play a minor role. At the same time, Moravcsik (1993) sustains that national 
governments manage to articulate the mixture of intra-state preferences coming from different 
societal groups, balancing diverging interests. The author maintains that the primary interest of 
national governments is to retain their position, and the possible electoral sanction from dissatisfied 
citizens holds governments accountable for their behaviour.  
However, what does this approach say about the structure of preferences for EU governance? 
Moravcsik (1993) maintains that state preferences for European integration are oriented towards 
managing globalisation, but the governments’ response may vary across policy issues and time, 
resulting in an incoherent set of preferences. For this reason, Moravcsik suggests looking at issue and 
time concrete preferences, rather than overarching ideological preferences. This means that support 
for EU governance is not consistent across policy domains (1). Moreover, according to liberal 
intergovernmentalist theory, national governments are willing to cooperate in an international regime, 
thus constraining their governance capacity, when this is the most effective way to cope with policy 
externalities generated by international interdependence (Pollack 2012). Negative policy externalities 
occur when policies of one state (i.e. trade barriers and air pollution) affect directly or indirectly 
another state’s community, economy or territory (Moravcsik 1993). Cooperation may reduce these 
externalities and increase the overall benefit, in a win-win logic. Hence, pooling sovereignty via 
majoritarian decision-making (in the Council), or delegating sovereignty to supranational institutions 
like Commission and the Court, is the way to provide credibility to mutual commitments (Pollack 
2012), but EU governance is only supported when is more efficient than national or sub-national 
governance (2). 
Finally, for this approach, national executives are the gate-keepers of access to EU politics (Börzel 
1999) since they mediate the demands coming from domestic groups. In times of growing global 
interdependence, societal groups face new challenges, raising political demands that often require 
supranational responses. In this scenario, European institutions are designed – and limited – to reduce 
externalities and to provide a common answer to national demands.  
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1.2 Neo-Functionalism 
Neo-functionalism is a theory initially elaborated by Haas (1958) and Lindberg (1963) to account for 
the first steps of European integration (European Coal and Steel Community, and European Economic 
Community) (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998). It is a theory of political integration within a specific 
region, which is the reason why national states decide to integrate and transfer decision-making power 
from national governments to the EU (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 2012). It assumes that integration 
is driven by growing international interdependence, and by the self-interest of national elites (e.g. 
parties and economic elites) who recognise that their political or economic goals can be pursued only 
via supranational actions and decisions (Haas 1958). National elites and groups may form cross-
national coalitions to press their national governments to establish supranational integration 
(Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998).  
Niemann and Schmitter (2009) maintain that the original theorization of the neo-functional 
account makes five assumptions: (1) Rational and self-interested actors look at supranational 
solutions to their national problems, and in the long run, driven by their interest, they will shift 
expectations and loyalties from the national arena towards the new political centre; (2) European 
institutions, once established, become agents of further integration; (3) Further integration mainly 
derives from marginal adjustments to the unintended consequences of former decisions; (4) European 
integration is not a zero-sum game but rather a positive sum game; (5) Further integration is a result 
of the interdependence of some policy domains, which leads to an automatic functional spillover from 
policy domain to another not yet integrated one. This spillover is not merely an increase of 
competencies in new sectors, but it is necessary to reach the initial policy purpose that would not be 
attained without further integration (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998).  
It follows that neo-functionalism, as liberal intergovernmentalism, believes that the growing 
international interdependence among national states drives support for EU governance (1), but this 
pressure for dealing with policy externalities automatically activates both the spillover effect and a 
shift of expectations and loyalties, resulting in a cross-policy support for EU governance (2). 
Therefore, neo-functionalists consider integration to be a process, not an outcome, and it proceeds 
with incremental power delegation (Niemann and Schmitter 2009). It is undoubted that ‘supranational 
governance’ – that is the EU’s capacity to govern policy fields, requiring members’ compliance 
towards its binding decision – has deepened and expanded over time (Grande et al. 2016, Börzel and 
Risse 2017). However, in Haas’ theorization (1958) spillover is an automatic process, leading to 
complete policy integration (Niemann and Schmitter 2009). A federal and supranational Europe 
would have become a reality due to automatic spillover.  
There are two remarkable critical reviews of Haas’ neo-functionalism. In one of them, Schmitter 
(2004, cit. in Niemann and Schmitter 2009) rejects the assumption of automatic spillover, adding four 
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alternative mechanisms of integration, and remarking that intergovernmental politics have not 
ultimately left room to supranational governance. Schmitter (2004, cit. in Niemann and Schmitter 
2009: 55) postulates the following mechanisms:  
 (1) 'spill-around'; the proliferation of functionally specialized independent, but strictly 
intergovernmental, institutions;   
(2) 'build-up', the concession by member states of greater authority to the supranational 
organization without expanding the scope of its mandate;  
(3) 'muddle-about', when national actors try to maintain regional cooperation without 
changing/adjusting institutions;  
(4) 'spillback', which denotes withdrawal from previous commitments by member states.  
Therefore, the set of national governments’ political answers is much more compounded than 
‘simple’ functional spillover (Niemann and Ioannou 2015): political decisions to increase or reduce 
supranational governance may be limited by national constraints, be they economic or normative (e.g. 
popular or parliamentary consensus). 
Finally, the second critical review comes from Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (1998). They propose 
to dismiss the assumption that interest-based integration would produce a shift of loyalty, 
expectations and political activities towards a new European centre (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 
1998): according to them, whether this happens or not, it should not be part of a theory based on 
actors’ instrumental rationality. Considered together, both Schmitter, and Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 
argue that national states are still at the core of the European politics, notwithstanding more than sixty 
years of European integration and the growing transnational interdependence produced by 
globalisation processes. 
1.3 Constructivism/Post-functionalism 
Ideas and value-based commitments are at the core of early attempts to establish a European 
community (Diez and Wiener 2009a; Schimmelfennig 2012). After the second world war, federalist 
movements mobilised for establishing European integration - basing their commitment on a political 
project of European unification - which culminated in 1954 in the proposals for a European Defence 
Community (EDC) and the European Political Community (EPC) (Burgess 2009; Schimmelfennig et 
al. 2015). After the demise of those projects, and the establishment of economic-driven integration, 
values lose their prominence in European integration theorization: for neo-functionalistic accounts, a 
sense of loyalty and community is simply a (positive) by-product of socialization to supranational 
institutions, whereas for liberal intergovernmentalism the role of ideas and values is at most a limiting 
factor in European integration, but only when values modify economic or geopolitical utility 
functions (Schimmelfennig 2012). According to Diez and Wiener (2009a), only in the 1990s 
16 
 
constructivist approaches gained relevance in the field of European studies, integrating prior 
European integration theories. 
Hooghe and Marks (2009) maintain that European governance may be a functional and rational 
response to global interdependence, but it often collides with a demand for self-rule coming from 
national (or regional) communities and anti-integration parties. The authors contest the overwhelming 
focus on economic factors of the other two theories, and the low importance given to public opinion. 
Hooghe and Marks (2009) see an upsurge of salience and political contestation of European 
integration after the enactment of the Maastricht treaty, which ended the permissive consensus that 
had sustained the European integration for four decades. They claim that EU is now a salient political 
issue both for parties and individuals, not just for (economic) elites. In a recent article (2017), they 
write about the emergence of a ‘transnational cleavage’ that structures the political space, merging 
European integration and immigration, resulting in a cultural as well as economic threat to the 
traditional way of life17 (Hooghe et al. 2017). They argue that the increase of competence delegated 
to European institutions after the Maastricht Treaty has led to a growing politicisation of the EU issue 
(De Vries 2010) mainly driven by radical right parties mobilising against immigration flux and 
sovereignty loss (2009). Hooghe and Marks (2009: 13) remark that “[c]onnections between national 
identity, cultural and economic insecurity and issues such as EU enlargement cannot be induced 
directly from experience, but have to be constructed”, and they are constructed by parties that mainly 
compete along the GAL/TAN dimension18 (Hooghe et al. 2017). TAN parties support a ‘spillback’ 
(see Schmitter 2004, cit. in Niemann and Schmitter 2009: 55) from prior European commitments that 
constrain states sovereignty and impose accepting free movement and immigration. GAL parties, on 
the contrary, are open and supportive of more integration and European solidarity.  
Post-functionalism is promising because it links three strands of research (European integration 
theory, party politics, and political sociology) into a coherent set of propositions that describes how 
politicisation (see de Wilde 2011; Grande et al. 2016) may affect integration decisions. Börzel and 
Risse (2017) argue that identity claims about community boundaries prevented an effective European 
response to the migrant crisis. They maintain that political decisions that affect identity and 
citizenship are highly salient for large parts of national societies, and “Eurosceptic populist parties 
and movements, particularly on the right […] have increasingly succeeded in mobilizing those 
citizens with exclusive national identities along the TAN/GAL cultural cleavage” (Börzel and Risse 
2017: 15). Börzel and Risse (2017) report that holders of exclusive identities have not increased 
                                                 
17 It is debatable whether their theorized “transnational cleavage” satisfies the requirements for being conceived a proper 
‘cleavage’ (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Bornschier 2009), since it misses specification regarding the links between self-
identification, social location, and interest representation.  
18 ‘GAL’ stands for Green-Alternative-Libertarian and ‘TAN’ for Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist (Hooghe et al. 
2002). 
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through time, but the central point is that politicisation has been strategically enacted (Grande et al. 
2016) by political entrepreneurs (Hobolt and De Vries 2016), who activated latent attitudes among 
societal segments (Börzel and Risse 2017).  Therefore, post-functionalism suggests that support for 
EU governance of the key actors of integration (national executives and governing parties) is 
contingent upon public opinion, which can vary across policy domains, and it constrains public 
choices limiting the room of manoeuvre of office-seeking politicians. Hence, from a post-functional 
perspective, TAN political parties are those who activate popular resentments against EU governance 
among citizens with exclusive national identities. For those with exclusive national identities in the 
context of high politicisation of the EU issue (De Vries 2010) support for EU governance is extremely 
unlikely. However, Cederman (2001) suggests that increasing EU governance modifies identity-
boundaries among national groups. The extent to which this happens varies across policy domains 
since some sectors are more associated with identity issues and have a greater impact on the way of 
life of citizens (i.e. welfare), with the result that the integration of these sectors is seen as more 
problematic. Therefore, opposition to further EU governance, as well as a preference for a ‘spillback’ 
from earlier competence transfer, is expected to: (1) vary across policy depending on the 
characteristics of the policy domains given their different association with identity issues; (2) be 
contingent upon the level of politicisation of the EU issue within national politics. 
The central point in the post-functional thesis, then, is the concept of politicisation. In liberal 
intergovernmentalist and neo-functionalist accounts, governments and elites are assumed to be 
unitary actors. On the contrary, post-functionalism deliberately dismisses the ‘unitary’ assumption, 
introducing party politics in the field of European integration theories. On this, a brief review of the 
literature on ‘politicisation’ is provided in the next section. 
2. Politicisation 
De Wilde defines the concept of politicisation as “an increase in polarization of opinions, interests or 
values and the extent to which they are publicly advanced towards the process of policy formulation 
within the EU” (de Wilde 2011: 560). A recent contribute by Grande and his colleagues (Grande et 
al. 2016) investigates politicisation of the EU issue (De Vries 2010) in six European countries during 
the period 1970-2016. Their theoretical puzzle is how and when politicisation occurs. They identified 
three sets of drivers of politicisation: conflicts over (a) national sovereignty, (b) national identity, and 
(c) transnational solidarity.  
Analysing the content of newspaper articles of the period 1970-2012, they argue that (a) 
“[c]onflicts over national sovereignty have been the most persistent in the history of European 
integration” (Grande et al. 2016: 13). A political conflict between supporters of supranational 
integration and defenders of national sovereignty recurred at every major step of integration and 
dramatically contributed to slowing down political integration (Grande et al. 2016). 
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(b) The enlargement of the EU to include Central and East European (CEE) countries contributed 
to increasing the perception of cultural differences within the European polity. Intra-EU migration 
raised the salience of the cultural dimension, turned into identity politics by many political parties, 
which claimed to preserve national specific identities (Grande et al. 2016). 
(c) The more European integration departs from the original policy co-ordination framework 
towards a semi-federal polity, expanding its governance and including new member states, the more 
EU politics is involved in redistributive policies. The divides between the so-called debtor counties 
and creditor countries and between net receivers and net givers of European funds summarise this 
inter-state conflict. Moreover, the recent sovereignty debt crisis exacerbates this divide (Grande 
2016). 
The authors (Grande et al. 2016) demonstrate that these conflicts come with three different 
justification strategies: a cultural discourse (benefit from cultural diversity vs negative consequences 
on national identity), an economic cost-benefit analysis of EU integration, and a ‘utilitarian’ 
pragmatic reasoning (non-economic consequences). The third is specially employed to underline the 
increasing (or reducing) efficacy in pursuing non-economic policy goals (i.e. environmental 
protection and borders control). 
However, rather than politicising current policy decisions, focusing on how EU institutions make 
use of their power, political parties extensively concentrate their commitments on polity or 
constitutional issues regarding terms of membership and EU competencies (see Braun et al. 2016, 
2017). For this reason, it is still debated whether politicisation leads towards something like a healthy 
political debate between different legitimate positions, as required by normative liberal democracy 
theory (Grande et al. 2016), or results in a negative turn for the system itself.  
Early neo-functionalist (e.g. Haas 1958; Lindberg 1963) believed that politicisation would have 
fostered support for more integration, due to societal pressure for a more efficient welfare provision. 
On the same side, yet with different reasons, there are the proponents of the democratic deficit thesis 
(e.g. Follesdal and Hix 2006; Hix 2008), which recommend politicisation of European elections as a 
solution for solving this deficit, arguing that any democracy is ‘substantial’ and not just ‘procedural’ 
if “there is open competition for executive office and over the direction of the policy agenda” (Hix 
2008: 8). The last attempt to positively politicise European politics may be found in the 2014 
European Parliamentary (EP) elections, where the major Eurogroups in the EP nominated their 
leading candidates for the European Commission presidency, thus personalising the campaign and 
strengthening the link between election results and executive formation (Schmitt and Teperoglou 
2015).  
On the other side, proponents of the post-functionalistic perspective (Hooghe and Marks 2009) 
argue that politicisation reduces the availability of political choices since national governments are 
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constrained by lack of EU legitimacy and support for a European choice. Politicisation of polity 
related issues, the main set of conflicts, seems to confirm that conflicts are still about the rules of the 
game (who decides what, and for whom) and less about the contents. Hooghe and Marks (2009) 
maintain that Eurosceptic parties drive politicisation, with these parties contesting the legitimacy or 
the ‘nature’ of the EU polity (de Wilde and Trenz 2012)19. 
Party based-Euroscepticism (Taggart 1998) has been the object of a growing literature. Usherwood 
and Startin (2013: 6) remark that there are four party-families that directly address the EU issue: (1) 
Single-issue pro-sovereignty parties; (2) radical right parties that merge anti-immigrant discourse and 
Euroscepticism; (3) extreme left-wing parties that oppose the neo-liberal market integration; and (4) 
mainstream parties, mostly from the right side, that criticize the present and future integration on 
issues like the EU budget, the future of the euro and further enlargement. Euroscepticism was a 
peripheral phenomenon, but now has spread into mainstream politics, at least since the 2009 EP 
elections (see Usherwood and Startin 2013; Leconte 2015).  
However, the meaning of the term Euroscepticism is still vague. The earliest studies in this field 
speak about support or opposition towards European integration, but since the Taggart’s seminal 
description of Euroscepticism as a “contingent or qualified opposition, as well as [… an] unqualified 
opposition to the process of European integration” (Taggart 1998: 366) this term have become 
popular. The work of Taggart (1998, see also Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004; Szczerbiak and Taggart 
2008a and 2008b) aim to analyse party-based Euroscepticism, and proposes a distinction between 
hard and soft Euroscepticism, where the hard type refers to a principled opposition to any idea of 
transferring powers to a supranational institution, and the soft type defines a qualified opposition to 
the current EU core policies or an aversion towards further extension of EU competencies (Szczerbiak 
and Taggart 2008a, 2008b).  
Flood and Usherwood (2005) propose to consider hard and soft Euroscepticism as two poles of a 
continuum, while Conti (2003) remarks the importance of also considering neutral and positive 
commitments in party attitudes towards the EU, including ‘no commitment’, ‘functional 
Europeanism’ (based on cost-benefit analysis), and ‘identity Europeanism’ (emotional commitment). 
Conti’s typology follows a path opened by Kopecky and Mudde (2002), who propose to combine two 
dimensions to identify party positions: Diffuse support - an approval of the general idea of European 
integration - and specific support for the EU’s current structure and for the planned future evolution 
of the European integration (Kopecky and Mudde 2002). 
As it is evident, research efforts are dedicated to map and understand party support or opposition 
towards the EU, in terms of their evaluation of EU political legitimacy as well as its efficacy. The 
                                                 
19 This mimic the conceptual division between regime support and policy support (see Hobolt e De Vries 2015). 
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more politicised EU legitimacy and efficacy are, the more these issues become a matter of mass 
politics. 
3. Discussion 
This chapter reviewed three macro theories of European integration: liberal intergovernmentalism, 
neo-functionalism, and post-functionalism. They provide accounts of why European integration 
occurs (or not occurs), and they do so defining how preferences for EU governance are structured: 
1. liberal intergovernmentalism (see Moravcsik 1993) stresses that each of the key actors of 
integration has an inconsistent set of preferences for EU governance since support depends 
upon intrinsic characteristics of the policy domains;  
2. neo-functionalism (see Haas 1958) maintains that actors’ support for EU governance cross-
cuts policy domains since functional spillover automatically produces further demand for 
integration of domains not yet integrated;  
3. post-functionalism (see Hooghe and Marks 2009) suggests that actors’ support for EU 
governance is contingent upon public opinion, which can vary across policy domains and 
constrains public choices limiting the room of manoeuvre of office-seeking politicians.  
These alternative structures of preferences are referred to collective actors (i.e. governments, actors, 
and organised elites) and not to individuals. However, they configure three models of support for EU 
governance that can easily be applied to individuals20: 
Model 1 (liberal intergovernmentalism) 
 support for EU governance varies across policy domains: support is not a unitary dimension 
that cross-cuts policy domains; 
 support for EU governance is influenced by characteristics of the policy domains: is more 
likely in domains characterised by policy externalities generated by international 
interdependence; 
Model 2 (neo-functionalism):  
 support for EU governance is a unitary dimension that cross-cuts policy domains; 
 support is not contingent upon characteristics of the policy domains since EU governance is 
always more effective than national or sub-national governance; 
Model 3 (post-functionalism):  
 support for EU governance varies across policy domains: support is not a unitary dimension 
that cross-cuts policy domains; 
 support for EU governance is contingent upon: 
                                                 
20 It follows that I assume each EU citizen has a set of (negative, neutral, or positive) preferences for EU governance. 
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o the characteristics of the policy domains given their different association with identity 
issues; 
o the politicisation of the EU issue within national politics. 
It follows that these three models can be compared with empirical findings to assess the structure of 
citizens support for EU governance. This is important because this form of EU support is an indicator 
of the degree of Europeanization (see Radaelli 2003) of citizen policy preferences. Since the ‘Single 
European Act’ (1986), the EU has acquired policy competences - formerly held by national states - 
that exceed economic regulations (see Alesina and Wacziarg 1999; Alesina et al. 2005; Magalhaes 
2012a, 2012b; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 2012), and this process has moved the European 
integration towards a political union. Yet, the more the EU moves away from being “an international 
regime for policy co-ordination” (Moravcsik 1993: 480) to become a political union, the more issues 
of political legitimacy (see Chapter 2) and democratic representation (see Follesdal and Hix 2006; 
Hix 2008) enters the debate. 
Moreover, post-functional accounts (see Hooghe and Marks 2009; Börzel and Risse 2017) 
emphasise that the current era of European integration is characterised by the so-called constraining 
dissensus regarding the European project. The legitimacy of the EU is questioned by Eurosceptics 
parties that mobilize citizens who are worried about globalization and Europeanization processes 
(Kriesi et al. 2012), and the effect of these Eurosceptic claims is that European integration has become 
a matter of mass-politics, a result of politicisation of the EU issue (Hooghe and Marks 2009; De Vries 
2010; Hooghe et al. 2017). In some cases, Eurosceptic parties endorse a complete withdrawal from 
the EU, while in others they campaign for a different form of integration, characterised by a downturn 
of supranational governance (Taggart 1998; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004; Szczerbiak and Taggart 
2008a, 2008b)21.  
To conclude, this dissertation studies citizen support for EU governance, but it does so with clear 
in mind that the concept of EU support is more complex than what presented in this chapter: it is 
composed of more dimensions - this work identifies four dimensions of EU support - and the one 
tapping citizen preferences for a EU level governance is only one of them. This issue is introduced 
and debated in the next chapter.  
 
 
  
                                                 
21 In the proceeding of this dissertation (Chapter 5), the influence of this politicisation on mass EU support is tested. 
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CHAPTER 2 - CONCEPTUALISING EU SUPPORT 
This chapter addresses the concept of support towards the European Union (EU support). In the 
Introduction is reported that the main goal of this dissertation is to study the Europeanization of 
citizen policy preferences - defined as a process that has altered the citizen support for a generic 
and/or specific EU governance. However, being in favour of EU policy governance is not the only 
form of political support that can be related to the EU. In fact, the concept of EU support can be better 
defined and understood when decomposed in its constitutive dimensions. It follows that this chapter 
surveys the literature on political legitimacy and system support to define theory as well as 
empirically grounded dimensions of EU support. Four dimensions are defined in Section 1: one 
related to the outputs of the EU system, called ‘Output legitimacy’, that indicates the perceived benefit 
of being a EU citizen; one that taps the legitimacy of EU governance and the scope of EU policy 
integration, labelled ‘EU governance legitimacy’; one that defines the strength of individual 
identification with the European political community22, named ‘European identification’; and the last 
one that corresponds to an evaluation of the EU democratic process, called ‘EU democracy’.  
Decomposing the concept of EU support in more defined dimensions is important since this has 
two implications: first, it allows differentiating among different forms of EU support that correspond 
to different ways of supporting the EU; and second, these different forms of EU support can indicate 
distinct pathways for the future development of the EU, since they show the perceived weak points 
of the current European integration. Section 2 defines the indicators of these four dimensions of EU 
support, drawing from the two data sources used in this dissertation: Eurobarometer data (European 
Commission 2017) and Intune project data (Cotta et al. 2009). Section 3 makes use of the available 
indicators included in Eurobarometer trend data23 to provide a longitudinal analysis of the long-term 
evolution of the four different forms of EU support. Using as proxies a limited set of indicators, it 
emerges a decline across time of two forms of EU support: ‘Output legitimacy’ (support as a matter 
of utility) and ‘EU democracy’ (support as political representation at the EU level). Whereas, the 
proxy variables for the dimensions of ‘EU governance legitimacy’ (support as a preference for EU 
policy governance) and ‘European identification’ (support as we-feeling) show, instead, greater 
stability across time. Yet, support for EU governance deeply varies across policy domains. In 
addition, for all the four dimensions of EU support, there is a remarkable cross-country variability. 
This chapter adopts a longitudinal perspective on the study of EU support, and it should be read in 
combination with the next chapter, where the empirical consistency of the four dimensions of EU 
support is tested. These two chapters together form the analytical toolkit used to study the concept of 
EU support. 
                                                 
22 See note 7 at page 4. 
23 See note 12 at page 6. 
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1. What the literature says 
The concept of EU support is strongly related to that of political legitimacy. Political legitimacy is a 
central concept in the debate about EU institutional structure and democratic process. On the one 
side, in the dispute between intergovernmental and supranational mode of governance, the issue of 
legitimacy is a normative debate about the power of technocratic bodies (EU Commission, ECB, and 
Court of Justice) over political institutions (the Council and the EP), and this also involves how 
citizens are represented via national governments and members of the European Parliament (MEP). 
Fuchs and Klingemann (2011) maintain that this normative debate taps what they label objective 
legitimacy: normative standards are elaborated, and once they are met, a political system is legitimate. 
On the other side, some approaches study the EU subjective legitimacy, that is the citizens’ belief that 
“it is right and proper for him to accept and obey the authorities and to abide by the requirements of 
the regime [… because] he sees these objects as conforming to his own moral principles, his own 
sense of what is right and proper in the political sphere.” (Easton 1965: 278). It is here that the concept 
of political support and that of political legitimacy overlaps. In the literature, there are two main 
conceptual frameworks of support and legitimacy for a political system: the Eastonian political 
system support, and Scharpf’s input-output legitimacy model (1999). 
It is hard to find a concept in the field of political science more employed than the Eastonian 
diffuse-specific support. From its seminal definition in 1965, it has been used for fifty years with 
several different operationalisations and refinements (e.g. Niedermayer and Westle 1995; Dalton 
1999; Norris 1999; Westle and Segatti 2016), and it is still the starting point for theorizing about 
system support. Following Easton (1975: 436) support is either a positive or negative attitude towards 
one of three political objects that compose any political system: (a) political community, (b) regime, 
and (c) authorities. Westle and Segatti (2016), adapting this framework to their study, define (a) 
political community as the citizens belonging to the same political entity and living together on a 
territory. Institutions within a political community constitute the political (b) regime, besides norms, 
values, rules and system of government. The third object of support defined by Easton is that of (c) 
political authorities, which encompasses both the power of authorities as defined by law and its use 
made by political incumbents.  
Political support is thus based on evaluations of the object, and, depending on how this process of 
assessment is conducted, two alternative modes of support are defined: specific, and diffuse support. 
Easton states that people distinguish between the object itself and how it is working in that moment, 
by the fact that it is embodied or ruled by a specific group of people in a certain period. He talks about 
specific support when the focus is about what an object is doing and producing, and of diffuse support, 
in case the focus is on what the object is or represents (Easton 1965, 1975). Quoting Easton, diffuse 
support is a “reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate 
24 
 
outputs to which they are opposed or the effects of which they see as damaging to their wants” (Easton 
1975: 444). Diffuse support is assumed to be independent of outputs and performances, at least in the 
short run (ibidem). Diffuse support is an underlying disposition, rather than an opinion on a specific 
policy outcome, and it is directed to regime and community, as well as political authorities. 
Conversely, Easton claims that specific support applies only to the political authorities, whose 
decisions are evaluated on the outcomes they produced.  
If specific support may be easily understood as the perceived rewards of short-term outputs (Fuchs 
and Klingemann 2011), diffuse support encompasses at least three sources of support: (a) Trust, (b) 
Legitimacy, and (c) Identification. Easton (1975) defines (a) Trust as a positive support for regime’s 
goals, rules and structure (in terms of arrangements of authority roles). It is a generalised evaluation 
of the performance of a regime in providing outcomes that are effective in pursuing regime’s goals 
(Fuchs and Klingemann 2011). Trust is mainly associated with the action of the authorities since 
Trust implies a deep confidence that the interests of the political community “would be attended to 
even if the authorities were exposed to little supervision or scrutiny.” (Easton 1975: 447) The central 
point in the eastonian framework is that Trust is an element of the system, not a property attached to 
any specific incumbent of an authority role. If the latter is the case, this support takes the form of a 
specific support for the performance of the incumbent. 
The second source of system support is (b) (subjective) Legitimacy, already introduced, as a deep-
rooted acceptance of the norms, procedures, and values of a regime, as well as of authoritative 
decisions of incumbents of political roles. As for political community, Legitimacy reflects agreement 
with the criteria for inclusion (and exclusion) in a polity (Easton 1975). As studies on social identity 
have undoubtedly demonstrated (see Huddy 2001 for a review), boundaries are necessary to start the 
process of (c) Identification in a political community, which is the last source of diffuse support 
described by Easton (1975). He deploys a broad definition of Identification, as a ‘sense of community’ 
and ‘we feeling’, both in terms of affective feelings and cognitive elements. An alternative version of 
this framework is the one proposed more than forty years ago by Lindberg and Scheingold (1970), 
who suggest talking about utilitarian and affective support, rather than specific and diffuse support, 
where utilitarian support is based on a cost-benefit analysis, and affective support represents an 
emotional response.  
Various scholars (e.g. Lubbers and Scheepers 2005; Sanders et al. 2012a, 2012b) that studies the 
legitimacy of the European Union make use of another conceptualisation introduced initially by Fritz 
Scharpf (1999). He conceptualises two types of system legitimacy: the first one is based on the outputs 
produced by the EU decision-making process, and the second one on the input side, namely citizens’ 
participation via elections, identification with the polity, and support for norms and values that sustain 
the institutional system. The lack of a truly European demos grounded on a common (European) 
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identity has been one of the main complications for complying with the normative requirement of 
input legitimacy (Scharpf 1999) besides institutional mechanism for translating citizens’ demands in 
policy outcome via representative actors (Hix 2008). The latter has been labelled the ‘democratic 
deficit’ and addressed recently with more politicisation of European elections and an increase in the 
power of European Parliament, whereas the former is still in need of successful strategies to cope 
with it. Recently, Schmidt (2013) integrated the model of input-output legitimacy including the so-
called ‘Throughput’ legitimacy, where she states that EU democratic process must respect some 
criteria of efficacy, accountability, transparency, inclusiveness and openness to be considered fully 
legitimate (Schmidt 2013). Her concept is similar to what Easton (1975) calls Trust in the system, 
and Fuchs and Klingemann (2011) call Effectiveness, although Schmidt’s account is normative 
(objective-legitimacy) while the others refer to citizen perceptions (subjective-legitimacy, in Fuchs 
and Klingemann (2011) terms).  
From these broad theorizations, an important number of studies address their empirical validity. 
Among them, Norris (1999) suggests considering the Eastonian diffuse-specific dichotomy as two 
poles of a continuum, where different dimensions of support can take place. Starting from the diffuse 
pole, she places (i) identification with and attachment towards the political community; (ii) support 
for principles of the EU regime; (iii) satisfaction with the policy process; (iv) confidence in regime 
institutions; and (v) support for political authorities. Fuchs and Klingemann (2011), and Dalton 
(2004) apply very similar conceptualisations, supported by empirical findings. Boomgarden and his 
colleagues (Boomgarden et al. 2011), analysing Dutch citizens, propose to distinguish between 
‘affection towards the EU’ from ‘identification with the European polity’ and to consider also a 
political dimension of support, that taps preference for Europeanizing policy decisions. They find the 
latter to be a distinct dimension from that of ‘general affection’, contrary to what Gabel (1998a) 
sustains in his influential study. Similarly, Lubbers and Scheepers (2005) - working with 
Eurobarometer data - demonstrated that instrumental assessments of EU membership and preferences 
for policy Europeanization are two distinct dimensions of support.  
Finally, the Intune series on elite and mass EU support (Sanders et al. 2012a, 2012b; Best et al. 
2012) uses a dimensional definition of EU attitudes drawn from Benhabib’s concept of ‘citizenship’ 
(Benhabib 2002). The authors define three dimensions of European citizenship: (1) Identity - the 
sense of belongingness towards Europe; (2) Representation - the extent to which the EU represents 
citizens’ preferences; (3) Scope of governance - the degree of support for a EU level policy 
governance of strategic policy domains.  
To clarify this, all these studies stress that support towards the EU is multidimensional, and it is 
misleading to concentrate on only one of them. Second, although there is no common framework of 
analysis, a minimal conceptualisation can be derived from these studies. This minimal definition 
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requires at least four dimensions: one related to the outputs of the EU system, labelled ‘Output 
legitimacy’; one concerning the scope of a European policy governance, labelled “EU governance 
legitimacy’; one regarding identification with the European political community, named ‘European 
identification’; and the last one that taps an evaluation of the EU democratic process, called ‘EU 
democracy’. 
Table 1 - Dimensions of EU support 
These four dimensions compose the concept of EU support but they should be considered 
independently since - in theory - each dimension is autonomous: in order to support the EU it is not 
necessary holding positive feelings/attitudes on every dimension, but at least on one of them. The 
relation among these dimensions and the concept of EU support is a family resemblance structure 
(Goertz 2005), where the logical “OR” defines the model. Hence, a formal modelling of this relation 
is the following:  
EU support = Output legitimacy or EU governance legitimacy or European identification or EU democracy. 
However, whether these four dimensions exist in citizen minds and whether they are really 
distinguished is a matter of empirical analysis, and not of theory.  
Finally, before proceeding with the operationalisation of these dimensions, it must be noted that 
this thesis uses a definition of the concept of ‘European identification’ that corresponds with the 
second of the three possible conceptualisations of political identity provided by Citrin and Sides 2004 
(see also Brewer 2001; Citrin et al. 2001): they maintain that political identity can be defined and 
measured 1) as the self-categorization as group member (a cognitive element), 2) as the strength of 
the attachment towards the group (an affective element), and 3) in terms of the meanings associated 
with group membership (a normative element). In this dissertation, the first and the third 
conceptualisations of political identity are considered, instead, as determinants of the strength of 
‘European identification’, and their effects will be assessed in chapters 4 and 6. 
 
            Author 
Dim. 
Easton Scharpf Norris Boomgarden 
et all. 
Lubbers & 
Scheepers 
Intune series 
Output legitimacy 
Specific 
support/Trust 
Output 
legitimacy 
- 
Utilitarianism 
and 
idealism 
Instrumental 
Euroscepticism 
Representation 
EU governance 
legitimacy 
Legitimacy 
Input 
legitimacy 
- Strengthening 
Political 
Euroscepticism 
Scope of 
governance 
European 
identification 
Political 
community 
Input 
legitimacy 
Political 
community 
Identity - Identity 
EU democracy Trust 
Output 
legitimacy 
Regime 
processes 
Performance - Representation 
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2. Defining indicators of the four dimensions of EU support 
The previous section concluded with a conceptual definition of EU support. This concept is unpacked 
in four theoretical dimensions that correspond to different forms of EU support: ‘Output legitimacy’ 
(EU support as benefit), ‘EU governance legitimacy’ (EU support as a preference for EU policy 
governance), ‘European identification’ (EU support as we-feeling), and ‘EU democracy’ (EU support 
as political representation).  
The current section reports the strategy used for measuring these four dimensions, defining specific 
indicators of these dimensions among those available in the datasets used in this work. The thesis 
makes use of three sources of data to analyse citizen EU support: individual-level survey data from 
the Intune 2009 project (Cotta et al. 2009) and from the Eurobarometer 86.2 (November 2016) 
(European Commission 2017), and time-series aggregate country-level data from the Eurobarometer 
website24 that pool together Eurobarometer survey data since early ’70 (Eurobarometer 86.2 is one of 
those surveys).  
However, most of the analyses in this dissertation are based on Intune 2009 data. This depends on 
the fact that many indicators, necessary to measure the four dimensions of EU support, are not 
available on Eurobarometer data, as it is evident looking at Table 2. This table displays the difference 
between the Intune and the Eurobarometer data (time-series and Eurobarometer 86.2 data) concerning 
the available indicators of the four dimensions. 
Table 2 - Operationalisation of EU support: Intune 2009 and Eurobarometer data 
Concept Indicator Intune 
2009 
Eurobarometer 
data 
Output legitimacy Overall EU membership evaluation x x 
National benefit from EU membership  x - 
Personal benefit from EU membership  x - 
EU governance legitimacy Unemployment policy x - 
Environmental policy x - 
Fighting crime policy x - 
Health care policy x - 
Agricultural policy x - 
Unified tax system policy x - 
Immigration policy x x 
Foreign policy x x 
European identification Attachment towards Europe x x 
Cognitive identification: psychological  centrality x - 
Cognitive identification: interdependence x - 
EU democracy Satisfaction with EU democracy x x 
Trust in the EU Commission x x 
Trust in the EU Parliament x x 
Trust in EU policy-makers x - 
                                                 
24 See note 11-12 at page 6. 
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‘Output legitimacy’ is a dimension that taps a cost-benefit analysis. With the Intune data, it is 
measured with three indicators: ‘Overall evaluation of country EU membership’, ‘Perceived national 
benefit derived from country EU membership’, and ‘Perceived personal benefit derived from country 
EU membership’25. Unfortunately, Eurobarometer data consistently measures only the first of these 
indicators across time, limiting the degree of comparability.  
‘EU governance legitimacy’ refers to the preference for a European policy governance. In the 
Intune dataset, there are eight indicators of this dimension, since each of them measures the 
respondents’ support for EU governance of a specific policy domain: ‘Unemployment’, 
‘Environmental’, ‘Fighting crime’, ‘Health care’, ‘Agricultural’, ‘Tax’, ‘Immigration’, and ‘Foreign’ 
policies. However, Eurobarometer data provide only comparable measurements of support for EU 
governance of ‘Immigration’ and ‘Foreign’ policies. 
As for the dimension of ‘European identification’ (support as a we-feeling) three indicators of this 
dimension are defined: ‘Degree of attachment towards Europe’, ‘Cognitive identification in terms of 
psychological centrality of being European’, and ‘Cognitive identification as perception of 
interdependence among Europeans’. All of them are included in the Intune data, while Eurobarometer 
data measure only the first one.  
The last dimension is ‘EU democracy’ (EU support as political representation), and it is measured 
with four indicators: ‘Satisfaction with EU democracy’, ‘Trust in the EU Parliament’, and ‘Trust in 
the EU Commission’, and ‘Trust in the EU policy-makers’. However, Eurobarometer data do not 
include a measure of the last indicator. 
 It is clear that the Intune dataset offers more choice and it allows a more ‘precise’ measurement. 
Eurobarometer data are used in Section 3 to assess the long-term variability of some indicators of EU 
support, albeit with some limitations due to the limited number of variables. In fact, it must be noted 
that EU support is a rather complex concept, and its measurement should be carefully operated. With 
more indicators per dimension, it is possible to reduce the impact of measurement errors, and the 
choice of this dissertation is to measure the four dimensions of EU support as latent dimensions, as 
carried out in the next chapter using the Intune 2009 data.  
3. Aggregate level analysis (Eurobarometer trend data) 
The Eurobarometer trend series is a reliable source of survey data on EU citizen attitudes. These data 
cover the last forty years and provide individual as well as aggregate level data. This section relies 
on aggregate country-level data from 2002 onwards to analyse long-term tendencies in EU support 
across European countries. The last time-point of this Eurobarometer series is November 2016 with 
the survey EB 86.2 (European Commission 2017), and all the variables of interest included in that 
                                                 
25 The wording of these survey questions is reported in Table 7 in Appendix B. 
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survey are also available for time span 2002-2003/2016 (see Table 2 at page 27). The following 
analyses make use of these variables as proxies to study the variability of the four dimensions of EU 
support across time. In detail, these variables are: ‘Overall EU membership evaluation’ (for ‘Output 
legitimacy’); support for ‘Immigration’ and ‘Foreign’ policies (for ‘EU governance legitimacy’); 
‘Attachment towards Europe’ (for ‘European identification’); ‘Satisfaction with EU democracy’, 
‘Trust in the EU Parliament’, and ‘Trust in the EU Commission’ (for ‘EU democracy’). In addition, 
there are some indicators of ‘EU governance legitimacy’ such as ‘Unemployment’, ‘Environmental’, 
‘Fighting crime’, ‘Health care’, and ‘Agricultural’ policies that are available in the Eurobarometer 
trend series, but their time-series data end in 2010-2011. Hence, for these indicators, the time span is 
2002/2010-2011.  
This longitudinal analysis shows the presence of an important cross-country variability in the 
levels of EU support (considering any of the four dimensions). Moreover, it shows a decline through 
time of two forms of EU support: ‘Output legitimacy’ (support as a matter of utility) and ‘EU 
democracy’ (support as political representation at the EU level). Whereas the proxy variables for the 
dimensions of ‘EU governance legitimacy’ (support as a preference for EU policy governance) and 
‘European identification’ (support as we-feeling) show, instead, greater stability. 
3.1 Output legitimacy 
At first, the European Union is a matter of benefit. The European project has been established to make 
European countries steadily recover from the ruins of the second world war. National states decided 
to agree on a common production of mineral resources, and gradually chose to integrate their separate 
national markets, and European integration has helped to preserve a peaceful relationship among 
national states. This peaceful relationship implies that EU country members are satisfied enough by 
the way European institutions manage common issues.  
According to Scharpf (1999), the legitimacy of the European Union resides mostly in its capacity 
to provide satisfying outcomes for its citizens. This is precisely what the concept-dimension of 
‘Output legitimacy’ represents. As a proxy, in the Eurobarometer trend data there is one question on 
the perceived benefit of being an EU member. The wording of this question had remained stable until 
2012 when it was changed. The original formulation (2002-2011) is: 
Q1: Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership of the EU is ...  
Answers: A good thing, A bad thing, or Neither good nor bad. 
From 2012 onwards, this question was revised and turned into a Likert-like scale, where respondents 
state their accordance with the proposed sentence: 
Q2: Please tell me whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree: (OUR COUNTRY) could better 
face the future outside the EU 
Answers: Totally Agree, Tend to Agree, Tend to Disagree, or Totally disagree. 
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To compare results coming from the two versions, a European aggregate net index per year is 
computed, subtracting the yearly average of anti-EU answers (Q1: ‘Bad thing’, or Q2: ‘Totally Agree’ 
and ‘Tend to Agree’) to that of pro-EU answers (Q1: ‘Good thing’, or Q2: ‘Totally disagree’ and 
‘Tend to Disagree’). The net index ranks from -1 (minimum output satisfaction) to +1 (maximum 
output satisfaction).  Figure 1 reports this European aggregate net index with the dashed line. 
Afterwards, country-level net indexes per year (same scale [-1,+1]) are calculated and plotted as black 
points. 
Figure 1 - Overall EU membership evaluation (good vs bad difference): source Eurobarometer data and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 
2009); Data rescaled without missing. 
 
Looking at the European average, it reaches its maximum in 2007, and steadily decreases through the 
crisis period, reaching its lowest values in 2013 and 2016. The big ‘X’ in 2009 data indicates the 
average net index for those fifteen countries26 that were surveyed in 2009 by the Intune research 
(Cotta et al. 2009). In this case, the net index is about 15 percentage points higher. Considering the 
black dots, which are the yearly country averages of each of the 28 EU member states, it is evident 
that there is an important variation in the country net index. The range of variation does not seem to 
change across time, and the difference between the minimum and the maximum value within every 
year is always the same (about 0.7). Table 3 reports the average net index for each country in four 
                                                 
26 See note 11 at page 6. 
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time-period (2002-2005; 2006-2009; 2010-2013; 2014-2017). It emerges that the decline of EU 
support across time is more evident in Cyprus, Czech Republic, Italy, and Slovenia. Even though 
there is a decrease of support also in the other countries, here the magnitude is greater. Moreover, 
although there is a variation across time, the countries in which EU support in 2002-2005 was higher 
(for instance Belgium and Germany) tend to maintain greater EU support, and vice-versa. 
Table 3 - Overall Evaluation of EU Membership. Source Eurobarometer data, and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
COUNTRY 2002-2005 2006-2009 2010-2013 2014-2017 
Austria + = = = 
Belgium ++ ++ ++ ++ 
Bulgaria   ++ ++ + 
Croatia     = = 
Cyprus ++ + = - 
Czech Republic ++ ++ = = 
Denmark ++ ++ ++ ++ 
Estonia ++ ++ ++ ++ 
Finland + + + ++ 
France ++ ++ ++ ++ 
Germany ++ ++ ++ ++ 
Greece ++ ++ + + 
Hungary ++ + + + 
Ireland ++ ++ ++ ++ 
Italy ++ ++ + = 
Latvia + + + + 
Lithuania ++ ++ ++ ++ 
Luxembourg ++ ++ ++ ++ 
Malta + ++ ++ ++ 
Netherlands ++ ++ ++ ++ 
Poland ++ ++ + + 
Portugal ++ ++ + + 
Romania   ++ ++ + 
Slovakia ++ ++ ++ ++ 
Slovenia ++ ++ + - 
Spain ++ ++ ++ ++ 
Sweden = ++ + ++ 
United Kingdom = = - - 
LEGEND: "++" indicates net index >= 0.3; "+" indicates >=0.15; "=" indicates = 0; "-" indicates <0; 
Therefore, from these figures, it is evident that the perceived ‘Output legitimacy’ of the EU highly 
vary from country to country, and that the succeeding European crises have decreased this form of 
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EU support if compared to the pre-crises peak in 2007, where no EU countries had a negative net 
index values27. 
3.2 EU governance legitimacy 
‘EU governance legitimacy’ is the counter side of ‘Output legitimacy’, since it taps the legitimacy of 
the power structure of the EU, which Scharpf calls Input legitimacy (Scharpf 1999). The more the 
EU moves towards a political union, the more it acquires policy prerogatives formerly held by 
national states (Alesina and Wacziarg 1999; Magalhaes 2012a, 2012b; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 
2012). It is a process that proceeds through waves of competence transfers, which coincide with the 
signing of new treaties.  
Currently, the EU has variegated policy competences. In some policy sectors, the EU has strong 
and exclusive powers (i.e. in monetary policy within Eurozone), while in others it has shared 
competencies with EU member states (i.e. agricultural policy), and only supporting competences in 
some areas (i.e. health protection). Hence, from an institutional perspective, the EU policy 
prerogatives are not equal across policy areas, but also citizen support for EU governance varies as 
well across sectors.  
In the Eurobarometer trend data, there are many questions on support for EU governance of 
specific policy sectors. Unfortunately, only for two policy sectors there are comparable data until 
2016: these are ‘Immigration’, and ‘Foreign’ policies. Whereas, for ‘Agricultural’, ‘Fighting crime’, 
‘Environmental’, ‘Health care’, and ‘Unemployment’ policies there are only data until 2010-2011, 
and they will be commented taking into account this limitation. 
For ‘Immigration’ policy, the question wording had remained stable from 2006 until 2011, and in 
2014 it was changed. In addition, between 2011 and 2014, as well as for the year 2009, there are no 
data. The original formulation (2006-2011) was: 
Q1: For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the 
(NATIONALITY) Government, or made jointly with the EU? Immigration policy. 
Answers: (NATIONALITY) Government, or Jointly with the EU. 
From 2014 onwards, this question was revised and respondents are requested to state their accordance 
with the proposed sentence: 
Q2: What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, 
whether you are for it or against it: ‘A common European policy on migration’ 
Answers: For, or Against. 
To partially fill the gap between missing years, Intune data on fifteen EU countries are used to 
measure 2009 support. The question wording is similar, but not exactly the same:  
                                                 
27 This means that before 2009 in every EU country there were more satisfied then unsatisfied people. 
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Q26: In most European countries today, political decisions are made at three different levels of 
government: at the regional level, at the national level, and at the level of the European Union. 
In your opinion who should be responsible for each of the following policy areas?  
 Immigration policy. 
Answers: Regional level, National level, or European Union level. 
To compare data, the answering options ‘Jointly with the EU’, ‘For (a common European policy on 
migration)’ and ‘European level’ are considered as a preference for EU governance. Figure 2 shows 
that most of the Europeans support EU integration of this policy sector (dashed line). The average 
support for a European governance of immigration has increased through time, from barely 60% of 
supporters in 2006 to more than 70% in 2016. The average support in the Intune 2009 dataset (fifteen 
EU countries) is about 10 percentage points smaller (big ‘X’ in 2009) than the yearly average in 2008 
and 2010, most likely due to different answering options proposed to respondents: in the Intune data 
a preference for EU governance means favouring an exclusive EU policy competence, while in EB 
data the pro-integration option is ‘Jointly with the EU’ – which does not mean exclusive EU 
competence in that policy sector.  
Moreover, at each time point, there is an important cross-country variation (Figure 2 black points), 
since the range of variation between the most and the least supportive country is constantly about 50-
60 percentage points (except in 2014 when it is 30 points).  
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Figure 2 Support for EU governance of Immigration policy: source Eurobarometer data and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009); Data 
rescaled without missing. 
The second policy domain with comparable data is ‘Foreign’ policy. In this case, the question wording 
has remained stable during years, and respondents are asked to state their agreement with this 
proposed sentence: 
Q1: What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, 
whether you are for it or against it: ‘A common foreign policy of all Member States of the EU’ 
Answers: For, or Against. 
As for ‘Immigration’ policy, to partially fill the lack of information for the year 2009, the Intune data 
are used:  
Q27 Thinking about the European Union over the next ten years or so, can you tell me whether 
you are in favour or against the following?  
 A single EU foreign policy toward outside countries. 
Answers: Strongly in favour, Somewhat in favour, Somewhat against, or Strongly against. 
Even in this case, support is rather high in most of the EU countries (Figure 3). The European average 
(dashed line) is between 70% and 80% in the time-period 2003-2016. The peak is in 2007, but after 
the upsurge of the economic and Eurozone crises it has continued to be higher than 70%. In 2009 the 
fifteen-country average is 74%. Yet, in all the time span the yearly variation across countries is 
remarkable (black dots), and the range of variation is about 40-50 percentage points.  
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Figure 3 Support for EU governance of Foreign policy: source Eurobarometer data and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009); Data 
rescaled without missing 
 
Overall, most of the European respondents are in favour of more EU governance of ‘Immigration’ 
and ‘Foreign’ policies. As for within-country variation, Table 4 summarises country trajectories 
across time for these two policy domains. To increase readability, data are aggregated in four time-
period (2002-2005; 2006-2009; 2010-2013; 2014-2016) and for each country is reported with the sign 
‘+’ when the country average support is greater than the European mean, and with the sign ‘-’ when 
it is smaller.  
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Table 4  - Support for Eu governance. Source Eurobarometer data, and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
COUNTRY POLICY 
DOMAIN 
2003-2005 2006-2009 2010-2013 2014-2016 
Austria 
Immigration   - - - 
Foreign policy - - - - 
Belgium 
Immigration   + + + 
Foreign policy + + + + 
Bulgaria 
Immigration   + + + 
Foreign policy + + + + 
Croatia 
Immigration   +   - 
Foreign policy + + - + 
Cyprus 
Immigration   + + + 
Foreign policy + + + + 
Czech Republic 
Immigration   + - - 
Foreign policy - - - - 
Denmark 
Immigration   - - - 
Foreign policy - - - - 
Estonia 
Immigration   - - - 
Foreign policy + + + + 
Finland 
Immigration   - - - 
Foreign policy - - - - 
France 
Immigration   + + + 
Foreign policy - - - - 
Germany 
Immigration   + + + 
Foreign policy + + + + 
Greece 
Immigration   - - + 
Foreign policy + + + + 
Hungary 
Immigration   + + - 
Foreign policy + + + - 
Ireland 
Immigration   - - + 
Foreign policy - - + + 
Italy 
Immigration   + + + 
Foreign policy + + + + 
Latvia 
Immigration   + + - 
Foreign policy + + + + 
Lithuania 
Immigration   + + + 
Foreign policy + + + + 
Luxembourg 
Immigration   - - + 
Foreign policy + + + + 
Malta 
Immigration   + + + 
Foreign policy - - - - 
Netherlands 
Immigration   + - + 
Foreign policy - - - - 
Poland 
Immigration   + + - 
Foreign policy + + + + 
Portugal 
Immigration   + + + 
Foreign policy + + - + 
Romania 
Immigration   + + + 
Foreign policy + + + + 
Slovakia 
Immigration   + + - 
Foreign policy + + + + 
Slovenia 
Immigration   + + = 
Foreign policy + + + + 
Spain 
Immigration   + + + 
Foreign policy + + + + 
Sweden 
Immigration   - - + 
Foreign policy - - - - 
UK 
Immigration   - - - 
Foreign policy - - - - 
LEGEND: "+" indicates percentage of support greater than European mean; "-" indicates percentage of support lower 
than European mean; "=" indicates percentage of support equals the European mean. 
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Overall, for both policy domains, those countries that were the most (or the least) supportive at the 
beginning of the surveyed period maintain their higher (or lower) level of support compared to the 
European mean. Some exceptions emerge for ‘Immigration’ policy. Eastern European countries 
(Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, and Poland) were among the highest supporters of 
common immigration policy in 2006-2009, but they have not increased their support with the same 
extent as the others did. For this reason, in the period 2014-2016 their support for EU immigration 
policy is lower than the European mean. On the other side, Greece, Luxemburg, and Sweden reach 
the group of the most supportive countries. 
A brief analysis of the other policy domains for which data coverage end in 2010/201128 
(‘Agricultural’, ‘Fighting Crime’, ‘Environmental’, ‘Health Care’, and ‘Unemployment’ policies) 
shows specific results. A common EU governance of ‘Environmental’ (Figure 4), ‘Fighting Crime’ 
(Figure 5), and ‘Agricultural’ policies (Figure 6) tend to be consistently supported by most of the 
respondents across time, although for ‘Fighting Crime’ and ‘Agricultural’ policies respondents are 
almost equally divided into supporters and rejecters of EU governance. In addition, as soon as the 
survey question is about supporting exclusive EU prerogatives (cf. Intune 200929), the percentage of 
supporters drops down below 50%. This means that for EU citizens sharing policy competencies is 
not the same as transferring policy prerogatives.  
                                                 
28 The question wording is the same as the one for Immigration policy, since it is drawn from the item battery. EB trend 
data cover the period (2003-2008, and the year 2010), and Intune data the year 2009.  
29 See previous note. 
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Figure 4 Support for EU governance of Environmental policy: source Eurobarometer data and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009); Data 
rescaled without missing 
 
Figure 5 Support for EU governance of Fighting Crime policy: source Eurobarometer data and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009); Data 
rescaled without missing 
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Figure 6 Support for EU governance of Agricultural policy: source Eurobarometer data and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009); Data 
rescaled without missing 
 
Furthermore, support for EU social policies like ‘Health Care’ (Figure 7), and ‘Unemployment’ 
policies (Figure 8) is far lower than in the other policy domains, since the majority tends to reject any 
shared or exclusive (in 2009) EU governance. This dissertation will return to this issue in Chapter 5, 
where the influence of policy-specific characteristics on support for their EU governance is addressed.  
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Figure 7 Support for EU governance of Health care policy: source Eurobarometer data and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009); Data 
rescaled without missing 
 
Figure 8 Support for EU governance of Unemployment policy: source Eurobarometer data and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009); Data 
rescaled without missing 
 
41 
 
From the analyses provided above, it emerges that support for EU policy governance does not vary 
intensely through time (except for ‘Immigration’ policy), but there is an important variation across 
countries and policies. When considering policy sectors like ‘Health care’, and ‘Unemployment’ 
policies European respondents are much less keen to legitimate EU governance, while the contrary is 
true for ‘Immigration’, ‘Foreign’, ‘Environmental’, ‘Fighting crime’, and ‘Agricultural’ policies. 
Finally, Europeans seems to prefer a joint-decision method rather than an exclusive EU governance. 
This shows that an intergovernmental system of EU governance is still preferred by European 
respondents over a supranational governance. 
3.3 European identification 
The third dimension of EU support involves the identity issue. The EU is a political system that, like 
any other, ultimately draws its legitimacy from citizen support. Earlier in the text, Input and Output 
legitimacy are argued to be the two pillars of EU public legitimacy. According to Scharpf (1999), to 
fulfil the normative requirement of Input legitimacy, Europeans should identify with the European 
community (see Section 1). Indeed, identification is a leading source of EU support: identity exerts 
its power driving a type of legitimacy that is (in the short term) detached from outputs (Easton 1965, 
1975).  
In the Eurobarometer trend data, there is only one indicator of the extent of identification with the 
European community30. This is the product of the following question (the same wording is used in 
the Intune survey):  
Q1 People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to 
their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to Europe  
Answers: Very attached, Fairly attached, Not very attached, Not at all attached 
On average, from 2003 onwards, more than 55% of the European citizens declare that they are ‘very’ 
or ‘fairly’ attached to Europe (Figure 9). The average European value is highly stable, and no evident 
trends emerge since the percentage in 2016 is nearly the same as in 2003. However, substantial cross-
country differences are still present. 
                                                 
30 See note 7 at page 4. 
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Figure 9 Attachment towards Europe: source Eurobarometer data and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009); Data rescaled without missing. 
Percentages as sum of ‘very’ and ‘fairly’ attached to Europe. 
 
Table 5 shows the average percentage of respondents ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ attached to Europe in two 
time-periods (2003-2009 and 2014-2016). The table is ordered from the highest to the smallest 
percentage in 2014-2016. It is evident that from the first to the second period there is some variability, 
but only for Italy one may speak about a dramatic decrease in the attachment. Indeed, less than 50% 
of Italian respondents report a strong level of attachment to Europe, almost reaching the level of 
Greeks. This indicates an emotional distance from the European community, and I suppose this result 
is influenced by the European crises (Eurozone and refugee crises), that profoundly affected Italian 
(and Greek) society in that period of time.   
  
43 
 
Table 5 - Attachment towards Europe. Source Eurobarometer data, and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
COUNTRY 2003-2009 2014-2016 
Luxembourg 79% 81% 
Sweden 76% 76% 
Denmark 73% 74% 
Hungary 87% 72% 
Poland 81% 68% 
Finland 69% 68% 
Germany 68% 67% 
Latvia 53% 67% 
Malta 60% 67% 
Romania 81% 62% 
Slovakia 65% 61% 
Belgium 69% 61% 
France 61% 60% 
Netherlands 50% 59% 
Spain 62% 57% 
Austria 64% 56% 
Czech Republic 74% 56% 
Ireland 65% 56% 
Lithuania 43% 55% 
Bulgaria 70% 54% 
Estonia 46% 52% 
Slovenia 69% 52% 
Croatia 58% 51% 
Portugal 60% 51% 
United Kingdom 47% 51% 
Italy 73% 46% 
Greece 47% 38% 
Cyprus 31% 31% 
LEGEND: Percentage of 'very' and 'fairly' attached. Sorted in 
descending order by 2014-2016 values. 
The definition of ‘European identification’ employed in this dissertation coincides with the strength 
of the attachment towards the European political community (see page 26). However, Eurobarometer 
data allow studying the long-term evolution of the percentage of those with ‘exclusive national 
identification’. Later in the dissertation, this self-categorisation as exclusive national (see Citrin and 
Sides 2004) is considered as a determinant of the extent of ‘we-feeling’ with other group members. 
To allow comparing the results coming from the two conceptualisations of ‘European identification’, 
Figure 10 below provides the percentages of those with ‘exclusive national identification’ in the 
period 2002/2016. As a methodological note, the question wording is the same both in Eurobarometer 
surveys and in the Intune survey, and 2009 data – missing in Eurobarometer trend data – are filled 
with the Intune data:  
Q2 In the near future, do you see yourself as…  
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Answers: (NATIONALITY) only, (NATIONALITY) and European, European and 
(NATIONALITY), European only. 
Figure 10 Exclusive national identification: source Eurobarometer data and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009); Data rescaled without 
missing. Percentage of only national identification. 
 
In line with the findings of Börzel and Risse (2017), holders of exclusive identities have not increased 
through time, and, on average, about 40% of European respondents consider themselves ‘exclusive’ 
nationals. However, these percentages deeply vary across countries, from the highest percentage of 
the UK to the lowest percentage of Luxemburg.  
3.4 EU democracy 
The concluding of this section presents indicators of attitudes towards the current European 
democracy. This dimension is theoretically distinguished from the others because it involves what 
Schmidt (2013) calls ‘Throughput’ legitimacy and Easton (1975) names ‘Trust’ in the political 
system. In the Eurobarometer data, three indicators tap this dimension: ‘Satisfaction with European 
democracy’, ‘Trust in the European Parliament’, and ‘Trust in the European Commission’: 
Q1 On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied 
with the way democracy works in the European Union? 
Answers: Very satisfied, Fairly satisfied, Not very satisfied, or Not at all satisfied. 
Q2 Please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it? 
 The European Parliament 
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Answers: Tend to trust, Tend not to trust. 
Q3 Please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it? 
 The European Commission 
Answers: Tend to trust, Tend not to trust. 
These questions have remained the same through time, but there are no data for ‘Satisfaction with the 
EU democracy’ in 2008 and 2009. As usual for the year 2009, this gap is filled with Intune data. The 
question wording and answering options are similar to those of Eurobarometer: 
Q25 On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in the European Union? 
Are you…? 
Answers: Very satisfied, Somewhat satisfied, Somewhat dissatisfied, or Very dissatisfied. 
Looking at Figure 11, the average percentage of Europeans that ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ endorse 
European democracy varies between 50 and 60 percent in the period 2002-2016, with higher values 
between 2005 and 2010. After 2010, this satisfaction has decreased by 10 percentage points, but - 
more important - is the fact that cross-country differences have increased. 
Figure 11 Satisfaction with the European democracy: source Eurobarometer data and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009); Data rescaled 
without missing. 
 
Moreover, when moving from a general assessment of EU democracy to a more specific evaluation 
of EU institutions, like the European Parliament (Figure 12) and the European Commission (Figure 
13), it clearly emerges that citizen trust in the fundamental institutions of the European political 
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system has steadily decreased after the year 2007. Indeed, in 2007 about 65% of Europeans trust these 
institutions, while in 2016 these percentages drop down to approximately 45%. The two figures show 
that the deterioration of trust has stopped in 2014, but is still far from the pre-crises value. The 
averages measured in 2009 by the Intune survey (big X in both figures) show good accordance with 
the Eurobarometer yearly mean31. 
Figure 12 Trust in the EU Parliament: source Eurobarometer data and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009); Data rescaled without 
missing. 
 
                                                 
31 Question wording is reported in Table 45a-b-c-d in Appendix B. In these figures, trusts from the Intune data are 
dichotomized as follows: answers 0-4 are considered as 0, answers 5-10 as 1. 
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Figure 13 Trust in the EU Commission: source Eurobarometer data and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009); Data rescaled without 
missing. 
 
Table 6 reports the country trajectories across years for these three variables. As for the overall 
evaluation of EU membership (see section 3.1), data are aggregated in four time-periods (2002-2005; 
2006-2009; 2010-2013; 2014-2016) and the sign ‘+’ indicates that the average country support is 
greater than the European mean, and the sign ‘-’ when it is smaller.  
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Table 6 - Indicators of EU democracy. Source Eurobarometer data, and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
COUNTRY VARIABLE 2003-2005 2006-2009 2010-2013 2014-2016 
Austria Satisfaction EU democracy - - - - 
Trust EU Commission - - - - 
Trust EU Parliament - - - - 
Belgium Satisfaction EU democracy + + + + 
Trust EU Commission + + + + 
Trust EU Parliament + + + + 
Bulgaria Satisfaction EU democracy + + + + 
Trust EU Commission + + + + 
Trust EU Parliament + + + + 
Croatia Satisfaction EU democracy - - - + 
Trust EU Commission - - - + 
Trust EU Parliament - - - + 
Cyprus Satisfaction EU democracy + + - - 
Trust EU Commission + + - - 
Trust EU Parliament + + - - 
Czech Republic Satisfaction EU democracy + + - - 
Trust EU Commission - - - - 
Trust EU Parliament - - - - 
Denmark Satisfaction EU democracy + + + + 
Trust EU Commission - - + + 
Trust EU Parliament - + + + 
Estonia Satisfaction EU democracy + + + + 
Trust EU Commission + + + + 
Trust EU Parliament + + + + 
Finland Satisfaction EU democracy - - - + 
Trust EU Commission - - + + 
Trust EU Parliament - - + + 
France Satisfaction EU democracy - - - - 
Trust EU Commission - - - - 
Trust EU Parliament - - - - 
Germany Satisfaction EU democracy - - - - 
Trust EU Commission - - - - 
Trust EU Parliament - - - - 
Greece Satisfaction EU democracy - - - - 
Trust EU Commission + - - - 
Trust EU Parliament + - - - 
Hungary Satisfaction EU democracy + + + - 
Trust EU Commission + + + + 
Trust EU Parliament + + + + 
Ireland Satisfaction EU democracy + + + + 
Trust EU Commission + + - + 
Trust EU Parliament + + - + 
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Italy Satisfaction EU democracy - + - - 
Trust EU Commission + + - - 
Trust EU Parliament + + - - 
Latvia Satisfaction EU democracy + + + + 
Trust EU Commission - - - + 
Trust EU Parliament - - - + 
Lithuania Satisfaction EU democracy + + + + 
Trust EU Commission + + + + 
Trust EU Parliament + + + + 
Luxembourg Satisfaction EU democracy + + + + 
Trust EU Commission + + + + 
Trust EU Parliament + + + + 
Malta Satisfaction EU democracy + + + + 
Trust EU Commission + + + + 
Trust EU Parliament + + + + 
Netherlands Satisfaction EU democracy - - - - 
Trust EU Commission - + + + 
Trust EU Parliament - - + + 
Poland Satisfaction EU democracy + + + + 
Trust EU Commission + + + + 
Trust EU Parliament + + + + 
Portugal Satisfaction EU democracy - - - - 
Trust EU Commission + + - - 
Trust EU Parliament + + - - 
Romania Satisfaction EU democracy + + + + 
Trust EU Commission + + + + 
Trust EU Parliament + + + + 
Slovakia Satisfaction EU democracy - - - - 
Trust EU Commission + + + - 
Trust EU Parliament + + + - 
Slovenia Satisfaction EU democracy + + - - 
Trust EU Commission + + - - 
Trust EU Parliament + - - - 
Spain Satisfaction EU democracy + + - - 
Trust EU Commission + + - - 
Trust EU Parliament + + - - 
Sweden Satisfaction EU democracy - - - - 
Trust EU Commission - - + + 
Trust EU Parliament - - + + 
United Kingdom Satisfaction EU democracy - - - - 
Trust EU Commission - - - - 
Trust EU Parliament - - - - 
LEGEND: "+" indicates a value greater than European mean; "-" indicates  a value lower than European mean; "=" 
indicates  a value equals European mean. 
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Most of the countries do not exhibit particular trends in their level of support. This means that they 
follow the general pattern of decrease shown in figures 11-12-13. However, some exceptions need to 
be commented. Most of the southern European countries (Cyprus, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) and also 
Slovenia decreased their satisfaction and trust in European institutions more than the other European 
countries. Indeed, before 2010 the levels of support were greater than the European mean, but after 
that year distrust and dissatisfaction started to increase. Finland and Sweden, instead, begin to register 
higher levels of support from 2010, reaching the group of most supportive countries. 
3.5 Drawing conclusions from longitudinal aggregate data 
Overall, this overview of the long-term evolution helps in understanding the broad context of this 
analysis, and some elements need to be commented. First, indicators of ‘Output legitimacy’, and ‘EU 
democracy’ decline through time much more than indicators of ‘EU governance legitimacy’, and 
‘European identification’. The reason for this difference depends on the fact the first two are much 
more linked to both the representation of political interest and the results provided by the European 
system of governance, two aspects profoundly affected by the European crises. Indeed, citizen 
expectation in time of crisis may not fit with political answers (Caiani and Guerra 2017). Second, 
there is an important cross-country variability. European countries exhibit different levels of EU 
support, and some countries show a steeper decrease in their support after the begin of the economic 
crisis in 2008-2009 (mostly southern and eastern European countries). Notably, the decline of a 
utility-based support (‘Output legitimacy’) is more prominent in Cyprus, Czech Republic, Italy, and 
Slovenia, whereas a form of support grounded in political representation (‘EU democracy’) deeply 
decreases in southern European countries (Cyprus, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). As already reported, 
attachment to Europe (‘European identification’) remains everywhere rather stable, except in Italy 
where it dramatically drops down after 2009. Lastly, support for EU governance is contingent upon 
what policy domains one considers. Indeed, European respondents report different ideas when it 
comes to supporting the EU integration of specific policy sectors. They favour EU governance of 
‘Immigration’ and ‘Foreign’ policies, and recent data show that support for EU governance of these 
policy domains was not negatively influenced by the economic and refugee crises. However, eastern 
European countries exhibit lower level of support for EU governance of ‘Immigration’ and ‘Foreign’ 
policies, even though the majority of their citizens still prefer the EU level governance in these fields.  
Finally, although data coverage ends in 2010-2011, it emerges that European respondents are far 
less likely to support EU governance of social policies (‘Unemployment’ and ‘Health care’ policies), 
compared to other sectors like ‘Agriculture’, ‘Environment’, and ‘Fighting crime’. These results 
support the idea that the characteristics of the policy domain profoundly influence support for EU 
governance (see Chapter 5 for an empirical test of this hypothesis), suggesting that the first and the 
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third model of EU support introduced in Chapter 1 (see page 20) may well represent the structure of 
support. 
This concludes the overview of the longitudinal data provided by the Eurobarometer surveys. In 
the next chapter, using the Intune 2009 data, the latent structure of individual attitudes towards the 
EU is measured, assessing whether theorized conceptual dimensions result in distinguished empirical 
dimensions that fit the theoretical framework and that are invariant across countries. This means 
testing whether the different components of the concepts are merely the product of a single latent 
preference for a EU level politics, or, instead, each dimension has its own consistency. Anticipating 
the results, analyses demonstrate that the four dimensions are invariant across European countries, 
meaning that European respondents distinguish the same different forms of EU support. 
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CHAPTER 3 MEASURING FOUR LATENT DIMENSIONS OF EU SUPPORT 
The previous chapter introduced the conceptualisation of the four dimensions of EU support, and it 
presented long-term tendencies of some indicators of these dimensions. However, an aggregate level 
analysis cannot tell whether this set of items tapping attitudes towards the EU does measure different 
dimensions of EU support. To do this is necessary to look at individual-level data. Indeed, up to here 
the dimensionality of the concept is only sustained by referring to earlier theoretical or empirical 
studies (see Chapter 2 Section 1).  
This chapter, instead, analyses the structure of individual-level attitudes using latent variable 
modelling (see Bollen and Long 1993). This approach is helpful to measure complex concepts like 
that of EU support since latent modelling makes use of more indicators per dimension to reduce the 
impact of measurement errors, reaching a more ‘precise’ measurement of the multidimensional 
concept of EU support. Hence, two hypotheses are tested: 1) that the four dimension of EU support 
are empirically distinct; 2) that their measurement is invariant across countries. This second issue is 
important because the lack of measurement invariance does not allow comparability of measures 
across countries since the same dimension would be differently measured in each country.  
To address these issues, Intune data referring to the year 2009 are used, and Table 7 reports the 
indicators - available in this dataset - that are employed to measure the dimensions of EU support.   
Table 7 - Operationalisation of EU support 2009 
Concept Indicator Intune 
2009 
Output legitimacy Overall EU membership evaluation x 
National benefit from EU membership  x 
Personal benefit from EU membership  x 
EU governance legitimacy Unemployment policy x 
Environmental policy x 
Fighting crime policy x 
Health care policy x 
Agricultural policy x 
Unified tax system policy x 
Immigration policy x 
Foreign policy x 
European identification Attachment towards Europe x 
Cognitive identification: psychological  centrality x 
Cognitive identification: interdependence x 
EU democracy Satisfaction with EU democracy x 
Trust in the EU Commission x 
Trust in the EU Parliament x 
Trust in EU policy-makers x 
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Each indicator corresponds to one survey question, and some of them have already been presented in 
the previous chapter32. There are still a few indicators for which it has not been reported the relative 
survey question yet. They are, respectively, ‘National benefit from the EU membership’, ‘Personal 
benefit from EU membership’, ‘A unified tax system for the EU’, ‘Cognitive identification: 
psychological centrality’, ‘Cognitive identification: interdependence’, ‘Trust in the EU Commission’, 
‘Trust in the EU Parliament’, and ‘Trust in EU policy-makers’. The wording of all these survey 
questions can be found in Table 45a-b-c-d in Appendix B, while Table 8 displays how the variables 
are measured and, if necessary, recoded from original values. The range of variation of each variable 
is ‘0-1’. Missing data are excluded from the analysis, except for ‘National’ and ‘Personal benefit from 
EU membership’, where the answer ‘Don’t know’ is considered as a neutral position between the two 
poles, mimicking in this way the measurement strategy - already in the original coding - for the 
‘Overall EU membership evaluation’. Items regarding policy competences are dichotomized in two 
categories: ‘European’ vs ‘National or sub-national’ level33. 
In order to empirically measure the components of EU support, I employ a strategy that consists 
of using, in sequence, two different statistical techniques to assess a theorized data latent structure: 
first Principal Component Factor Analysis (PCFA), and then Multi-Group Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis (MGCFA). Moreover, Appendix A reports two additional analyses performed with Item 
Response Theory (IRT), and Latent Class Factor Analysis (LCFA). These four techniques differ from 
each other in their assumption about the nature of the data to which they are applied, as well as for 
their statistical procedures, their outcomes, and their analytical purpose. Each of them has some pros 
that make it prefers to the other, but also some cons that limit their application (Table 40 in Appendix 
A summarises these features).  
PCFA is the most used exploratory method for identifying dimensions that explain the associations 
among a set of variables. It is widely employed because its use is rather straightforward, its results 
are easy to be interpreted, and sociological literature provides acknowledged rules of thumb for 
assessing dimensionality and factor meaning. However, the simplicity of this technique contrasts with 
its limit. First, it considers every variable as a perfect indicator of these dimensions: it means that 
there is not an error term associated with each indicator. Second, PCFA is not a suitable method for 
testing confirmatory factor models (each variable measures all the dimensions), nor for assessing the 
invariance of a measurement model across groups. Third, it assumes that indicators and latent 
factor(s) are continuous, and biased outcomes may result when this assumption is not respected. To 
                                                 
32 They are ‘Overall EU membership evaluation’, ‘Unemployment policy’, ‘Environmental policy’, ‘Fighting crime 
policy’, ‘Health care policy’, ‘Agricultural policy’, ‘Immigration policy’, ‘Foreign policy’, ‘Attachment towards 
Europe’, and ‘Satisfaction with EU democracy’. 
33 Table 46a-b-c-d in Appendix B reports country averages for all the indicators. 
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overcome the first two issues (measuring proper latent dimensions, and testing a confirmatory model 
as well as assessing the measurement equivalence across countries, it is necessary to use MGCFA. 
Table 8 - Descriptive statistics indicators of EU support. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
Output legitimacy 
Indicator-variable Coding Mean (SD) N. Cases N. Missing 
Overall EU membership evaluation (Q7a) 
0=Bad thing; .5=Neither good 
nor bad; 1=Good thing 
.77 (.37) 14705 385 
National benefit from EU membership 
(Q8a) 
0=Has not benefited; 
.5=Neutral; 1=Has benefited; 
.73 (.43) 15050 40 
Personal benefit from EU membership 
(Q9a) 
0=Have not benefited; 
.5=Neutral; 1=Have 
benefited; 
.51 (.48) 15061 29 
EU governance legitimacy 
Indicator-variable Coding Mean (SD) N. Cases N. Missing 
Unemployment (Q26a_1) 
0=National or sub-national 
level; 1=European level 
.27 (.44) 13974 1116 
Immigration policy (Q26a_2) .47 (.5) 13922 1168 
Environmental policy (Q26a_3) .48 (.5) 13803 1287 
Fight against crime (Q26a_4) 0.41 (.49) 13797 1293 
Health care policy (Q26a_5) 0.2 (.4) 14174 916 
Agricultural policy (Q26a_6) 0.3 (.46) 13973 1117 
A unified tax system for the EU (Q27_1) 
0=Strongly+Somewhat 
against; 
1=Strongly+Somewhat in 
favour 
0.61 (.49) 13582 1508 
Common foreign policy (Q27_3) 
0=Strongly+Somewhat 
against; 
1=Strongly+Somewhat in 
favour 
0.77 (.42) 13683 1407 
European identification 
Indicator-variable Coding Mean (SD) N. Cases N. Missing 
Attachment towards Europe (Q11_4) 
0=Not at all; .33= Not very; 
.66= Fairly; 1=Very attached; 
.59 (.3) 14857 233 
Cognitive identification: psychological 
centrality (Q10) 
0=Not at all; .33= Not very 
much; .66= Somewhat; 1=A 
great deal; 
.47 (.33) 14785 305 
Cognitive identification: interdependence 
(Q17) 
0=Not at all; .33= Not very 
much; .66= Somewhat; 1=A 
great deal; 
.67 (.28) 14761 329 
EU democracy 
Indicator-variable Coding Mean (SD) N. Cases N. Missing 
Satisfaction with EU democracy (Q25) 
0=Very dissatisfied; 
.33=Somewhat dissatisfied; 
0.66=Somewhat satisfied; 
1=Very satisfied; 
.53 (.24) 14088 1002 
Trust in EU Parliament (Q5_2) Scale of trust from 0='No 
trust' to 1='Full trust' 
.48 (.25) 14114 976 
Trust in EU Commission (Q5_4) .48 (.25) 13792 1298 
Trust in EU policy-makers (Q24_3) 
0=Strongly disagree; .33= 
Somewhat disagree; .66= 
Somewhat agree; 1=Strongly 
agree; 
.59 (.32) 13921 1169 
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MGCFA still assumes continuous variables and factors, but it has the advantage to be easy to run 
and interpret, providing widely recognised statistical goodness of fit indexes of the latent structure 
stability and its invariance. Despite its widespread employment in socio-political research, a recent 
simulation-study (van der Eijk and Rose 2015) suggests that Factor Analysis often over-produces 
latent dimensions. For this reason, in Appendix A the result of MGCFA is the object of further 
validation using a parametric IRT model, and a nonparametric IRT model such as LCFA. These 
methods handle any type of indicator variables, then not assuming continuous indicators. They 
estimate, respective, continuous latent dimensions (IRT), and ordinal latent dimensions (LCFA). 
However, they are computationally expensive, and current statistical software limit their 
application to a few latent factors. For this reason, given that the emphasis of this dissertation is on 
‘EU governance legitimacy’, only the empirical division between this dimension and the one of 
‘Output legitimacy’ is examined with IRT and LCFA techniques. These analyses confirm MGCFA 
results, further corroborating Scharpf’s (1999) input-output legitimacy model. 
1 Principal component factor analysis 
A principal component factor analysis is an exploratory technique that analyses how the variance and 
covariance matrix of a set of items can be explained by a lower number of factors (Jolliffe 2002, 
Acock 2013). Table 9 displays the results of a PCFA with oblimin rotation using the pooled dataset 
of fifteen countries34.  
Table 9 - PCFA with oblimin rotation using the pooled dataset. Data source Intune 2009 (cotta et al. 2009) 
ITEM F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 
Overall EU membership evaluation  0.775     
National benefit from EU membership   0.873     
Personal benefit from EU membership   0.774     
Unemployment policy  0.675    
Immigration policy   0.584    
Environmental policy   0.667    
Fighting crime policy  0.669    
Health care policy   0.677    
Agricultural policy   0.655    
A unified tax system for the EU      0.801 
Foreign policy      0.746 
Attachment towards Europe    0.506   
Cognitive identification: psychological  centrality    0.601   
Cognitive identification: interdependence    0.810   
Satisfaction with EU democracy     0.496  
Trust in the EU Parliament     0.906  
Trust in the EU Commission     0.901  
Trust in EU policy-makers     0.615  
 
                                                 
34 PCFAs are performed using SPSS 24, with PAIRWISE deletion. Syntax is reported in Appendix C. 
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Total explained variance 
Component 
Eigenvalue 
Total % of variance 
F1 4.326 24.036 
F2 1.111 6.174 
F3 1.187 6.594 
F4 2.372 13.178 
F5 1.050 5.834 
Five factors have eigenvalue greater than 1, which is commonly accepted as a minimal threshold for 
analytical importance (Acock 2013). Four of them correspond to the theoretical dimensions, but a 
fifth factor emerges because the items corresponding to support for a ‘Unified tax system’ and for a 
common ‘Foreign policy’ are not explained by the same factor that explains the variation of the other 
policy areas (F2). This result does not surprise much for two orders of reasons: first, a similar analysis 
using PCFA with Intune 2009 data is already presented by Sanders and his colleagues (Sanders et al. 
2012b), who report analogous results; second, when looking at levels of support for EU governance 
of the different policy sectors (Figure 14), it is evident that these two items clearly differ from the 
others. Indeed, 77% of respondents endorse a common ‘Foreign policy’, and 61% support a ‘Unified 
tax system’35. On the contrary, EU governance of ‘Environmental’, ‘Immigration’, and ‘Fighting 
crime’ policies is approved by less than 50% of respondents, and that of ‘Agricultural’, 
‘Unemployment’, and ‘Health care’ policies by 30% or less. 
Figure 14 - Support for EU governance of specific policy domains. Source Intune 2009 (cotta et al. 2009) 
 
                                                 
35 In every country in the dataset the highest support for integration is found for ‘Foreign policy’, and the second highest 
is ‘Unified tax system’, except in Denmark where it is ‘Agriculture’. 
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Taken into account these findings, dropping these items away from the analysis and running again a 
PCFA, the theorized four dimensions of EU support emerge as expected (Table 10 below). The 
correlation among the factors is provided in Table 11: F1 (‘Output legitimacy’) is very weakly 
correlated with F2 (‘EU governance legitimacy’), highly correlated with F4 (‘EU democracy’), and 
modestly correlated with F3 (‘European identification’); F2 (‘EU governance legitimacy’) is very 
weakly correlated with any other factor; and F4 (‘EU democracy’) and F3 (‘European identification’) 
are modestly correlated between each other.  
Table 10 - PCFA with oblimin rotation using the pooled dataset - 6 policy items. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
ITEM F1 F2 F3 F4 
Overall EU membership evaluation  0.798    
National benefit from EU membership   0.881    
Personal benefit from EU membership   0.759    
Unemployment policy  0.683   
Immigration policy   0.614   
Environmental policy   0.653   
Fighting crime policy  0.685   
Health care policy   0.674   
Agricultural policy   0.643   
Attachment towards Europe    0.519  
Cognitive identification: psychological  centrality    0.601  
Cognitive identification: interdependence    0.811  
Satisfaction with EU democracy     0.506 
Trust in the EU Parliament     0.902 
Trust in the EU Commission     0.898 
Trust in EU policy-makers     0.631 
 
Total explained variance 
Component 
Eigenvalue 
Total % of variance 
F1 4.141 25.882 
F2 1.051 6.567 
F3 1.174 7.337 
F4 2.351 14.696 
 
Table 11 - Components correlation. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
COMPONENTS CORRELATION 
Component F1 F2 F3 F4 
1 1 0.176 0.461 0.239 
2 - 1 0.131 0.129 
3 - - 1 0.216 
4 - - - 1 
All the correlations are significant: p<= 0.01 
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Finally, the exploratory nature of PCFA does not provide any further information regarding how the 
items are related to the latent factor, since no constraints are posed to the relationship between 
indicators and latent components. Indeed, every item is a perfect indicator (no error term associated 
with each item) of all the dimensions (each item measures all the dimensions). In addition, it is 
impossible to assess measurement invariance across countries since PCFA implicitly assumes it 
without testing it: for all these tasks is necessary to move to MGCFA. 
2 Multi-group Confirmatory Factor Analysis (MGCFA) 
Confirmatory Factor Analyses (CFA) is a technique that allows testing the presence of a latent 
structure behind individual responses to survey questions (Davidov et al. 2012; Acock 2013): these 
items may be indicators of one or more latent dimensions that explains the associations among survey 
items. Compared with PCFA, CFA is a more flexible tool, since some items may tap some and not 
all latent dimensions, and with less assumptions, since PCFA assumes that each item is a perfect 
indicator of the latent factors (Acock 2013). This means that each indicator is associated to one or 
more dimensions, and that each indicator has a specific error term, which represents the item 
uniqueness, the part of variance that is not explained by latent factors. 
Multi-group CFA (MGCFA) is an extension of CFA, helpful when different cultural groups or 
countries are pooled into a single sample. When this occurs, it is necessary testing the measurement 
invariance across countries, otherwise the latent measuring might lead to biased results (Davidov et 
al. 2012). In this case, having biased results means that the relationships between the four dimensions 
of EU support and their indicators are assumed to be the same in every country when this is not true. 
If this happens, one might misinterpret, for instance, that the latent dimension of ‘Output legitimacy’ 
has the same meaning in every country.  
For this reason, Davidov and his colleagues (Davidov et al. 2012) recommend testing whether the 
association between items and factors is the same across countries. Three types of invariance or 
equivalence (in Davidov and his colleagues’ terms) may be established, and they are hierarchically 
ordered: Scalar, Metric, and Configural equivalence. Scalar equivalence means that the latent 
dimensions have the same meaning in every country, and it requires the same relationships item-
factor in every country, which means that the same set of items indicates the same factors, and item 
intercepts, as well as factor loadings, are invariant across countries. Metric equivalence means that 
respondents interpret the items in the same way, but differences among the respondents are partially 
explained by their country’s membership that consistently influences their answers. Metric 
equivalence requires only the item-factor configuration and the factor loadings to be equal, while item 
intercepts may differ across countries. Lastly, Configural equivalence requires only the same item-
factor configuration to be established, and this indicates that the same dimensional structure is 
present, but it does not guarantee that respondents interpret the items consistently across countries. 
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Therefore, Table 12 below reports the design of the final measuring model, where ‘Foreign policy’ 
and ‘Unified tax system’ are excluded from the model, following the results of PCFA. Figure 15 
visually displays it, and in the figure the double-headed arrows between F1-F3; F1-F4, and F3-F4 
mean that correlation between these latent factors is freely estimated. Since the result of PCFA shows 
a very low correlation between F2-‘EU governance legitimacy’ and the other factors, correlation is 
not explicitly modelled36.  
Table 12 - Measuring model of EU support 
CONCEPTS INDICATOR 
F1-Output legitimacy Overall EU membership evaluation  
National benefit from EU membership   
Personal benefit from EU membership   
F2-EU governance legitimacy Unemployment policy  
Immigration policy  
Environmental policy  
Fight against crime  
Health care policy  
Agricultural policy  
F3-European identification Attachment towards Europe  
Cognitive identification: psychological  centrality  
Cognitive identification: interdependence  
F4-EU democracy Satisfaction with EU democracy  
Trust in EU Parliament  
Trust in EU Commission  
Trust in EU policy-makers  
                                                 
36 I have tested also a model where correlation among all the latent factors is estimated: despite model fit improves, 
substantial results do not change. Moreover, when computing latent factor scores of the same latent dimension measured 
with these two models, the measure of associations is 0.99 (Pearson correlation coefficient).  
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Figure 15 Measurement Model EU Support (MGCFA). 
Using this model-configuration, four models are tested37: the first one is simply a CFA using the 
pooled dataset of fifteen EU countries38; the second one is a MGCFA with configural equivalence; 
the third one is a MGCFA with metric equivalence; and the fourth one is a MGCFA with scalar 
equivalence. Table 13 reports the results of these models. Except for the scalar equivalence model, 
the other models have acceptable goodness of fit indexes: CFI >= 0.90, RMSEA <=0.08, and SRMR 
<=0.08 (see Hu and Bentler 1999; Acock 2013). Among these models with acceptable indexes, the 
metric equivalence model turns out to be the best model, namely the one with the lowest loss of 
information, according to the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 39.  
Table 13 - Fit indexes models of Figure 15 (MGCFA). Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
MODEL X2 CFI RMSEA SRMR BIC DF 
POOLED 2916 0.94 0.05 0.07 93230 101 
CONFIGURAL 4860 0.92 0.06 0.08 87880 1515 
METRIC 5928 0.9 0.06 0.08 87397 1683 
SCALAR 12192 0.77 0.09 0.09 91593 1907 
Metric equivalence is fundamental because this result corroborates the hypotheses that the four 
dimension of EU support are empirically distinct and that their measurement is sufficiently invariant 
                                                 
37 MGCFAs are performed using STATA 14, with the SEM command (syntax in Appendix C) and listwise deletion. 
Correlation matrix of the sixteen indicators is reported in Table 48 in Appendix B.  
38 Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, France, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Estonia, the UK, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, and Bulgaria 
39 Group-level fit statistics are reported in Table 49 in Appendix B. 
61 
 
across countries: this allows using latent scores as independent or dependent variables as performed 
in chapters 4-5-6.  
Metric equivalence guarantees that the relationship between the indicators and the four latent 
dimensions of EU support is the same across countries, and that a unitary increase of the latent 
variable has the same meaning in every country (Davidov et al. 2012): although differences between 
individuals are partially explained by their country’s membership, which creates an offset in the scale 
of the groups (Davidov et al. 2012), the influence of individual latent dispositions on item responses 
is held constant across countries. This means that the discrimination power (slope) of each item is 
invariant, while the difficulty (intercept) varies across countries since in some countries EU support 
is more widespread than in others.  
Because the item difficulty is not invariant, a comparison of latent means across countries is not 
possible (Davidov et al. 2012). However, it is possible to compare the correlation matrix of these four 
dimensions across European countries (see Table 14). Results confirm that ‘EU governance 
legitimacy’ is weakly correlated with the other dimensions of EU support, whereas there is an 
important structure of correlation among the other three dimensions of support. This result suggests 
that the dimension of support of EU policy governance has not yet integrated into the structure of 
beliefs towards the EU. 
Table 14 - Correlation matrix of the MGCFA model of Figure 15. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
DIM 1 Output 
legitimacy 
Output 
legitimacy 
Output 
legitimacy 
EU 
governance 
legitimacy 
EU 
governance 
legitimacy 
European 
identification 
DIM 2 EU 
governance 
legitimacy 
European 
identification 
EU 
democracy 
European 
identification 
EU 
democracy 
EU 
democracy 
COUNTRY 
Pearson 
correlation 
Pearson 
correlation 
Pearson 
correlation 
Pearson 
correlation 
Pearson 
correlation 
Pearson 
correlation 
Pooled 0.19 0.75 0.58 0.18 0.13 0.62 
Belgium 0.24 0.76 0.63 0.24 0.13 0.57 
Denmark 0.27 0.53 0.65 0.24 0.17 0.55 
Germany 0.22 0.79 0.63 0.21 0.14 0.65 
Greece 0.18 0.81 0.64 0.20 0.19 0.72 
Spain 0.16 0.82 0.46 0.17 0.07 0.74 
France 0.32 0.86 0.67 0.34 0.19 0.72 
Italy 0.25 0.76 0.50 0.26 0.10 0.63 
Portugal 0.12 0.72 0.56 0.13 0.07 0.63 
UK 0.30 0.81 0.60 0.28 0.25 0.64 
Estonia 0.08^ 0.93 0.53 0.07^ 0.06^ 0.52 
Hungary 0.11 0.64 0.46 0.09 0.10 0.42 
Poland 0.26 0.63 0.69 0.19 0.21 0.55 
Slovakia 0.18 0.77 0.43 0.13 0.13 0.58 
Slovenia 0.14 0.81 0.67 0.12 0.11 0.75 
Bulgaria 0.06^ 0.87 0.67 0.03^ 0.07^ 0.67 
Note: all the correlations are significant (p<=0.05) excepts those indicated with sign ^ 
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To further investigate ‘EU governance legitimacy’, a focus on the relationship between this latent 
dimension and its six indicators is provided. The purpose is to assess the extent to which support for 
EU governance of specific policy domains is explained by a latent and generic preference for more 
EU governance. The six indicators are manifest variables and each indicates support for EU 
governance of a specific policy domain. The relationship between the latent dimension and each of 
the manifest variables is the following:  
Manifest variable = score on the latent dimension + policy specificity + error 
It follows that there is part of the variance that is not accounted for by the simple score on the latent 
dimensions. Table 15 reports the percentage of variance of the six items that is explained by the latent 
dimension (R2)40.  
Table 15 - Predictive power of 'EU governance legitimacy' (MGCFA). Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
Policy sector R^2 
Unemployment policy 0.45 
Immigration policy 0.32 
Environmental policy 0.39 
Fighting crime 0.37 
Health care policy 0.41 
Agricultural policy 0.40 
Among the six policy areas, ‘Unemployment’ has the maximum amount of explained variance 
(R2=.45), whereas ‘Immigration’ has the least (R2=.32). The R2 of the other four policy domains vary 
between these two values. Overall, in every policy sectors, more than 55% of the item variance is not 
explained the latent dimension of ‘EU governance legitimacy’. This result either suggests that, 
besides a latent generic disposition for EU policy governance, individual preferences for EU 
governance are also influenced by other drivers, or that the measurement technique employed 
(MGCFA) has led biased results because it assumes interval level variables. The former hypothesis 
is addressed in the next chapter, while the latter is examined in Appendix A, where two alternative 
statistical techniques - IRT and LCFA - are used to analyse ‘Output legitimacy’ and ‘EU governance 
legitimacy’. However, the results of IRT and LCFA confirm that of MGCFA. This is evident also 
looking at the degree of correlation between the three different measures.  
 
 
 
                                                 
40 Since the item intercepts are country-specific (vary across countries), item explained variances vary as well. Here, for 
sake of simplicity, is reported the average R2, calculated regressing separately each policy item on the ‘EU governance 
legitimacy’ factor score regardless data clustering. 
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Table 16 - Correlation across measuring methods. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
OUTPUT LEGITIMACY MGCFA IRT LCFA 
Output legitimacy MGCFA 1.00 - - 
Output legitimacy IRT 0.82 1.00 - 
Output legitimacy LCFA 0.90 0.82 1.00 
     
EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY MGCFA IRT LCFA 
EU governance legitimacy MGCFA 1.00 - - 
EU governance legitimacy IRT 0.87 1.00 - 
EU governance legitimacy LCFA 0.93 0.94 1.00 
Table 16 shows the correlations among the three latent scores computed with the three methods 
(MGCFA, IRT, and LCFA): for ‘Output legitimacy’, the correlation between LCFA scores and those 
from MGCFA is .90, and with IRT is .82; for ‘EU governance legitimacy’ is .93 with MGCFA, and 
.94 with IRT: all the correlations are extremely high41, and the choice of one of the three methods 
does not substantially affect latent scores. Therefore, given the minimal difference between methods, 
and since the other latent dimensions that compose the spectrum of attitudes towards the EU, namely 
‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’, have already been measured in MGCFA concurrently 
with those of ‘Output legitimacy’ and ‘EU governance legitimacy’, I decided to continue the analysis 
using MGCFA results and scores42.  
To conclude, the low predictive power of ‘EU governance legitimacy’ dimension seems not to be 
a matter of method, but a matter of theory. A latent disposition only explains part of the individual 
level preferences, and other drivers may influence the choice. This issue will be addressed in the next 
chapters, where the effects of theory-driven micro and macro level determinants of support for EU 
governance are tested. 
3 Discussion 
The reason for studying empirically the dimensionality of EU support lies in the compounded nature 
of European integration: from one side, it is still an intergovernmental issue where integration efforts 
are explained by member states’ benefit derived from a common regulated market; from the other 
side, European citizens must cope with a Union that enlarged its competences in many policy fields, 
increasing its presence in national politics and in their citizens daily life. For this reason, support 
towards the EU, as a socio-political phenomenon, needs to be analysed side by side, dimension by 
dimension. Chapter 2 defined four dimensions of EU support drawing upon Easton’s political system 
theory (1965, 1975) and Scharpf’s (1999) input-output legitimacy framework. These dimensions 
                                                 
41 Performing this analysis country by country, correlation is even higher than 0.90 for each pair of method (results not 
shown, available by request). 
42 Furthermore, indicators of ‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’ are ordinal variable, measured with Likert-
like scales, and this poses less concerns on employing Factor Analysis based on correlation matrixes. 
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represent four different forms of EU support: ‘Output legitimacy’ (EU support as benefit), ‘EU 
governance legitimacy’ (EU support as a preference for EU policy governance), ‘European 
identification’ (EU support as we-feeling), and ‘EU democracy’ (EU support as political 
representation).  
This conceptual definition of EU support is central in this dissertation, because the empirical 
literature often studies EU support either using only one proxy variable, supporting this choice with 
the argument of studying the Eastonian diffuse support but implicitly turning the concept of EU 
support in what measured by that variable, or it only concentrates on a specific dimension of EU 
support, disregarding the relationships that one dimension has with the others. Indeed, on this latter 
point, it is important to analyse the structural relationship among these dimensions, theorizing and 
testing whether one form (dimension) of EU support influences the development of another form EU 
support (on this see Chapters 4 and 5).  
In addition, defining the dimensions of EU support allows interpreting the deterioration through 
time of citizen attitudes towards the EU as the decline of two specific forms of EU support (see 
Chapters 2 Section 3): even though for some dimensions the long-term analysis is limited to one 
indicator only, support as utility (‘Output legitimacy’) and support as political representation at the 
EU level (‘EU democracy’) profoundly vary through time, steadily decreasing after the economic 
crisis in 2008-2009. However, support as we-feeling (‘European identification’) has not changed 
much through time, and support for EU policy governance (‘EU governance legitimacy’) has 
remained stable. These results included in Chapter 2 showed that the dimensions that are closer to the 
instrumental pole - ‘Output legitimacy’ and ‘EU democracy’ - are those most affected by the recent 
European crises (refugee and Economic crises). Indeed, these crises weakened the idea that Europe 
is a land of prosperity and that the European integration is the best democratic way for accessing this 
prosperity.  Conversely, the ideas of Europe closer to the pole of values - ‘European identification' 
and ‘EU governance legitimacy’ - do not seem to be influenced by these events. 
However, longitudinal analysis with aggregate data cannot tell the full story. Analyses included in 
this chapter empirically corroborates the four theorized dimensions of EU support, and they 
demonstrate that this latent structure of attitudes towards the EU is the same across European 
countries. This means that respondents across Europe distinguish the same four different forms of EU 
support, and the only difference among countries rests on the fact that individuals live in context with 
higher or lower levels of EU support, and this influences their level of support (Metric equivalence). 
Other two findings emerge in this chapter, and they regard the dimensions of ‘EU governance 
legitimacy’. Among the four dimensions of EU support, that of ‘EU governance legitimacy’ is very 
modestly correlated with the other dimensions of EU support, while the others, even though 
theoretically and empirically distinct, exhibit an important structure of correlation among themselves. 
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This result suggests that support for a generic EU policy governance is not integrated into a consistent 
(positive or negative) system of beliefs towards the EU. In other words, support for EU policy 
governance is not deeply associated with the other forms of EU support, while EU support as utility 
(‘Output legitimacy’), as we-feeling (‘European identification’), and as political representation (‘EU 
democracy’) tend to emerge concurrently in the set of individual attitudes.  
Support for EU governance (‘EU governance legitimacy’), of course, is more likely when one 
individual holds the other forms of support, but this association is weak. More on this will be provided 
in the next chapter, where the predictive power of ‘Output legitimacy’, ‘European identification’, and 
‘EU democracy’ on ‘EU governance legitimacy’ is tested as well as those of exogenous determinants 
of these latent dimensions.  
Finally, Chapter 1 introduced three models of support for EU governance: in Model 1 and 3 this 
support varies across policy domains (they differ in the causes of this), while in Model 2 support for 
EU governance is a unitary dimension that cross-cuts policy domains. The analyses included in this 
chapter provide evidence supporting Model 2, since there is an individual latent and generic 
disposition of EU support. Yet, this generic latent attitude does not explain preferences for EU 
governance of two policy domains (‘Foreign policy’ and ‘Unified tax system’). Moreover, even 
though a unitary latent dimension explains part of the variability of support for EU governance of the 
indicators of ‘EU governance legitimacy’43 at least more than 55% of the variance still remains 
unexplained. Therefore, there is something more than just a latent preference, and further analyses 
provided in Chapter 5 test the role of micro (individual), macro (contextual), and meso (policy 
domain) determinants on support for EU policy governance of distinct policy domains. 
 
  
                                                 
43 ‘Unemployment’, ‘Environmental’, ‘Fighting crime’, ‘Health care’, ‘Agricultural’, and ‘Immigration’ policies. 
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CHAPTER 4 – EXPLAINING EU SUPPORT 
This chapter addresses the question44 of what are the determinants of the four dimensions of EU 
support defined and measured in chapters 2 and 3, and it has a twofold purpose: first, it tests whether 
the four dimensions are explained by a common set of traditional45 exogenous determinants of EU 
support. In case results confirm earlier findings already in the literature, this analysis can also be 
interpreted as a proof of the external validity (Leviton 2001) of the measurement of EU support. 
Second, this chapter studies a potential hierarchy among the four dimensions of EU support, testing 
whether the generic support for EU policy governance depends upon holding one or more of the other 
three forms of EU support.  
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 1 analyses the literature on exogenous determinants of 
support towards the EU, focussing on theory-based explanatory mechanisms, and empirical results. 
Earlier in this dissertation, the concept of EU support has been unpacked in four empirical dimensions 
that account for different aspects of this concept and different forms of support: ‘Output legitimacy’ 
(EU support as benefit), ‘EU governance legitimacy’ (EU support as a preference for EU policy 
governance), ‘European identification’ (EU support as we-feeling), and ‘EU democracy’ (EU support 
as political representation). Drawing upon previous studies, Section 2 provides working hypotheses 
and describes the method used for testing the influence of traditional exogenous determinants on each 
of the four dimensions of EU support. Section 3 presents the empirical results and compares their 
effects across the four dimensions. Results are debated in Section 4. Afterwards, Section 5 argues on 
the presence of a hierarchy among the four endogenous components of EU support, and it tests 
whether ‘Output legitimacy’, ‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’ directly influence ‘EU 
governance legitimacy’. Finally, Section 6 comments and interprets the empirical findings. 
 All these analyses are performed country by country, using structural equation modelling (Bollen 
and Long 1993). Results confirm the influence of four exogenous determinants: ‘exclusive national 
identification’, ‘confidence in national institutions’, ‘national attachment’, and ‘political values’. This 
corroborates the external validity (Leviton 2001) of the measurement of EU support. However, these 
determinants exert different effects, depending on the dimension considered, and only ‘exclusive 
national identification’ has a consistent influence on the dimension of ‘EU governance legitimacy’.  
Moreover, despite the literature suggests a hierachy among the four dimensions of EU support, 
where ‘EU governance legitimacy’ is explained by ‘Output legitimacy’, ‘European identification’, 
and ‘EU democracy’, only weak findings suggest that these endogenous determinants influence ‘EU 
governance legitimacy’ in a consistent way across European countries. This leaves open room for 
                                                 
44 RQ3 in the Introduction at page 6. 
45 ‘Traditional’ means that there is a well-established literature on these determinants of EU support. 
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further research that explains why support for EU policy governance does not regularly covary with 
the other three dimensions of EU support. 
1. The debate on support for European integration and Euroscepticism 
For more than 30 years the speed and logic of European integration had been decided by European 
elites and accepted with limited interest by citizens (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Hobolt and de Vries 
2016). After the enactment of the Maastricht treaty, popular support for the EU has started to decrease 
(Eichenberg and Dalton 2007), closing the era of the so-called permissive consensus and opening a 
new era of constraining dissensus (Hooghe and Marks 2009).  
In more cases than the past, EU citizens have expressed their opposition towards the elite project, 
either in referendum on EU constitution (in France and The Nederlands in 2005) or in supporting 
Eurosceptic parties (Cramme and Hobolt 2014), and survey studies demonstrated that trust in EU 
institutions and support for European integration have declined over time (Ciftci 2005; Eichenberg 
and Dalton 2007; Guerra and Serricchio 2014; see also Chapter 3). Moreover, during the Eurozone 
and the migrant crises (Börzel and Risse 2017), EU citizens have experienced that what European 
institutions decide (mainly the Commission and the Council) deeply affects their daily life, especially 
in EU countries that received economic bailouts (Ireland, Spain, and Greece).  
Despite these findings, the concept of EU support is still in need of qualification. This concept has 
many faces, and often scholars simply concentrate on one of them (with few exceptions: Norris 1999; 
Lubbers and Scheepers 2005; Fuchs and Klingemann 2011; Boomgaarden et al. 2011; Sanders et al. 
2012a, 2012b). This thesis distinguishes four dimensions of EU support (see Chapter 2 and 3), and 
this section surveys the literature on individual-level exogenous determinants of EU support. The 
term exogenous indicates that they are external to the definition of the concept of EU support, and 
they are considered as antecedents of EU support46.  
In the literature, EU support is explained by four sets of individual-level exogenous determinants: 
(1) Instrumental reasoning, (2) Confidence in national institutions, (3) National identification and 
attachment, and (4) Social-location and political values. These sets of determinants are, respectively, 
reviewed in the next pages, and some hypotheses on how these determinants relate to the four 
dimensions of EU support are also provided.  
1.1 Instrumental reasoning 
For four decades, European integration had been focused on economic and market regulation 
(Hooghe and Marks 2009; Hobolt and de Vries 2016). Hence it is natural that the main explanation 
                                                 
46 Whereas endogenous determinants are elements that constitute the concept of EU support and that are conceived as 
antecedents in the development of specific forms of EU support. Section 5 analyses whether ‘Output legitimacy’, 
‘European identification’ and ‘EU democracy’ influence the development of ‘EU governance legitimacy’. Hence, in 
Section 5 ‘Output legitimacy’, ‘European identification’ and ‘EU democracy’ are considered as endogenous 
determinants. 
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of support for the European project was based on a cost-benefit analysis. The instrumental rational 
choice perspective assumes that pro-European attitudes are the result of instrumental self-interest 
(e.g. Anderson 1998; Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel 1998a; Gabel and Whitten 1997; McLaren 
2002, 2004, 2007) since European integration produced a gap between winners and losers of 
integration (Kriesi et al. 2012). For this reason, those who are on the winning side - better economic 
or social condition after the European integration - are more supportive of the EU than those on the 
losing side (Gabel and Palmer 1995; Gabel 1998a; Kriesi et al. 2012).  
People who have higher skills are expected to be better able to deal with an integrated advanced 
market economy and European marketplace (Anderson and Reichert 1996; Loveless and 
Rohrschneider 2011), whereas those with lower skill levels run a much higher risk to lose their job 
due to a relocation of production across national borders (Hobolt and de Vries 2016). An indicator of 
this divide is the educational level: as Hakhverdian and his colleagues demonstrated (Hakhverdian et 
al. 2013), the impact of education on EU support has increased, particularly after the signing of the 
Maastricht Treaty. Income is another relevant indicator of this divide: higher income earners benefit 
from EU integration because it creates more investment opportunities, while lower income earners 
must face a diminished welfare provision due to increased capital liberalization (Loveless and 
Rohrschneider 2011; see also Gabel and Palmer 1995; Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel 1998a; 
Hobolt and de Vries 2016).  
This divide between winners and losers should emerge on both of the two dimensions of utility: 
objective and subjective utility. Subjective utility indicates a perceived utility that passes through 
personal assessment of the benefits of EU integration. However, it is straightforward that the objective 
utility is expected to directly influence the subjective one. Earlier in the thesis, subjective utility is 
argued to represent the concept of ‘Output legitimacy’ (Scharpf 1999), a pillar of the 
multidimensional concept of EU support (see Chapters 2 and 3). For this reason, objective utility 
should be positively associated with ‘Output legitimacy’.  
As for the relationship between objective utility and the other three dimensions of EU support, it 
is expected that those in the winning side support EU policy governance, measured by the dimension 
of ‘EU governance legitimacy’, since further EU policy integration can extend their privileges. 
Conversely, those from the losing side want to reduce EU policy governance to recover a better socio-
economic condition within their national state borders via protectionist measures (Hobolt and de Vries 
2016). Objective utility should be as well associated with higher levels of ‘European identification’ 
since a correspondence between individual interests and political outcomes can activate identification 
in the supranational political community (following a neo-functional intuition, see Haas 1958). 
Finally, it is evident that being in the winning side is expected to influence the perception of good 
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political representation within European institutions, resulting in a positive association between 
objective utility and the dimension of ‘EU democracy’. 
1.2 Confidence in national institutions 
In the literature, there are traditional explanations of EU support that look at attitudes towards national 
institutions to identify patterns of EU support. Two competing mechanisms are reported. The first 
relates positive evaluation of national institutions to favourable attitudes towards the EU (‘Transfer’ 
hypothesis) (see McLaren 2002, 2004, 2007; Ray 2003a, 2003b). Many authors (e.g. Anderson 1998; 
Gabel 1998a; McLaren 2002, 2004, 2007; Rohrscheneider 2002; Ray 2003a, 2003b) demonstrate that 
people often use heuristics when they must deal with political opinions, especially when they should 
develop opinions on a distant political institution such as the EU (Sanders et al. 2012b). The 
underlying logic is that they use information about something they know, that is national politics and 
the national institutional system, to make a judgment regarding something they know less. If they 
positively evaluate their national environment, they positively assess the EU, transferring their 
opinion from one domain to the other.  
However, for the case of central and east European countries, the opposite mechanism has also 
been theorized and validated empirically: people who perceive their own national-level political 
institutions as corrupted or inefficient are likely to see the EU positively, since the EU can limit the 
power of such national institutions (Sanchez-Cuenca 2000). It follows that when national institutions 
satisfy the demands of their citizens, those citizens are expected to be loyal to their nation rejecting 
EU integration (‘Substitution’ hypothesis) (see Sanchez-Cuenca 2000). Therefore, both these two 
alternative mechanisms can - potentially -  influence the four dimensions of EU support. 
1.3 National identification and attachment 
A post-functional turn in this field of research has started (see Hooghe and Marks 2009; Börzel and 
Risse 2017; Hooghe et al. 2017). The more the EU moves towards more integration, the more identity 
claims become prominent: Börzel and Risse (2017) maintain that an effective European policy in 
reaction to the migrant crisis was substantially weakened by identity claims coming from some EU 
countries. Indeed, a common European policy on migration would have implied delegating 
sovereignty to the EU institutions in a highly salient issue, resulting in a common policy that would 
have further increased short-term immigration due to relocation and resettlement. Hobolt and de Vries 
(2016: 420) maintain that “European integration is not only, or even primarily, about a single-market, 
but also about a pooling of sovereignty that potentially erodes national self-determination and blurs 
boundaries between distinct national communities”. 
However, some studies demonstrate that levels of national attachment are positively associated 
with European identification (Risse 2004; Westle and Segatti 2016), as effects of ‘nested identities’: 
“European and other identities pertaining to territorially defined entities can be nested into each other 
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so that ‘Europe’ forms the outer boundary, while one’s region or nation-state constitute the core” 
(Risse 2004: 250). Yet, exclusive national identification is, on the contrary, a factor that leads to 
contrasting the Europeanization of the national polity, seen as a threat to national cultural integrity 
(e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2004, 2005; McLaren 2007; Lubbers 2008) and an open door to immigration 
(de Vreese and Boomgarden 2005). Hooghe and Marks (2004) theorize and provide findings that 
people who conceptualise their identities exclusively in terms of national identity are likely to be 
against the EU project, whereas who have either multiple identities that include the European 
dimension or a full European identity47 are likely to support the EU (Hooghe and Marks 2004; see 
also McLaren 2007). This is particularly important since national and European identities are not 
expected to compete, but they can compenetrate in different mixtures (Risse 2004; Westle and Segatti 
2016).  
Hence, national identification plays its influence on EU support in a composite way. This chapter 
conceives national identification both in terms of self-categorisation as exclusive national and as the 
strength of the attachment towards the nation. They correspond to two of the three conceptualisations 
of political identities provided by Citrin and Sides 2004 (see also Brewer 2001; Citrin et al. 2001): 
they maintain that the first one is cognitive, and it regards self-categorisation as group member; the 
second one is affective, and it defines the strength of the attachment towards the group; and the third 
one is normative, and it outlines the in-group boundaries - in terms of criteria for inclusion in the 
group48.  
As for the first definition, exclusive national identification is an undisputed driver of opposition 
against EU integration and European identification (Hooghe and Marks 2004, 2005; McLaren 2007; 
Lubbers 2008; Westle and Segatti 2016). It follows that exclusive national identification should be 
negatively associated with every one of the four dimensions of EU support. With regards to the second 
definition of political identity, Carey (2002) and McLaren (2006) find that the strength of the 
attachment towards the nation negatively influences EU support, while the literature on national and 
European identity shows that a strong national attachment is, instead, associated with greater 
European identification (Risse 2004; Westle and Segatti 2016). For this reason, the strength of 
national identification is expected to be negatively associated with the dimensions of ‘Output 
legitimacy’, ‘EU governance legitimacy’ and ‘EU democracy’, while being positively associated with 
‘European identification’. 
                                                 
47 Self-categorisation as only European. 
48 A recent strand of research looks at the underlying meaning of national and European identities, proposing to 
disentangle them to understand how European citizens conceptualise identity boundaries, and how this influences 
European identification (see Bruter 2005; Segatti and Guglielmi 2016). Chapter 6 studies how identity-meanings 
influence EU support. 
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1.4 Social location and political values 
Within the label of social location are placed some theories about how social characteristics shape 
individual attitudes towards the EU (see Loveless and Rohrschneider 2011). The most known is the 
cognitive mobilization hypothesis, which is elaborated by Inglehart as part of his theory of the Silent 
Revolution (Inglehart 1977). This hypothesis maintains that attitudes towards the European 
integration are highly influenced by levels of political sophistication and awareness of the European 
political system, which are a function of education – that enhances sophistication - and information 
(Inglehart 1977; Inglehart and Rabier 1978). The theory argues that due to the high level of abstraction 
of the European political system, only citizens with high level of political skills can deal with the 
complexity of those processes, understanding political discourses about it and developing personal 
thoughts (Inglehart 1977). Inglehart argues that having political skills is the antecedent needed to 
produce positive attitudes towards Europe, since to higher skilled people the European dimension is 
more familiar and less threatening than for poorer skilled ones (Inglehart and Rabier 1978; Jassen 
1991). On the contrary, those who do not have such skills should be more worried by European 
integration, since they are unaware of what the EU actually is, which entails opposition to the 
membership (Jassen 1991).  
Empirical analyses have demonstrated that those who are better educated and frequently involved 
in political discussions, as indicators of cognitive mobilization, are more aware of and have more 
positive stances on the integration project (Jassen 1991). Similar results emerge for European identity 
(Duchesne and Frognier 1995; Bellucci et al. 2012; Conti and Memoli 2015). Therefore, cognitive 
mobilization is expected to positively influence EU support on each of the four dimensions. 
In addition, a divide is found in the literature between ‘centrists’ and ‘extremists’ individuals 
(Steenbergen et al. 2007; De Vries and Edwards 2009; Lubbers and Scheepers 2010; Van Elsas and 
Van der Brug 2014). These authors maintain that the relation between left/right self-placement and 
EU support draws an inverted U-curve, where centrists are more supportive than both extreme leftists 
and rightists (Hooghe et al. 2002). The two poles have different reasons for opposing the EU (Hix 
and Goetz 2000; de Vries and Edwards 2009): as long as European integration was mainly economic, 
the extreme left opposed European integration because integration would have enhanced the market-
driven (neo-liberal) character of their societies. On the contrary, for the extreme right integration 
would have meant an increase in the regulatory activity of political institutions, thus limiting the free 
market (Hix and Goetz 2000; de Vries and Edwards 2009). Once the European integration has become 
something more than just an integrated market, the extreme right has started arguing at preserving 
national sovereignty and identity (de Vries and Edwards 2009). It follows that the relationship 
between political values (‘left/right self-placement’) and EU support is expected to produce an 
inverted-U curve on each of the four dimensions of EU support. 
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2. Data and method 
The previous section surveyed the literature on EU support to identify theory-based and individual-
level exogenous determinants of the four different forms of EU support. These exogenous 
determinants are ‘objective utility’, ‘confidence in national institutions’, ‘exclusive national 
identification’, ‘national attachment’, ‘cognitive mobilization’, and ‘political values’. As reported 
earlier, the term exogenous indicates that they are external to the definition of the concept of EU 
support, and they are treated here as antecedents of EU support.  
Table 17 reports their expected influence on the four dimensions of EU support, summarising the 
arguments of Section 1 and listing seven hypotheses regarding the direction of these effects. As shown 
in the table, the direction of the effect is consistent across the four dimensions (always negative or 
positive) for all the determinants, but for ‘national attachment’. In this case, it is expected a positive 
influence on the dimension of ‘European identification’ and a negative effect on the other three 
dimensions (Risse 2004; Westle and Segatti 2016)49. 
Table 17 - Direction of the expected influence of micro determinants 
 
Output legitimacy EU governance 
legitimacy 
European 
identification 
EU democracy 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
 EXOGENOUS 
 Micro Determinant 
Expected effect Expected effect Expected effect Expected effect 
Hp1 Objective utility + + + + 
Hp2 Confidence in national 
institutions (Transfer) 
+ + + + 
Hp3 Confidence in national 
institutions (Substitution) 
- - - - 
Hp4 Exclusive national 
identification 
- - - - 
Hp5 National attachment - - + - 
Hp6 Cognitive mobilization + + + + 
Hp7 Political values 
extreme left and 
right: - 
extreme left and 
right: - 
extreme left and 
right: - 
extreme left and 
right: - 
centrists: + centrists: + centrists: + centrists: + 
To analyse the influence of these exogenous determinants a full structural equation model (full SEM) 
(Bollen and Long 1993) is used, with data on fifteen EU countries50 collected in 2009 by the Intune 
project (Cotta et al. 2009). Full SEM is an extension of MGCFA (see Chapter 3) that allows testing 
the linkages among latent factors and among latent factors and exogenous variables (Bollen and Long 
1993).  
                                                 
49 See Section 1.3. 
50 Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, France, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Estonia, the UK, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, and Bulgaria. 
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Hence, the four latent dimensions of EU support (‘Output legitimacy’, ‘EU governance 
legitimacy’, ‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’) are the dependent variables of this 
analysis. The building block of this model resides in Chapter 3 analyses, where the presence of the 
four latent dimensions of EU support is empirically established. These latent dimensions are stable 
across countries, and metric invariance is confirmed: this means that latent dimensions have the same 
meanings51 in different countries (Davidov et al. 2012). Ten variables are used to test the hypotheses 
on the influence of the exogenous determinants:  
 ‘Objective utility’ is measured via two proxy variables: ‘Socio-economic status (SES)’ and 
‘Education’;  
 ‘Confidence in national institutions’ via the proxy variable: ‘Trust in the national 
government’;  
 ‘Exclusive national identification’ via with a dummy variable that detects those with 
‘Exclusive national identification’; 
 ‘National attachment’ is measured with a variable ‘National attachment’; 
 ‘Cognitive mobilization’ is measured via two proxy variables: ‘Knowledge of the EU’52 and 
‘Education’; 
 ‘Political values’ are measured with a variable tapping ‘Left/right self-placement’ plus the 
variable squared ‘Left/right squared’ since this is the instrument to test the supposed 
curvilinear relationship between Left/right and EU support; 
 Finally, two control variables are included in the analysis: ‘Gender female’ and ‘Age’.  
Figure 16 graphically displays the model that is tested, where these independent variables influence 
each of the four latent dimensions of EU support53. Table 18 displays descriptive statistics of these 
variables54, which are rescaled from original coding to vary between zero and one55 to facilitate 
comparison.  
                                                 
51 The term ‘meaning’ is here used to intend that the relationship between indicators and latent factors is constant at the 
metric level across countries. 
52 EU knowledge is an additive index that is created using four items that test respondent’s real knowledge about how 
many and what states compose the EU. See Table 50 in Appendix B. 
53 There is a minor difference between the design of the measurement part of this model and the one employed in Chapter 
2. In the model of Chapter 3, the latent dimensions of ‘EU governance legitimacy’ is assumed to be independent from 
the other three (assumptions of no correlation with the other dimensions). Conversely, in the following analysis all the 
latent dimensions are correlated. In this case, assuming and estimating correlations do not create problems of 
comparability of results between methods, differently from the former case. 
54 Corresponding survey questions are reported in Table 50 in Appendix B. 
55 Table 51 in Appendix B reports country averages for the exogenous variables. 
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Figure 16 - SEM model micro determinants of EU support 
 
Table 18 - Descriptive statistics of micro determinants - Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
Exogenous 
determinants 
Variable name Coding Mean 
(SD) 
N. 
Cases 
N. 
Missing 
Instrumental 
reasoning 
Socio-economic 
status (SES) 
0=Working class; .33=Lower 
middle class; .66=Upper middle 
class; 1=Upper class; 
.31 (.27) 14026 1064 
Confidence in 
national institutions 
Trust in the 
national 
Government 
Scale of trust from 0='No trust' to 
1='Full trust' 
.42 (.28) 14917 173 
National 
identification and 
affectivity 
Exclusive 
national 
identification 
0=Also European identification; 
1=Only national identification; 
.40 (.49) 14700 390 
National 
attachment 
0=Not at all; .33= Not very; .66= 
Somewhat; 1=Very attached; 
.82(.24) 15029 61 
Social location and 
political values 
Education 
0=Middle school or lower; 
.5=Secondary education; 
1=University or higher; 
.51 (.37) 14412 678 
Knowledge of 
the EU 
Index of knowledge created with 
four testing questions: every right 
answer scores .25.  
0=No right answer; 1=Four right 
answers; 
.46 (.27) 15090 0 
Left/right self-
placement 
Scale of political placement from 
0='Extreme left' to 1='Extreme 
right' 
.50 (.25) 13891 1199 
Controls 
Gender female 0=Male; 1=Female; .46 (.50) 15090 0 
Age 
0= lower than 26; .125= 26-35; .25= 
36-45; .375= 46-55; .5= 56-65; 
.625= 66-75; .75= 76-85; .875= 86-
95; 1= 96-105;   
.35 (.22) 14953 137 
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Therefore, these variables are proxies of the exogenous determinants of EU support and are included 
in the full SEM model as independent variables, while ‘Output legitimacy’, ‘EU governance 
legitimacy’, ‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’ are the dependent (latent) variables. 
Notably, fifteen models - one for each country - are tested concurrently. The measurement of the 
dimensions of EU support is fixed across countries (Metric invariance), while the influence of the 
exogenous determinants is country specific, meaning that their effects can vary from country to 
country. This is important to understand whether the hypotheses hold in different countries56. 
3. Results  
The results of the full SEM model are shown in Table 19, which reports standardised regression 
coefficients57. Overall, these results draw a picture where only two independent variables are 
significant predictors58 of EU support in most of the countries: these are ‘exclusive national 
identification’ and ‘trust in the national government’, but the most consistent predictor of the four 
dimension of EU support is ‘exclusive national identification’. This dichotomic variable influences 
EU support in all the countries and for all the dimensions, except in two countries59 where this effect 
is not significant on the dimension of ‘EU governance legitimacy’. This confirms the hypothesis on 
the role of ‘exclusive national identification’ in leading opposition towards the EU (Hp4).  
‘Trust in the national government’ is the second variable that constantly influences EU support: it 
has a significant positive influence on three of the four dimensions of EU support (‘Output 
legitimacy’, ‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’) in almost all the countries, without 
showing any divide between eastern and western European countries60. This corroborates the 
‘transfer’ hypothesis (Hp2) on the positive association between ‘confidence in national institutions’ 
and EU support, and it falsifies the ‘substitution’ hypothesis (Hp3) on the negative association 
between them. However, concerning ‘EU governance legitimacy’, there are no findings supporting 
neither the ‘transfer’ (Hp2) nor the ‘substitution’ (Hp3) hypotheses.  
The other independent variables are either only significant in few countries, or they only influence 
some specific dimensions of EU support. ‘National attachment’ falls into this latter group: it exerts a 
positive influence on ‘European identification’ in all the countries – confirming that a strong national 
attachment is not in competition with European identification, and supporting the idea of ‘nested 
                                                 
56 For the perspective of this chapter, the focus is on the effect that each determinant exerts on the latent dimension of EU 
support across countries. Analyses are computed using STATA 14, with the SEM command (syntax in Appendix C) 
and listwise deletion. 
57 Goodness of fit indexes are reported in Table 52 and group level indexes in Table 53 in Appendix B. 
58 In this chapter ‘predictor’ is employed as synonymous of ‘determinant’. 
59 These countries are Slovakia and Bulgaria. 
60 ‘Trust in the national government’ does not influence ‘Output legitimacy’ in Italy and Slovakia, and it does not affect 
‘European identification’ in Italy, Hungary and Slovenia. 
76 
 
identities’ (see Risse 2004; Westle and Segatti 2016) (Hp5). However, ‘national attachment’ does not 
have a consistent cross-country effect on the other dimensions of EU support61.   
Conversely, ‘Socio-economic status (SES)’, ‘Education’ and ‘Knowledge of the EU’ - proxies of 
‘objective utility’ and ‘cognitive mobilization’ - have only a sparse influence. They were expected to 
be positively associated with all the four dimensions of EU support, but they have a significant effect 
just in a few countries. Hence, these data do not confirm a diffuse effect of ‘objective utility’ (Hp1) 
and ‘cognitive mobilization’ (Hp6) across European countries. 
Finally, the influence of ‘political values’ on EU support needs to be carefully analysed. ‘Political 
values’ are tapped with respondents’ ‘left/right self-placement’, and drawing from previous research 
(e.g. Hix and Goetz 2000; de Vries and Edwards 2009) the effect of ‘left/right’ on EU support was 
expected to be curvilinear (Hp8): more extremist respondents were expected to be less EU supportive. 
This hypothesis is not confirmed by the analyses, which shows that this curvilinear relationship is 
present only in a very limited number of countries. This result casts doubts on the hypothesis that 
both extremes of the political spectrum tend to oppose the EU.  
To further check the influence of ‘political values’ on EU support, the former full SEM model is 
computed excluding the squared term (‘Left/right squared’). This tests whether the association 
between the two is, instead, simply linear. Table 54 in Appendix B reports the full result, but here is 
important to note that the effects of all the other independent variables remain largely similar to those 
already commented. Table 20 shows that ‘Left/right self-placement’ is now a significant predictor of 
‘Output legitimacy’ and ‘EU democracy’ in nine countries (barely two third of the total number), 
whereas it still does not have a consistent influence on ‘EU governance legitimacy’ and ‘European 
identification’. Moreover, the direction of these effects varies across countries: in most of the eastern 
European countries, respondents locating themselves on the right tend to be positively associated with 
higher scores on the dimensions of ‘Output legitimacy’ and ‘EU democracy’, whereas in western 
Europe this association tend to be negative.  
These findings support the idea that ‘political values’ matter in defining respondents’ perceptions 
of political representation (‘EU democracy’) and subjective benefit (‘Output legitimacy’), but their 
influence is country-specific. This result is in line with previous studies in the literature, which 
demonstrate that the effect of political values on EU support differ across European countries 
depending on institutional and economic contexts (Brinegar et al. 2004; Brinegar and Jolly 2005; 
Hooghe and Marks 2005). 
  
                                                 
61 ‘National attachment’ influences ‘Output legitimacy’ only in seven out of fifteen countries, and the magnitude of the 
effect is also limited. 
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Table 19 - Total effect - standardized coefficients. Data source Intune 2009 (cotta et al. 2009) 
 
Note: Coefficients significant at p<= 0.05 (two-tails) are marked in bold type and with the sign * 
Table 20 - Left/Right linear - total effect - standardized coefficients. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
 
Note: Coefficients significant at p<= 0.05 (two-tails) are marked in bold type and with the sign * 
EXOGENOUS DETERMINANT ON DIMENSIONS BELGIUM DENMARK GERMANY GREECE SPAIN FRANCE ITALY PORTUGAL UK ESTONIA HUNGARY POLAND SLOVAKIA SLOVENIA BULGARIA
SES ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY 0.10* 0.14* 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.09* 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.18* 0.15* -0.06 0.08 0.14* 0.07
SES ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY -0.02 0.12* -0.09 0.06 0.1* -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 0.05 -0.33*
SES ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION 0.06 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.23* 0.14* 0.18* 0.03 0.09 0.19*
SES ON: EU DEMOCRACY 0.03 0.07 0 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.11* 0.04 0.1 0.03 0.01 0.11* 0.12* -0.02
TRUST NAT. GOV. ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY 0.31* 0.21* 0.25* 0.23* 0.11* 0.24* 0.05 0.3* 0.22* 0.27* 0.37* 0.37* 0.09 0.18* 0.27*
TRUST NAT. GOV. ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY 0.02 -0.05 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.05 -0.13* 0 0.1* 0 0.12* 0.09 0.01 0.03 -0.01
TRUST NAT. GOV. ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION 0.11* 0.12* 0.1* 0.19* 0.13* 0.21* 0 0.18* 0.12* 0.17* 0 0.26* 0.1* 0.03 0.15*
TRUST NAT. GOV. ON: EU DEMOCRACY 0.67* 0.49* 0.66* 0.52* 0.56* 0.59* 0.45* 0.59* 0.64* 0.59* 0.21* 0.53* 0.58* 0.5* 0.47*
EXCL. NAT. ID ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY -0.33* -0.24* -0.33* -0.31* -0.38* -0.45* -0.31* -0.24* -0.3* -0.33* -0.11* -0.15* -0.25* -0.4* -0.36*
EXCL. NAT. ID ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY -0.27* -0.21* -0.22* -0.15* -0.12* -0.27* -0.19* -0.21* -0.26* -0.13* -0.13* -0.17* -0.06 -0.2* -0.05
EXCL. NAT. ID ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION -0.47* -0.4* -0.43* -0.53* -0.41* -0.48* -0.34* -0.31* -0.53* -0.4* -0.19* -0.35* -0.34* -0.53* -0.51*
EXCL. NAT. ID ON: EU DEMOCRACY -0.14* -0.22* -0.1* -0.29* -0.21* -0.23* -0.2* -0.21* -0.18* -0.13* -0.1* -0.12* -0.18* -0.25* -0.17*
NAT. ATTACHMENT ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY 0.02 0.01 0.13* 0.11* 0.1* -0.04 0.08 0.16* 0.08* 0.19* 0.07 0.02 0.1* 0.04 0.09
NAT. ATTACHMENT ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY -0.02 -0.04 -0.13* -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 -0.06 0 -0.04 -0.15* 0.02 0 -0.02 0.03 0.09
NAT. ATTACHMENT ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION 0.31* 0.24* 0.34* 0.22* 0.52* 0.22* 0.25* 0.39* 0.25* 0.42* 0.63* 0.28* 0.54* 0.37* 0.27*
NAT. ATTACHMENT ON: EU DEMOCRACY 0.02 -0.04 0.06 -0.01 0.09* 0.03 0 0.11* -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.07 -0.04 0.03 0.06
EDUCATION ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY 0.06 0.08* 0.09* 0.04 0.09* 0.09* 0.09 0.12* 0.14* 0.04 0.06 0.02 0 -0.01 0.12*
EDUCATION ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY 0.14* 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.11* 0.09 0.08 0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.16*
EDUCATION ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION 0.03 0.07 0.11* 0.14* 0.05 0.07* 0.07 0.09* -0.02 0.07 -0.09 -0.01 0.07 -0.04 0.08
EDUCATION ON: EU DEMOCRACY 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04 -0.05 0.03 -0.06 -0.01 -0.05 0.05
FEMALE ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY 0.1* 0 0.06 0 -0.01 0.03 0.15* 0.13* -0.02 0.08 -0.06 -0.07 0.02 0.02 0.02
FEMALE ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY 0.14* 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.11* 0.17* 0 0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.04 0.04 -0.1 -0.01
FEMALE ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION -0.06 -0.04 -0.16* 0 0 -0.06 -0.15* 0.05 -0.05 0.06 -0.08 -0.02 0 0.02 0.04
FEMALE ON: EU DEMOCRACY -0.03 -0.13* -0.11* -0.02 -0.08* -0.17* -0.13* -0.07* -0.12* -0.05 -0.12* 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.02
KNOW. OF EU ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY 0.07 -0.03 0.12* 0.03 0.11* 0.04 0.05 0.14* 0.12* 0.16* -0.01 0.01 0.16* 0.2* 0
KNOW. OF EU ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY 0.06 0.04 0.1 -0.08 0.09 0.15* 0.08 0.01 -0.05 0.05 0.05 0.01 0 0.14* 0.05
KNOW. OF EU ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION 0.05 -0.04 0.1* -0.01 0.06 0.06 0.11* 0.11* 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.05 0
KNOW. OF EU ON: EU DEMOCRACY -0.02 0.02 -0.04 -0.03 0 -0.06* -0.07 -0.02 0.06 -0.02 0.11* -0.06 0.06 0.04 0.05
LEFT/RIGHT ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY 0.14 0.3* -0.11 0.78* -0.06 -0.06 -0.25 0.06 -0.07 0.04 -0.14 0.68* 0.04 0.12 -0.24
LEFT/RIGHT ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY 0.13 0.07 -0.21 0.17 0.05 -0.09 -0.27 0.16 -0.46* -0.16 -0.06 0.26 -0.44* 0.06 -0.26
LEFT/RIGHT ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION -0.11 -0.03 -0.11 0.37* -0.03 -0.13* -0.35* 0.02 -0.1 -0.11 -0.54* 0.36* -0.13 -0.03 -0.21
LEFT/RIGHT ON: EU DEMOCRACY 0.22* -0.04 0.05 0.45* 0.14 -0.02 -0.24 0.19* -0.01 0.34* -0.04 0.41* -0.06 0.11 -0.08
LEFT/RIGHT SQUARED ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY -0.17 -0.29* 0.03 -0.68* -0.04 0 0.08 0.05 -0.05 -0.07 0.03 -0.81* 0.07 0.01 0.41*
LEFT/RIGHT SQUARED ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY -0.15 -0.01 0.1 -0.21 -0.16 0.01 0.22 -0.22 0.43* 0.19 -0.04 -0.29 0.31 -0.12 0.27
LEFT/RIGHT SQUARED ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION 0.07 0.05 0.11 -0.31* -0.02 0.05 0.25 0.06 0.01 0.13 0.51* -0.34 0.14 0.18 0.31
LEFT/RIGHT SQUARED ON: EU DEMOCRACY -0.23* -0.02 -0.1 -0.39* -0.01 -0.09 -0.01 -0.1 -0.07 -0.36* -0.22 -0.44* 0.13 0.1 0.35*
AGE ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY -0.08* -0.14* -0.05 0 0.08* -0.14* 0.07 -0.01 -0.16* 0.11* -0.05 -0.08 -0.06 0.08 -0.09
AGE ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY 0.06 0.06 0.1 -0.02 -0.05 0.13* 0.03 -0.03 -0.13* -0.2* -0.05 -0.01 0 0.01 -0.03
AGE ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION 0.07 0.1* 0.09* 0.1* 0.12* 0.01 0.09 -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.08 -0.02 -0.04 0.13* -0.06
AGE ON: EU DEMOCRACY -0.07* -0.15* -0.07* 0 0.11* -0.04 -0.1* 0.01 -0.14* 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.03
N. cases 729 698 687 542 705 773 494 626 579 350 544 327 580 535 405
EXOGENOUS DETERMINANT ON DIMENSIONS BELGIUM DENMARK GERMANY GREECE SPAIN FRANCE ITALY PORTUGAL UK ESTONIA HUNGARY POLAND SLOVAKIA SLOVENIA BULGARIA
LEFT/RIGHT ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY -0.02 0.03 -0.08 0.18* -0.1* -0.06 -0.18* 0.11* -0.12* -0.03 -0.11* -0.09 0.11* 0.13* 0.17*
LEFT/RIGHT ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY -0.01 0.06 -0.11* -0.02 -0.1 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 0.02 -0.1* -0.02 -0.14* -0.05 0
LEFT/RIGHT ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION -0.05 0.02 0 0.1 -0.05 -0.09 -0.12* 0.07 -0.09* 0.01 -0.05 0.03 0.01 0.14* 0.09
LEFT/RIGHT ON: EU DEMOCRACY 0 -0.06 -0.04 0.1* 0.13* -0.11* -0.25* 0.09* -0.08* -0.01 -0.25* -0.01 0.07 0.21* 0.25*
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4. Discussion  
With many countries and with four dimensions of EU support, it is not easy to interpret the results of 
these analyses, since the effects of some exogenous determinants (‘exclusive national identification’ 
and ‘confidence in national institutions’) emerge as theorized in most of the countries and for most 
of the dimensions, while others (‘national attachment’ and ‘political values’) are active only on some 
dimensions, or even do not work at all (‘objective utility’ and ‘cognitive mobilization’). To organise 
these results, the following list provides results separately for each dimension of EU support: 
 Output Legitimacy: ‘exclusive national identification’, ‘confidence in national 
institutions’ and ‘political values’ exert their influence on this dimension across (almost) all 
the countries; 
 EU governance legitimacy: among the set of exogenous determinants, only ‘exclusive 
national identification’ influences this dimension consistently across countries. The other 
determinants are not significant predictors of this dimension of EU support; 
 European identification: ‘exclusive national identification’, ‘confidence in national 
institutions’ and ‘national attachment’ have significant cross-country effects on this 
dimension;  
 EU democracy: ‘exclusive national identification’, ‘confidence in national institutions’ and 
‘political values’ are significant predictors of this latent dimension.  
This analysis demonstrated that four traditional determinants of EU support influence one or more of 
the dimensions of EU support, and this can be considered an indicator of the external validity (Leviton 
2001) of the measurement of EU support.  
However, only one mechanism works across Europe for all the four dimensions. In all the 
countries, the ‘exclusiveness’ of respondents’ national identity inhibits EU support. This confirms the 
post-functional account about the role of exclusive national identification in driving opposing to EU 
integration (see Hooghe and Marks 2004, 2005; McLaren 2007; Lubbers 2008). European integration 
blurs national boundaries (Hobolt and de Vries 2016), weakening the (perception) of cultural 
homogeneity within European countries. This activates the mechanism of opposition among those 
that see Europe as something outside of their personal (national) identity. 
Furthermore, this analysis provides additional proofs that support towards the EU passes through 
confidence in national democratic institutions (see also Anderson 1998; Gabel 1998a; Rohrscheneider 
2002; McLaren 2002, 2004, 2007) and that this relationship is positive, confirming the transfer 
hypothesis. This association is positive also in eastern Europe, differently from what argued by 
Sanchez-Cuenca (2000). EU support, then, is an extension of positive feeling towards national 
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institutions, and it can be interpreted as the result of a positive personal disposition toward authorities. 
However, this mechanism does not apply on the dimension of ‘EU governance legitimacy’. 
These findings are important since this analysis controlled for some alternative determinants of 
EU support, and, in particular, it controls for the effect of political values, a potential confounding 
variable. The role of political values is telling since it demonstrates that European integration is not 
the same thing for people living in different cultural and institutional contexts (see also Brinegar et 
al. 2004; Brinegar and Jolly 2005; Hooghe and Marks 2005). Despite a general influence of political 
values, they do not manifest the same effects across Europe: in some countries being on the right side 
of the political spectrum is associated with higher scores on the dimension of ‘Output legitimacy’ 
(high perceived benefit of EU membership) and ‘EU democracy’ (high perceived political 
representation), while in other countries with lower scores (low perceived benefit or political 
representation). Moreover, the ‘inverted-U curve’ hypothesis on the shape of the relationship between 
left/right and EU support is not confirmed, differently from previous studies (De Vries and Edwards 
2009; Van Elsas and Van der Brug 2014). From this analysis, extreme left and extreme right do not 
converge in the opposition towards the EU for any of the four different forms of EU support: EU 
support as benefit (‘Output legitimacy’), as preference for EU governance (‘EU governance 
legitimacy’), as we-feeling (‘European identification’), and as political representation (‘EU 
democracy’). 
Finally, it is surprising that ‘exclusive national identification’ is the only driver of ‘EU governance 
legitimacy’, while none of the other exogenous determinants exerts a consistent influence across 
countries. ‘Confidence in national institutions’ is not converted in support for a generic EU policy 
governance, and even ‘political values’ are not associated with this form of support. This raises 
questions about a potential structure of dependency among the four dimensions of EU support, where 
‘EU governance legitimacy’ can derive from ‘Output legitimacy,’ ‘European identification’, and ‘EU 
democracy’. Indeed, there are theories in the literature that directly or indirectly suggests the presence 
of this structure of dependency where ‘Output legitimacy,’ ‘European identification’, and ‘EU 
democracy’ are located at the same and first hierarchical level, and they concurrently influence ‘EU 
governance legitimacy’, which is placed at a lower hierarchical level. Hence, they all concur to define 
the concept of EU support, but within this concept they are hierarchically conceived. The next section 
reviews the literature and tests this hypothesis. 
5. Testing the influence of endogenous determinants on ‘EU governance legitimacy’ 
‘EU governance legitimacy’ taps individual support for a generic form of EU policy governance. This 
form of EU support is the final consequence of the process of ‘political integration’ defined by Haas 
as “the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their 
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loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or 
demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” (Haas 1958: 16).  
Undoubtedly, after the Maastricht treaty of 1992, the EU has acquired more competences, moving 
from a purely market-oriented integration. Indeed, before 1992, the purpose was deepening the 
economic integration to develop an integrated European market. Having reached that goal, this has 
opened space for a new phase of political integration. This integration requires a loyalty shift from 
the national community towards a ‘new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing 
ones” (Haas 1958: 16). A broad range of policy competences has ultimately been transferred to the 
EU, and it is clear then that the legitimacy of the EU as-it-is-now rests on support for a European 
system of governance (Sinnott 1995; De Winter and Swyngedouw 1999; Lubbers and Scheepers 
2005; Magalhaes 2012a, 2012b). This does not mean that the only way to support a European 
integration is to endorse the current or even further policy and political integration. Yet, the EU is 
currently structured as a multi-level system of governance, where many decisions are taken at the 
European level. Hence, to support ‘another’ EU is necessary to reject ‘this’ EU.  
Easton (1965, 1975) maintains that diffuse support (see Chapter 2 Section 1) is fuelled by citizens 
perceptions of political legitimacy, and that in the short run specific support for the outcomes of the 
system does not interfere with the perception of system legitimacy (Easton 1965, 1975). However, he 
acknowledges that in the long run discontent with performance may gradually erode trust in and 
legitimacy of the system, lessening diffuse support (Easton, 1975). On the same line, Haas’ neo-
functionalism theorizes that support for more European integration is driven by actors’ self-interest 
to pursue their economic goal (Haas 1958), which results in pro-European attitudes for those who 
recognise their benefits deriving from EU integration.  
As long as the integration was economic, opposition towards the EU was mainly based on concerns 
about the dominance of a market-capitalistic logic reducing national level protectionist measures 
(from an economic-leftist perspective), or arguing that the regulatory activity of European institutions 
was limiting the free market (from an economic-rightist perspective) (Hix and Goetz 2000; de Vries 
and Edwards 2009)62. The logic behind deciding the level of integration was based on instrumental 
reasoning. Both in neo-functionalist and liberal intergovernmentalist accounts of international 
cooperation, actors (states or elites) involved in the agreement are oriented towards supranational 
solutions to pursue their economic interest (Risse 2005; Hooghe and Marks 2009). The goal of a 
European community was to provide a European environment of peace and cooperation among states, 
which would have fostered economic growth and prosperity. The succeeds of this operation was the 
                                                 
62 However, a contextual effect of the countries’ economic system on citizen support for European integration should be 
considered, since the kind of capitalism that each state has followed deeply influences the perception of whether the 
integration leads toward a more regulated or unregulated system, given the harmonization process (Brinegar et. al 2004; 
Brinegar and Jolly 2005). 
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criterion for assessing the European project. Scharpf (1999) calls this Output legitimacy, to indicate 
that support for European integration is driven by evaluation of the outcomes of the system. Yet, the 
process of centre formation (Bartolini 2005) requires loyalty and compliance by member states as 
well as by those individuals subjected to its power. A reservoir of goodwill (Easton 1975) is required 
to make the system workable, giving legitimacy and effectiveness to a political system that has 
institutions and boundaries, without the possibility to use physical coercion (Bartolini 2005). Cross-
national individual-level analyses on support for EU policy governance are only a few (see de Winter 
and Swyngedouw 1999; Lubbers and Scheepers 2005, 2010; McLaren 2007; de Winter et al. 2009; 
Magalhaes 2012b), and in only one of them the effect of subjective utility is tested: McLaren (2007) 
finds that people who perceive individual benefits from EU integration are much more likely to 
support EU policy governance. Since the concept of subjective utility is measured by the latent 
dimension of ‘Output legitimacy’, it is expected that this dimension directly influences ‘EU 
governance legitimacy’. 
However, the literature suggests that the greater the political integration in a multi-level 
governance (Marks et al. 1996), the less a cost-benefit analysis of the performances of the European 
integration drives popular consensus (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Loveless and Rohrschneider 2011). 
Hooghe and Marks (2009) argue that an approach stressing economic calculation is more appropriate 
for the first age of European integration, from the late 1950s to late 1980s, where EU integration was 
not politicised yet (Hooghe and Marks 2009; see also the debate in Chapter 1). Collective 
identification is one the element that Easton, as well as Scharpf, consider as a fundamental element 
of political support (Easton 1965, 1975) and political legitimacy (Scharpf 1999). Linz and Stepan 
(1996) remark that people within a state are unlikely to accept the regime as legitimate without sharing 
some kind and degree of collective identification. This individual identification with the demos helps 
in accepting or tolerating “[…] outputs to which they are opposed or the effects of which they see as 
damaging to their wants” (Easton 1975: 444), especially in a democracy where policy decisions are 
made by majority voting. In this case, since the EU policy-making has moved from requiring a 
unanimous consensus of EU member states towards a majoritarian turn in many policy areas in the 
policy-making within the Council (Wallace et al. 2015), this seems to be even more important than 
in the past. Empirical studies confirm the influence of European identification on support for EU 
policy governance (Winter and Swyngedouw 1999; de Winter et al. 2009; Magalhaes 2012b). For this 
reason, the expectation is that the dimension of ‘European identification’ directly influences that of ‘EU 
governance legitimacy’. 
Finally, from the seminal work of Easton (1965, 1975), confidence in the political system is a 
leading source of popular support. However, EU institutions have been changed since their creation. 
Their norms and procedures, as well as their underlying principles, have been profoundly transformed 
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during the phases of enlargement and constitutional change. From a purely intergovernmental system 
to a multi-level system of governance, the very nature of this object has evolved step by step. Despite 
these changes, EU institutions still have the original sin of being technocratic bodies, where 
democratic control can be exercised only indirectly. At the national level, the accountability of 
political authorities is guaranteed by the possibility to sanction – via elections –  incumbents that do 
not provide the required outputs. There is a direct tie between outputs, authoritative 
decisions/incumbents, and citizens. At the European level this tie is not direct but mediated by 
national Governments, and to a lesser extent by parties in the European Parliament. Changes in the 
EU constitutional treaties have led to an increase in the role of citizens’ representatives in EU 
decisions, but the EU democratic deficit is still a debated issue, and the beginning of the economic 
crisis raised its salience in the public sphere63. The term ‘democratic deficit’ indicates a lack of 
democratic accountability of decision makers (Follesdal and Hix 2006; Hix 2008). The EU decision-
making process is said to be ‘blurred’, run by national governments and unelected technocrats in 
closed-door meetings. The EU produces binding decisions for its citizens, but these policies are not 
legitimised in the same way as national policies are. According to Follesdal and Hix (2006), this point 
is indeed the first element of the ‘standard’ thesis on the EU democratic deficit. At the national level, 
government is held accountable to the voters via the Parliament, but in the EU institutions, national 
ministers and government appointees are beyond the control of citizens’ representatives (Follesdal 
and Hix 2006). This means a decrease in the control power of (national) parliaments and an increase 
in the power of executives. Indeed, traditional channels of citizens’ representation are less effective 
than in the national environment, and this may lead to frustration and alienation.  
A minimal definition of democracy maintains a democratic system must give citizens the right to 
replace incumbents. Due to the EU’s multilevel structure of institutional arrangement this democratic 
accountability is not present, and even if EP elections are held, they are contested on national 
concerns, and as referenda on incumbent national governments (Schmitt and Teperoglou 2015). Hix 
(2008) remarks the lack of competition for control of political authority at the European level, and 
that there is an important difference between procedural democracy and substantial democracy: “it is 
substantively democratic only if there is open competition for executive office and over the direction 
of the policy agenda” (Hix 2008: 4). Although in 2014 EP elections political parties tried to solve this 
problem, still people perceive elections as second order (Van der Brug et al. 2016).  
Rohrschneider (2002) finds that people who think that there is something wrong with the EU 
democracy, no matter their personal interests or political preferences, tend to oppose the EU. This is 
in line with the democratic deficit thesis (see Follesdal and Hix 2006; Hix 2008). Along with the 
                                                 
63 Chapter 2 analyses show that dissatisfaction with EU democracy and institutions has deeply increased after the upsurge 
of the economic and Eurozone crises. 
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evaluation of the EU democracy, confidence in EU institutions is one of the undisputed drivers of EU 
support, since empirical findings suggest that the lower the confidence in European institutions, the 
lower the support for EU policy governance (McLaren 2007; de Winter et al. 2009; Magalhaes 2012b). 
However, as Loveless and Rohrschneider (2011) remark, when in survey question respondents are 
asked to evaluate EU institutional performance (i.e. ‘satisfaction with how the EU democracy works’) 
this question taps “[…] both the input component, that the EU government is both selected by popular 
sanction and institutions are sufficiently democratic in their process, and the output component, which 
is the ability of the EU to deliver on policy and enforcement” (Loveless and Rohrschneider 2011: 14). 
Hence, satisfaction with the EU democratic procedures and confidence in the EU institutions go side 
by side: analyses presented in Chapter 3 empirically demonstrates that satisfaction and confidence 
identify a single latent dimension, called ‘EU democracy’. Hence, the hypothesis is that ‘EU 
democracy’ influences the development of ‘EU governance legitimacy’. 
To test the hypotheses that the dimensions of ‘Output legitimacy’, ‘European identification’, and 
‘EU democracy’ are endogenous determinants64 of ‘EU governance legitimacy’, it necessary to 
modify the model tested earlier. Figure 17 shows the new path model65. Due to the model 
specification, the total effects of the other exogenous variables already included in the model66 remain 
the same as in the previous analysis, but it is now decomposed in direct and indirect effects (see Table 
21): the former is the part of the total effect coming from the direct link between exogenous variables 
and ‘EU governance legitimacy’, while the latter indicates the effect of the exogenous variables that 
passes through the other three dimensions of EU support. The total effect is the arithmetic sum of 
direct and indirect effects. Studying how the total effect is composed is important because it allows 
understanding the mechanism that links ‘exclusive national identification’ - the only significant 
exogenous determinant - and ‘EU governance legitimacy’. 
                                                 
64 Endogenous determinants are elements that constitute the concept of EU support and that are conceived as antecedents 
in the development of specific forms of EU support. 
65 This path model is computed using STATA 14, with the SEM command (syntax in Appendix C) and listwise deletion. 
66 The exogenous variables are ‘Socio-economic status (SES)’, ‘Education’, ‘Trust in the national government’, 
‘Exclusive national identification’, ‘National attachment’, ‘Knowledge of the EU’, ‘Left/right self-placement’, 
‘Left/right squared’, ‘Gender female’ and ‘Age’. 
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Figure 17- Hierarchical SEM Model 
 
Table 55 in Appendix B reports that the model fits data well, and Tables 21 e 22 show the results, 
that can be summarised as follows: 
 ‘Output legitimacy’ only exerts influence in five countries. Three of them are northern 
European countries (Denmark, Germany, and the UK) and two are eastern European 
countries (Poland, and Slovakia); 
 ‘European identification’ drives attitudes for EU policy governance in five countries. Two 
of them are northern European countries (Belgium, and Denmark) and three are southern 
European countries (Spain, France, and Italy); 
 ‘EU democracy’ only influences ‘EU governance legitimacy’ in two countries (Greece and 
the UK); 
 Much of the influence of ‘exclusive national identification’ is an indirect effect, and this 
effect passes mainly through the dimension of ‘European identification’ in two third of the 
countries: ‘exclusive national identification’ influences ‘European identification’ and this, 
in turn, affects ‘EU governance legitimacy’. 
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Table 21 - Hierarchical SEM model - total effect - standardized coefficients. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
 
Note: Coefficients significant at p<= 0.05 (two-tails) are marked in bold type and with the sign * 
 
Table 22 - Hierarchical SEM model - Endogenous determinants - total & indirect effect - standardized coefficients. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
 
Note: Coefficients significant at p<= 0.05 (two-tails) are marked in bold type and with the sign * 
 
 
DETERMINANT ON DIMENSIONS BELGIUM DENMARK GERMANY GREECE SPAIN FRANCE ITALY PORTUGAL UK ESTONIA HUNGARY POLAND SLOVAKIA SLOVENIA BULGARIA
OUTPUT LEGITIMACY ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY 0.15 0.29* 0.21* 0.12 -0.09 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.23* 0.07 0.11 0.26* 0.39* 0.05 0.13
IDENTIFICATION ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY 0.21* 0.18* 0.24 0.09 0.72* 0.50* 0.41* 0.07 -0.04 0.07 -0.04 -0.15 -0.23 -0.13 -0.19
EU DEMOCRACY ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY -0.03 0.00 0.02 0.18* -0.23 0.00 -0.05 -0.06 0.23* 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.13 0.11
SES ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY -0.02 0.12* -0.09 0.06 0.10* -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 0.05 -0.33*
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect* 35% 35% 6% 17% 42% 45% 30% 5% 22% 45% 30% 57% 28% 43% 11%
TRUST NAT. GOV. ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY 0.02 -0.05 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.05 -0.13* 0.00 0.10* 0.00 0.12* 0.09 0.01 0.03 -0.01
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect* 66% 38% 81% 58% 32% 62% 14% 54% 68% 48% 44% 100% 56% 61% 48%
EXCL. NAT. ID ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY -0.27* -0.21* -0.22* -0.15* -0.12* -0.27* -0.19* -0.21* -0.26* -0.13* -0.13* -0.17* -0.06 -0.20* -0.05
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect* 53% 69% 80% 92% 70% 97% 73% 10% 36% 42% 7% 2% 54% 7% 27%
NAT. ATTACHMENT ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY -0.02 -0.04 -0.13* -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 -0.06 0.00 -0.04 -0.15* 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.03 0.09
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect* 44% 36% 32% 36% 49% 39% 38% 54% 7% 18% 36% 54% 55% 37% 21%
EDUCATION ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY 0.14 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.11* 0.09 0.08 0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.16*
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect* 9% 70% 89% 78% 73% 42% 32% 10% 70% 9% 15% 36% 37% 16% 5%
FEMALE ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY 0.14* 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.11* 0.17* 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.04 0.04 -0.10 -0.01
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect* 2% 8% 25% 4% 26% 17% 18% 44% 35% 27% 13% 37% 16% 7% 32%
KNOW. OF EU ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY 0.06 0.04 0.10 -0.08 0.09 0.15* 0.08 0.01 -0.05 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.14* 0.05
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect* 37% 22% 51% 3% 36% 20% 59% 70% 32% 31% 10% 32% 51% 6% 12%
LEFT/RIGHT ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY 0.13 0.07 -0.21 0.17 0.05 -0.09 -0.27 0.16 -0.46* -0.16 -0.06 0.26 -0.44* 0.06 -0.26
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect* 6% 86% 24% 85% 49% 80% 52% 4% 4% 1% 10% 57% 8% 37% 0%
LEFT/RIGHT SQUARED ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY -0.15 -0.01 0.10 -0.21 -0.16 0.01 0.22 -0.22 0.43* 0.19 -0.04 -0.29 0.31 -0.12 0.27
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect* 3% 50% 31% 83% 6% 70% 47% 6% 7% 0% 71% 64% 1% 7% 14%
AGE ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY 0.06 0.06 0.10 -0.02 -0.05 0.13* 0.03 -0.03 -0.13* -0.20* -0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.03
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect* 8% 22% 9% 22% 35% 6% 78% 8% 52% 2% 1% 95% 51% 37% 4%
DETERMINANT ON DIMENSIONS BELGIUM DENMARK GERMANY GREECE SPAIN FRANCE ITALY PORTUGAL UK ESTONIA HUNGARY POLAND SLOVAKIA SLOVENIA BULGARIA
EXCL. NAT. IDENTIF. ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY -0.27* -0.21* -0.22* -0.15* -0.12* -0.27* -0.19* -0.21* -0.26* -0.13* -0.13* -0.17* -0.06 -0.20* -0.05
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect* 53% 69% 80% 92% 70% 97% 73% 10% 36% 42% 7% 2% 54% 7% 27%
% of the indirect effect via OUTPUT LEGITIMACY 34% 48% 40% 26% 9% 13% 0% 25% 54% 44% 46% 40% 51% 17% 30%
% of the indirect effect via EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION 66% 51% 59% 36% 78% 86% 100% 50% 14% 53% 32% 52% 42% 56% 59%
% of the indirect effect via EU DEMOCRACY 1% 1% 1% 38% 13% 1% 0% 25% 32% 3% 22% 8% 7% 27% 11%
86 
 
Overall, ‘Output legitimacy’ and ‘European identification’ are endogenous determinants of ‘EU 
governance legitimacy’ only in one-third of the countries. Hence, in most of the cases, they do not 
significantly influence support for a generic EU policy governance. Notably, they are concurrently 
significant only in Denmark. This means that (often) when one mechanism is working, the other one 
is not: this can be due to the way political parties frame public discourse on European integration (see 
Grande et al. 2016), resulting in the activation of different mechanisms at the individual level. 
However, these results do not strongly support the hypotheses on the diffuse effect of ‘Output 
legitimacy’ and ‘European identification’ across Europe. The result is even worse with respect to ‘EU 
democracy’, and it contrasts with the growing emphasis on the supposed democratic deficit of the 
EU. The most consistent result coming from this analysis is that the exclusiveness of national 
identifications tends to influence ‘EU governance legitimacy’ indirectly67 via ‘European 
identification’, indicating that ‘European identification’ mediates the effect. 
The next and concluding section comments the findings provided in this chapter, arguing that the 
weak predictive power of both exogenous and endogenous determinants of this form of EU support 
can depend upon the fact that ‘EU governance legitimacy’ measures a generic support for EU policy 
governance, instead of specific support for EU governance of distinct policy domains. Indeed, these 
determinants can exert different effects on different policies, but as long as the dependent variable is 
a latent generic support for EU governance, their real effects might not emerge. 
6. Conclusions and further research 
This chapter analysed the determinants of the four dimensions of EU support in order to understand 
whether the development of these forms of EU support is explained by a common set of micro-level 
determinants. Results showed that four traditional exogenous determinants of EU support influence 
one or more dimensions, corroborating the external validity of the measurement. However, there is a 
core of two exogenous determinants that explain support for all (in case of ‘exclusive national 
identification’) or almost all (in case of ‘confidence in national institutions’) the dimensions of EU 
support.  
The exclusiveness of respondents’ national identification strongly inhibits the development of all 
the forms of EU support, whereas a transfer effect from ‘confidence in national institutions’ to EU 
support is found for the dimensions of ‘Output legitimacy’ (support as subjective utility), ‘European 
identification’ (support as we-feeling), and ‘EU democracy’ (support as political representation). In 
addition, the strength of ‘national attachment’ is positively associated with the strength of ‘European 
identification’, confirming the ‘nested identity’ intuition (Risse 2004) that see European identity 
strongly compatible with national identity.  
                                                 
67 However, no evidence of this trend is found for Portugal, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. 
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The role of political values is also interesting because it introduces country variability in the 
relationship between exogenous determinants and EU support. Indeed, political values influence 
subjective utility (‘Output legitimacy’) and political representation (‘EU democracy’), but the 
direction of the effect varies across countries and this variation seems to be partially accounted for 
by the respondents’ geographical location: in eastern Europe respondents locating themselves on the 
right tend to have more positive attitudes than respondents on the left, while in western Europe this 
association is the opposite. 
Cross-country variability also emerges when the four dimensions are placed in a specific 
hierarchical order: it is tested whether ‘EU governance legitimacy’ is directly influenced not only by 
exogenous determinants, but also by the other three endogenous components of EU support (‘Output 
legitimacy’, ‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’). It follows that, when a hierarchy is 
applied, support for a generic EU governance is considered as a consequence of the other three forms 
of EU support. Although the literature suggests that this form of support is contingent upon subjective 
utility (‘Output legitimacy’), we-feelings (‘European identification’), and political representation 
(‘EU democracy’), only weak findings confirm that these endogenous determinants do influence ‘EU 
governance legitimacy’ in a consistent way across European countries. In some countries ‘Output 
legitimacy’ and ‘European identification’ have a significant effect, but in others they do not. 
Moreover, the influences of ‘EU democracy’ is rather absent.  
How can these findings be interpreted? Some possible interpretations can be found both in Chapter 
1 and 2. In Chapter 1 three models of support for EU governance are provided. Model 1 maintains 
that support is contingent upon the characteristics of the policy domains and it is likely when one 
domain involves strong international interdependence; Model 2 conceives support for EU governance 
as an attitude that cross-cuts policy domains; Model 3 holds that support for EU governance is 
influenced by the way each policy domain is related to collective identities. Hence, in two of these 
models, support varies across policy domains according to the characteristics of the domain itself. 
Chapter 3 confirms the presence of a unitary dimension of individual support for EU governance, 
proving evidence that Model 2 is useful to describe respondents’ structure of opinions. However, 
large part of the variability of support for EU governance of specific policy domains is not explained 
by this generic dimension of support. For this reason, Model 1 and 3 can still correctly explain the 
variability of support across policy domains. The same reasoning can be applied here to the findings 
of this chapter. ‘Output legitimacy’, ‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’ can have a 
specific influence on the support for EU governance of distinct policy domains. This can explain why 
they have such a weak association with the latent dimension of ‘EU governance legitimacy’. Indeed, 
it might be the case that a pattern of support is hidden by the fact that this latent dimension pools six 
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policy domains. It follows that this hypothesis needs to be tested: this is the purpose of the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 – EXPLAINING SUPPORT FOR EU GOVERNANCE OF SPECIFIC AREAS 
Policy-making at the EU level “can be characterized as policy without politics, which in turn makes 
for national politics without policy” (Schmidt 2013). This quotation by Vivien Schimdt remarks that 
European policy-making has gained such a prominent role in current European integration since it 
involves many more policy sectors than in the first thirty years of integration. Since the ‘Single 
European Act’ (1986), many policy areas have been gradually integrated, and the EU has acquired 
policy prerogatives that exceed economic regulations (Alesina and Wacziarg 1999; Alesina et al. 
2005; Magalhaes 2012a, 2012b; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 2012). This chapter studies citizen 
support for EU governance of specific policy domains, and it does so analysing survey data about 
eight policy domains and testing the influence of micro (individual), meso (policy), and macro 
(country) level determinants on this form of EU support. At the end of the previous chapter is argued 
that a generic disposition towards the EU policy governance68 is not consistently accounted for by 
micro level exogenous and endogenous determinants, except by the ‘exclusiveness’ of national 
identification, and that these unexpected findings can derive from the fact that these determinants can 
have different effects across policy sectors (i.e. subjective utility can influence support for EU 
governance of Immigration policy and have no influence on that for Unemployment policy). If this 
is the case, the effects of exogenous and endogenous determinants need to be analysed policy by 
policy. 
In the literature, there are three possible pathways for studying the allocation of policy 
competences in the multilevel European system of governance. The first one focusses on States or 
elites’ preferences for EU governance of a policy domain. Well established theories of European 
integration like liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1993), and neo-functionalism (Sandholtz 
and Stone Sweet 2012) look at how preferences of pivotal actors (elites and institutions) are 
elaborated, and they account for how bargaining processes evolve to combine variegate preferences. 
Units of analysis are States, national Governments, national and transnational interest groups, and 
European institutions.  
The second pathway is a normative account of whether EU governance of a policy sector 
corresponds to normative criteria of, for instance, effectiveness and functionality (e.g. Alesina and 
Wacziarg 1999; Alesina et al. 2005). Units of analysis are policy domains per se, which have some 
intrinsic characteristics like producing cross-country externalities or involving major budget 
redistributions. Cederman (2001) suggests that transferring policy prerogatives to the EU modifies 
national social boundaries influencing collective identities, and policy domains differ among 
themselves in their degree of association with the aspects of identity. A transfer of policy competences 
                                                 
68 Generic support for EU governance is measured as a latent dimension (‘EU governance legitimacy’) using six policy 
sectors as indicators of this latent disposition (see Chapters 3). 
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to the EU level is recommended when this produces better (according to normative criteria) policy 
governance and when EU policy governance does not alter dramatically citizens political 
identification.  
The third perspective looks at the subjective legitimacy (Fuchs and Klingemann 2011) of EU 
governance of specific policy domains. This strand of research makes use of survey data, aggregated 
at country level, to assess levels of support for EU policy governance across countries, looking at 
macro explanations of country differences (e.g. Eichenberg and Dalton 2007) and studying how 
policy specific characteristics (meso level) influence mass attitudes towards EU policy governance 
(Hooghe 2003; Magalhaes 2012a). 
This chapter follows the third strand of research. However, instead of looking at aggregate data, it 
analyses individual-level data. The purpose is to assess whether and how individual determinants, as 
well as national contexts and policy specific characteristics, influence approval of EU governance of 
eight policy sectors: Unemployment, Health care, Fighting crime, Agricultural, Environmental, 
Immigration, Foreign, and Tax policies. In order to do so, survey data about respondents of fifteen 
EU countries in 2009 (Intune data: Cotta et al. 2009) and 2016 (Eurobarometer data: European 
Commission 2017) are analysed69.  
To test hypotheses on the determinants of support for EU policy governance, a three-step approach 
is used. First, micro-level determinants are examined and their effects compared across policy areas. 
Second, the influence of policy domain characteristics is tested controlling for micro-level 
determinants. And third, macro-level determinants are assessed for all the eight policy areas using 
2009 data (Intune data), and for Immigration and Foreign policies also with 2016 data (Eurobarometer 
86.2), in both cases controlling for micro determinants. This multilevel approach is necessary because 
individual support for EU governance can be contingent upon policy domain attributes (individual 
support is nested within policy domains) and upon national contexts (individual support is nested 
within countries). 
To accomplish this three-step approach, this chapter proceeds as follows: Section 1 reviews the 
literature on EU governance and frames the research questions. Section 2 comments cross-national 
differences on the level of support for EU governance of the eight domains, suggesting that 
differences might be explained by policy characteristics (meso level). Section 3 draws upon the 
literature on micro determinants of EU support and analyses their influence on support for EU 
governance, providing comparable results for all the eight policy areas. Section 4 adds meso level 
determinants and tests their effects on support for EU governance. Section 5 introduces macro level 
determinants to the models of Section 3 and analyses their influence, whereas Section 6 assesses 
                                                 
69 Comparable data for 2016 are limited to Immigration, and Foreign policies. 
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whether micro and macro effects vary across time, comparing effects in 2009 and in the period 2009-
2016 for two policy domains (Immigration, and Foreign policy). To conclude, section 7 debates the 
empirical results. 
Analysing 2009 data, results confirm the hypotheses on the influence of subjective utility (‘Output 
legitimacy’) and identity (‘European identification’, and also ‘exclusive national identification’) on 
the probability to support EU governance of specific policy domains. However, the influence of 
micro-level determinants varies across policy sectors according to the characteristics of the policy 
fields. Moreover, policy-level attributes have also a direct effect on support for EU policy governance, 
while macro-level determinants, instead, have a marginal role in determining this form of support. 
Finally, pooling survey data from 2016 with those from 2009, the analyses show that support for EU 
governance of Immigration and Foreign policies is also positively influenced by the respondents’ 
perception of political representation within EU institution (a micro-level determinant), and by the 
number of asylum seekers claiming international protection within each country (a macro-level 
determinant).  
1. Literature on support for EU governance of specific policy domains 
The EU is currently a multi-level system of governance (Marks et al. 1996) where policy decisions 
are taken at different territorial levels (local, national, and European). Some policy domains are fully 
governed by EU institutions70, while for others the EU has shared71 or supportive72 competencies. 
Magalhaes (2012b) recalls the sequence of the transfer of competences from EU member states to the 
EU. The first integrated sectors were trade and agricultural policies in the Treaty of Rome, signed in 
1957. Then the Single European Act (1986) integrated policies regarding regional cohesion, scientific 
research, workers’ rights and environmental protection (Magalhaes 2012b), whereas the subsequent 
treaties (Maastricht in 1992, Amsterdam in 1997, and Lisbon in 2007) did the same for political 
asylum, immigration, judicial cooperation in civil matters, and foreign and security policy (Magalhaes 
2012b).  
However, the EU is a system of differentiated integration (Schimmelfennig et al. 2015), where 
differentiation is horizontal - since many policies are not uniformly integrated across the EU’s 
                                                 
70 The EU has exclusive competence in policy sectors like customs union, competition rule for internal market, common 
commercial policy, monetary policy for Eurozone countries, and policy for conservation of marine biological resources 
(Article 3 Treaty of Lisbon – European Union 2007) 
71 The EU has shared competence with member States principally for policies regarding internal market, social policy 
(limited to regulatory issues on employment, and labour law and working conditions), economic, social and territorial 
cohesion, agriculture and fisheries, environment, consumer protection, area of freedom, security and justice (internal 
border controls and common policy on asylum, immigration, and external border control), and transport (Article 4 
Treaty of Lisbon – European Union 2007). 
72 The EU has supportive competences on protection and improvement of human health, industry, culture, tourism, and 
education. Moreover, the EU has competence to “define and implement a common foreign and security policy” (Article 
2 Treaty of Lisbon – European Union 2007), although most of the decisions require unanimity among all the EU 
countries (see http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/competences/faq?lg=en#q1 - checked 30/09/2017). 
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member states - and vertical - because integration varies across policy domains. Indeed, Alesina and 
his colleagues (2005) find empirical evidence that the amount of EU legislation varies considerably 
across policy areas. Moreover, they argue (Alesina et al. 2005) on a discrepancy between normative 
and actual allocation of power between EU institutions and the Member States. Their normative 
criteria draw upon theories of fiscal federalism (see Oates 1999), and Alesina and his colleagues 
maintain that “[The EU] should focus on policy areas where economies of scale are large, and 
internalizing externalities is important, and delegate to national or even sub-national levels of 
government the policy prerogatives where heterogeneity of preferences is predominant relative to the 
benefit of scale” (Alesina et al. 2005: 277). They show that Agriculture and International Relations 
are the policy sectors that diverge most from normative expectations: too much EU involvement in 
the former and not enough in the latter (Alesina et al. 2005).  
Hooghe (2003) also underlines there is a discrepancy between elites and public attitudes towards 
EU policy governance, where elites are, on average, more supportive than European public on the EU 
integration of ‘high’ politics sectors (currency, humanitarian aid, foreign, defense, and immigration 
and asylum policies), while the reverse is true for social inclusion policies (Hooghe 2003). 
Furthermore, Hooghe (2003) demonstrates that the level of support for EU policy governance is 
affected by specific characteristics of the policy domain. For elites, support is higher for policy sectors 
where EU governance is more effective (functional explanation). For the European public support, 
instead, is higher for policies that work as market-correcting policies (social-model explanation), 
namely policies that guarantee a EU level protection from detrimental effects of globalization 
(Magalhaes 2012b) and that “would distinguish ‘Europe’s social model’ from Anglo-Saxon liberal 
capitalism” (Delors 1992 cit. in Hooghe 2003: 4, see also Börzel 2005).  
However, Hooghe (2003) shows that for elites as well as for European citizens support for EU 
governance varies according to levels of national public expenditure on that policy field, since the 
higher budget allocation, the less support for EU governance (spending logic). The rationale is that 
integrating high-expenditure policies would require a different distribution of resources within and 
across-countries, destabilising the status quo. This would re-open political conflicts with influential 
social and political actors claiming back their rights (Hooghe 2003), once guaranteed by national 
authorities.  
Magalhaes (2012b) remarks the presence of another mechanism that links policy characteristics 
and support for integrating its governance. He finds that support for EU policy governance depends 
on the degree of involvement the EU actually has in that policy field since people become habituated 
to EU governance where the EU has more competences (Magalhaes 2012b) (habituation mechanism). 
In his analysis (Magalhaes 2012b), the author almost entirely confirms Hooghe’s (2003) results, with 
the difference that Magalhaes does not find evidence supporting the spending logic hypothesis. 
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Moreover, his analysis confirms earlier findings (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007) on the decreasing 
support for EU integration of social policies (Unemployment, Health/Welfare, and Education) in the 
post-Maastricht era (2012b). 
The shortcomings of Hooghe (2003) and Magalhaes (2012b) analyses reside in the choice of the 
unit of analysis. Both make use of survey data, but they aggregate data to compute country averages, 
which become their units of analysis. They test whether these averages vary according to country or 
policy characteristics, disregarding citizen level effects. However, a long-standing literature 
demonstrates that attitudes towards the EU are profoundly influenced by EU citizens’ interests and 
values (see Loveless and Rohrschneider 2011 for a review), and some studies empirically show that 
individual opinions and characteristics also influence support for a generic form of EU policy 
governance (De Winter and Swyngedouw 1999; Lubbers and Scheepers 2005, 2010; McLaren 2007; 
De Winter et al. 2009; Magalhaes 2012a; see Chapter 4).  
This chapter draws together these two strands of research, studying how individual (micro), as 
well as country (macro) determinants and policy (meso) level attributes influence support for EU 
governance of eight specific policy domains: Unemployment, Health care, Fighting crime, 
Agricultural, Environmental, Immigration, Foreign, and Tax policies. However, before moving to 
analyse individual-level data, the next section provides an overview of country differences in the 
2009 aggregate-level support for EU governance of these domains, where it emerges that support 
deeply varies across countries. Moreover, this analysis shows that support also varies across policies 
and that policy domain characteristics might explain this variation. 
2. Aggregate level analysis 
  Table 23 shows the country average support for EU governance of each of the eight policy sectors 
measured in 2009 by the Intune project, earlier analysed in Chapter 373.  
Policies are sorted according to their average level of support, from the lowest to the highest. 
Considering respondents of fifteen EU countries74, it emerges that the percentage of people who 
support EU policy governance is:  
 Equal or less than thirty percent for Health care, Unemployment, and Agricultural policies;  
 Between thirty and fifty percent for Fighting crime, Immigration, and Environmental 
policies; 
 More than fifty percent for Tax, and Foreign policies. 
  
                                                 
73 For operationalisation of the variables see Table 8 at page 54. 
74 Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, France, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Estonia, the UK, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, and Bulgaria. 
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Table 23 -  Country average support for EU governance. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
COUNTRY Health Unemployment Agriculture Crime Immigration Environment Tax Foreign
Average 
percentage
BELGIUM 33% 34% 43% 52% 56% 56% 66% 72% 52%
DENMARK 13% 19% 40% 37% 30% 54% 25% 68% 36%
GERMANY 21% 27% 45% 61% 48% 69% 63% 83% 52%
GREECE 22% 28% 24% 25% 42% 39% 67% 77% 41%
SPAIN 19% 34% 28% 57% 61% 57% 72% 82% 51%
FRANCE 28% 29% 40% 44% 59% 59% 66% 72% 50%
ITALIA 18% 30% 20% 32% 54% 40% 77% 79% 44%
PORTUGAL 27% 44% 30% 45% 57% 49% 62% 74% 49%
UK 9% 10% 16% 9% 25% 32% 33% 51% 23%
ESTONIA 10% 13% 14% 16% 21% 18% 46% 86% 28%
HUNGARY 21% 30% 28% 51% 52% 58% 70% 82% 49%
POLAND 24% 28% 29% 43% 52% 41% 75% 84% 47%
SLOVAKIA 25% 32% 37% 66% 58% 44% 71% 87% 53%
SLOVENIA 20% 29% 26% 41% 40% 44% 60% 72% 41%
BULGARIA 16% 16% 25% 35% 54% 47% 65% 85% 43%
Total 20% 27% 30% 42% 47% 48% 58% 74% 44%
Min 9% 10% 14% 9% 21% 18% 25% 51%
Max 33% 44% 45% 66% 61% 69% 77% 87%
N. Cases 14174 13974 13973 13797 13922 13803 13582 13683
N. Missing 916 1116 1117 1293 1168 1287 1508 1407
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There is an important variation across countries, and the UK, Estonia, and Denmark exhibit the 
highest opposition towards EU policy governance75. Estonia supports only a common Foreign policy, 
whereas UK citizens are (almost) equally split among supporters and rejecters of EU governance of 
this domain. Besides supporting Foreign policy governance, Denmark also favours a common 
European policy on Environment. The other countries do not display remarkable patterns, except 
Belgium, Germany, Hungary, and Spain, where support is consistently above the European average.  
Drawing upon the studies presented above (Hooghe 2003; Magalhaes 2012b; for functional 
interdependence see also Schimmelfennig et al. 2015), support for EU governance is expected to be 
influenced by the characteristics of the policy domains. As a first assessment of this hypothesis, the 
eight policy domains are aggregated according to four criteria: functional interdependence, social-
model, spending, and EU competences. Table 24 displays policy aggregation on these criteria76.  
Table 24 - Characteristics of the policy domains. Source Magalhaes (2012b) and author's coding for Tax policy 
  POLICY ATTRIBUTES 
POLICY 
Interdependence Social-model Gov. Spending EU Competences 
[1 = YES, 0 = NO] [1 = YES, 0 = NO] [from 0 = None, 
  to 1 = Very high] 
[from 0 = None,  
  to 1 = Very high] 
Health 0 1 1 0 
Unemployment 0 1 0.75 0.5 
Agriculture 0 0 0.5 1 
Crime 1 0 0.5 0.5 
Immigration 1 0 0.25 0.5 
Environment 1 1 0.5 0.5 
Tax 0 1 0 0 
Foreign 1 0 0 0 
Four hypotheses are proposed to account for the influence of these policy characteristics: support for 
EU governance is expected to be higher for sectors either with functional interdependence 
(Hpinterdependence), that define a EU social-model (Hpsocial-model), or already deeply integrated (HpEU-
competences), whereas it should be lower for large-expenditure sectors (Hpspending). Here, these 
hypotheses are investigated pooling sectors according to the four criteria (functional interdependence, 
social-model, spending, EU competences), and then analysing the variation of the average support. 
Figure 18 shows that policy domains with functional interdependence exhibit higher support in all 
the fifteen countries (Hpinterdepence). Figure 19 shows, instead, the absence of strong evidence 
supporting the social-model hypothesis (Hpsocial-model). Figure 20 suggests that national budget 
allocation is particularly telling for how support for EU governance works, sustaining the spending 
                                                 
75 As methodological note, missing data are excluded from the analyses.  
76 Coding for all the policy domain except for Tax policies is taken by Magalhaes (2012b). A common tax policy is coded 
as a ‘market-correcting’ policy (social-model type). 
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hypothesis (Hpspending). Finally, Figure 21 does not confirm the expected positive relationship between 
actual EU competences and support for EU policy governance (HpEU-competences). On the contrary, it 
shows the presence of the opposite effect: the greater EU competences in a policy field and the less 
public support.  
Figure 18 - Functional interdependence. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
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Figure 19 - Social-model. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
 
 
Figure 20 - Spending. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
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Figure 21 - EU competences. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
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and measurement of the concept of EU support, and they are considered as antecedents of all the four 
different forms of EU support identified in Chapter 2. Endogenous determinants are, instead, 
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specific forms of EU support. In Chapter 4, ‘Output legitimacy’, ‘European identification’ and ‘EU 
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policy domains77. The argument reported in Chapter 4 about a potential influence of ‘Output 
legitimacy’, ‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’ on generic support for EU policy 
governance holds as well for this form of policy-specific support.  
Therefore, there are six exogenous determinants (‘objective utility’, ‘confidence in national 
institutions’, ‘exclusive national identification’, ‘national attachment’, ‘cognitive mobilization’, and 
‘political values’) and three endogenous determinants (‘Output legitimacy’, ‘European identification’ 
and ‘EU democracy’) (see Sections 1 and 5 of Chapter 4). Table 25 reports the direction of the 
expected influence of these micro determinants on support for EU governance as it emerges from the 
literature on EU support. Ten hypotheses on their effects are provided. ‘Objective utility’ (Hp1), 
‘cognitive mobilization’ (Hp6), ‘Output legitimacy’ (Hp8), ‘European identification’ (Hp9), and ‘EU 
democracy’ (Hp10) are expected to be positively associated with support for EU policy governance; 
while ‘exclusive national identification’ (Hp4) and ‘national attachment’ (Hp5) are expected to have 
a negative influence. As for ‘political values’, extremist (both on the left and the right) are supposed 
to reject EU policy governance, whereas centrists are expected to support it (Hp7). Finally, the role 
of ‘confidence in national institutions’ is still debated in the literature: some argue on a transfer 
mechanism from the national to the European institutions (Hp2), while others on a substitution 
mechanism (Hp3), where EU governance is preferred by those who see their national institutions as 
corrupted. 
Table 25 - Direction of the expected influence of micro determinants 
DETERMINANTS 
EU GOVERNANCE 
LEGITIMACY 
EXOGENOUS DETERMINANT Expected effect 
Hp1 - Objective utility + 
Hp2 - Confidence in national institutions (Transfer) + 
Hp3 - Confidence in national institutions (Substitution) - 
Hp4 - Exclusive national identification - 
Hp5 - National attachment - 
Hp6 - Cognitive mobilization + 
Hp7 - Political values 
extreme left and right: - 
for centre: + 
ENDOGENOUS DETERMINANT Expected effect 
Hp8 - Output legitimacy + 
Hp9 - European identification + 
Hp10 - EU democracy + 
 
                                                 
77 In chapters 3 and 4 the dimension of ‘EU governance legitimacy’ is measured using six of these eight policy domains 
as indicators. 
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Following the design already employed in Chapter 4, nine (plus one squared term) individual-level 
variables78 are used as proxies of the exogenous determinants, while the three endogenous 
determinants are tapped with three latent dimensions of EU support: 
 ‘Objective utility’ is measured via two proxy variables: ‘Socio-economic status (SES)’ and 
‘Education’;  
 ‘Confidence in national institutions’ via the proxy variable: ‘Trust in the national 
government’;  
 ‘Exclusive national identification’ via the dummy variable that detects those with ‘Exclusive 
national identification’; 
 The strength of ‘national attachment’ is measured with the variable ‘National attachment’; 
 ‘Cognitive mobilization’ is measured via two proxy variables: ‘Knowledge of the EU’ and 
‘Education’; 
 ‘Political values’ are measured with a variable tapping ‘Left/right self-placement’ plus the 
variable squared ‘Left/right squared’, since this is the instrument to test the supposed 
curvilinear relationship between Left/right and EU support; 
 ‘Gender female’ and ‘Age’ are included in the model as controls; 
 ‘Output legitimacy’, ‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’ are measured as latent 
dimensions using the MGCFA model of Chapter 379 (see Figure 15 at page 60); 
Eight multilevel logit regressions with dichotomic dependent variable are performed (one for each 
policy) with the pooled dataset of fifteen countries, and for taking into account the hierarchical nature 
of the data country fixed effects are included80. Table 26 displays results for all the policy sectors81. 
Effects are expressed in logit coefficients and are comparable, since all the variables are rescaled to 
vary between 0 and 1. What emerges is that ‘Output legitimacy’ (Hp8) and ‘European identification’ 
(Hp9) have a consistent significant effect across policy areas (except for Environmental policy, where 
‘European identification’ does not have a significant influence). In three sectors (Unemployment, 
Health care, and Tax) the effect of ‘European identification’ is two times that of ‘Output legitimacy’. 
This means that ‘European identification’ highly discriminates between supporters and rejecters of 
integration in three out of the four policy sectors that defines a European social-model (see Table 24 
                                                 
78 For operationalization and descriptive statistics see Chapter 4.  
79 ‘Output Legitimacy’, ‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’ are factor scores measured in Chapter 3 using 
MGCFA. Since these latent variables are not measured with a bounded scale, they are rescaled to vary from 0 to 1 using 
this formula: (value – minimum) / (maximum – minimum). 
80 Analyses are performed with Stata 14 using xtlogit command. Syntax in appendix C. 
81 In order to check stability of results and considering the theorized difference between Catholic/Orthodox and 
Protestant/mixed religion countries (see Section 5), results are contrasted between the two groups. Analyses are reported 
in Table 56a-b-c in Appendix B. However, there are no remarkable differences between the two groups. 
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at page 95).  On the other hand, ‘Output legitimacy’ is the first driver of support for common 
Environmental, Immigration, and Foreign policies – all domains characterized by functional 
interdependence (see Table 24 at page 95) – showing that an instrumental logic plays a leading part 
in supporting integration. 
Table 26 - Fixed effect logit model. Source of data Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009). Logit coefficients are reported. 
MICRO LEVEL 
DETERMINANT 
Health Unemploy. Agriculture Crime Immigrat. Environm. Tax Foreign 
OUTPUT 
LEGITIMACY 
0.5* 0.49* 1.2* 0.4* 0.93* 1.1* 0.67* 1.63* 
EUROPEAN 
IDENTIFICAT. 
1.13* 1.27* 0.9* 0.68* 0.44* 0.22 1.34* 0.96* 
EU  
DEMOCRACY 
0.33 0.11 0.42* 0.10 0.21 0.45* 0.44* 0.48* 
Gender female 0.15* 0.15* 0.21* 0.06 0.02 0.17* 0.15* 0.15* 
Age -0.53* 0.22* 0.36* 0.49* -0.28* -0.29* 0.66* 0.77* 
SES: Socio-
economic status 
-0.38* -0.16 -0.09 -0.19* 0.01 -0.04 -0.31* -0.13 
Knowledge of the 
EU 
-0.15 0.03 0.2* 0.25* 0.29* 0.44* 0.02 0.41* 
Education -0.26* -0.02 0.19* 0.13 0.33* 0.58* -0.12 0.32* 
Exclusive national 
identification 
-0.10 -0.14* -0.28* -0.2* -0.33* -0.24* -0.21* -0.22* 
Trust in the 
national 
Government 
-0.25* -0.21* -0.26* -0.02 -0.07 -0.09 -0.25* 0.05 
National 
attachment 
-0.64* -0.36* -0.46* -0.24* -0.3* -0.12 -0.44* -0.15 
Left/right self-
placement 
-0.79* -0.91* -0.35 0.06 -0.29 -0.47 -0.27 1.07* 
Left/right self-
placement squared 
0.61* 0.69* 0.10 -0.29 -0.13 0.06 0.10 -1.15* 
Note: Coefficients significant at p<= 0.05 (two-tails) are marked in bold type and with the sign * 
However, with regards to ‘objective utility’ (Hp1), ‘Socio-economic status (SES)’ is not positively 
associated with EU governance in any policy areas, and it is negatively associated in three of them 
(Fighting crime, Health care, and Tax policies). The other proxy of ‘objective utility’, namely 
‘Education’, has a positive effect on support for EU governance of four policy sectors (Agricultural, 
Environment, Immigration, and Foreign policies), but a negative effect on Health care policy. 
Combining these findings, it emerges that an instrumental logic passes through subjective (‘Output 
legitimacy’) rather than objective utility. 
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Compared to ‘Output legitimacy’ and ‘European identification’, ‘EU democracy’ (Hp10) has only 
a minor role in four areas (Agriculture, Environment, Tax, and Foreign policies), a sign of a relatively 
lower salience of this issue (at least in 2009). Considering the emphasis on this issue in the literature 
(see e.g. Follesdal and Hix 2006; Hix 2008; Schmidt 2013) perceived ‘democratic deficit’ was 
expected to have a higher discriminatory power, and this result does not fully confirm earlier 
empirical studies (McLaren 2007; Magalhaes 2012b)82. 
The effect of ‘trust in the national government’ shows that a ‘substitution’ mechanisms is active 
in four policy domains (Hp3). Indeed, for social (Unemployment and Health care), Agricultural, and 
Tax policies, EU citizens tend to support a transfer of competencies to the EU when they distrust their 
national government. This confirms the findings of Sanchez-Cuenca (2000), although his object of 
study was not support for EU policy governance. This result should be read in combination with the 
findings of Chapter 4 since in those analyses ‘Trust in the national government’ was positively – and 
not negatively – associated with the other dimensions of EU support (‘Output legitimacy’, ‘European 
identification’, and ‘EU democracy’).  
In addition, ‘national attachment’ is another example of an attitude that has different effects when 
changing the object of support. Indeed, it is negatively associated with preferences for EU governance 
in six policy areas (Hp5), while it was a leading driver of ‘European identification’ (see Chapter 4). 
This means that two mechanisms are working concurrently, one favouring a European community 
building project, and the other one opposing a European policy governance. Considered together, it 
is evident that EU governance is (correctly) perceived as a substitute of national governance, and this 
contrasts with the preferences of those attached to their national level. As for the role played by 
‘exclusive national identification’, it confirms being a source of opposition towards EU governance 
(Hp4), since it decreases the probability to support EU governance for seven policy domains.  
The hypothesis on the influence of ‘cognitive mobilization’ (Hp6) involved two proxies: 
‘Education’ and ‘Knowledge of the EU’. As already reported, ‘Education’ is positively associated 
with support for EU governance of four policy sectors, and negatively for one sector, while 
‘Knowledge of the EU’ has a positive effect on five sectors (Fighting crime, Agricultural, 
Environmental, Immigration, and Foreign policies). Hence, this hypothesis can be accepted. 
Finally, the hypothesised curvilinear relationship between left/right self-placement and support for 
EU policy governance is confirmed only for Foreign policy (Hp7). Some specifications should be 
provided. It is true that a curvilinear relationship fits data well for three policy areas (Unemployment, 
Health care, and Foreign policies) (see Table 26), but in two out of the three cases respondents on the 
two extremes are more supportive than centrists, and this contradicts the hypothesis. Computing 
                                                 
82 More on this in Section 6. 
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predicted probabilities83, it emerges that most of the curvilinearity is due to the left side, where people 
are more supportive than in the centre and on the right side. Running the model again without the 
squared term, a significant linear relationship appears for all the policy areas but Foreign policy 
(Table 27), with the result that the more respondent is right wing, the more it opposes EU policy 
governance.  
Table 27 - Left/Right linear. Source of data Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
MICRO LEVEL 
DETERMINANT 
Health Unemploy. Agriculture Crime Immigrat. Environm. Tax Foreign 
Left/right  
self-placement  
linear effect 
-0.2* -0.23* -0.25* -0.22* -0.41* -0.4* -0.17* -0.07 
Note: Coefficients significant at p<= 0.05 (two-tails) are marked in bold type and with the sign * 
Overall, the effect of micro-level determinants is not the same in all the policy areas. ‘European 
identification’ and ‘Output legitimacy’ are the predominant drivers of EU support. The latter is more 
influential in policy areas where functional interdependence is present, while the former leads support 
in domains that constitute a European social-model. The other determinants have certainly a role, but 
their magnitude is lower. It is important to note that ‘confidence in national institutions’ and political 
representation within the EU (‘EU democracy’) have an influence in some but not all policy domains, 
meaning that the overall salience of these factors is lower.  Finally, as noted in Chapter 4, the 
relationship with political left/right is largely linear, and right-wing respondents exhibit lower support 
than left-wing. These findings contradict prior studies (e.g. Steenbergen et al. 2007; De Vries and 
Edwards 2009; Lubbers and Scheepers 2010; Van Elsas and Van der Brug 2014), showing the two 
extremes do not converge in opposing European policy governance. To conclude, these analyses 
suggest that the characteristics of the policy domains modify the effect of micro-level determinants 
(especially ‘Output legitimacy’ and ‘European identification’), but it does not analyse their direct 
influence on support for EU governance: this issue is addressed in the next section, where policy-
level attributes enter the model. 
4. Testing policy-level hypotheses 
This section focusses on the four policy-level hypotheses proposed in Section 2. They maintain that 
support for EU governance of specific policy domains is more likely when EU governance is more 
effective (Hpinterdepence), or it guarantees a EU level protection from detrimental effects of globalisation 
(Hpsocial-model) (Magalhaes 2012b), or the EU has already strong competences in that field (HpEU-
competences); conversely, support for EU governance is less likely for policy domains that are extensively 
financed by the national government (Hpspending).  
                                                 
83 Not shown, available by request. 
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In order to test these hypotheses controlling for alternative micro-level explanations, the dataset is 
restructured as a stacked dataset, using the following procedure: N respondents were asked about 
eight policy domains, and, thus, there are eight dichotomous variables (support for EU vs national or 
sub-national governance) and N respondents. To create the stacked format, each respondent is 
included eight times in the dataset, one time for each policy domains. This brings the total number of 
cases to N*8. Instead of having eight separated policy variables, a new variable is computed: it 
contains the value of the first policy variable for case 1 to case N, the value of the second policy 
variable from case N+1 to case 2*N, and so on for the remaining six policy variables. Afterwards, 
this new variable becomes the dependent variable of a logit regression, and the same micro-level 
variables of Section 3 are included as determinants of its outcomes. As well, policy level 
characteristics introduced in Section 2 and reported in Table 24 at page 95 (functional 
interdependence, social-model, government spending, and EU competences) are included in the 
model84.  
Sixteen models are tested: one for each country, and one for the pooled dataset where country-
level differences are accounted for by country dummies. Table 28 displays the effects85 of the policy 
level determinants86 in these sixteen models. Starting from the pooled model, all the four effects are 
significant. The highest effect is given by level of governmental spending on a policy field: the higher 
the budget allocation that a policy field requires, the lower the support for EU policy governance 
(Hpspending). This confirms earlier findings (Hooghe 2003), showing that when the cost in terms of 
national redistribution of resources is large, support for a policy level shift substantially decreases. 
Looking at the country models, in every country the direction of the effect is the same, providing 
even more support to this argument. This suggest that a wider EU governance is unlikely to be 
legitimate if this would involve policy domains deeply financed with national taxes. 
The second in order of magnitude is the effect of actual EU competences. Magalhaes (2012b) 
provides findings supporting a positive relationship between actual competences and support for EU 
governance, but results of this analysis do not confirm this hypothesis (HpEU-competences), and proves 
that, controlling for the other three characteristics, the more competences the EU has in one field, the 
lower is support for EU governance of that policy field87. The supposed habituation mechanism is, 
instead, a disaffection mechanism. When the EU is responsible for policy governance, its decisions 
are not fully approved by citizens: this is shown by the fact that experiencing EU governance 
                                                 
84 To account for the fact that policies are clustered within respondents, a panel data correction procedure is employed 
(Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008) (see Appendix C for Stata syntax). 
85 The effect is expressed in logit coefficient. 
86 Since the focus of this section is on policy level determinants, individual level parameters are not shown in the text. 
Full results are available by request. 
87 This result confirms what already suggested by aggregate level analysis in the concluding of Section 2. 
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decreases individual support for EU policy governance. However, Denmark, and to some extent 
Germany, are outliers. Indeed, evidence of the habituation mechanism is found in Denmark, where 
EU competences have a positive influence, while in Germany none of the two mechanisms 
(habituation vs disaffection) drives individual-level support. Within the framework of this thesis, no 
explanation accounting for Denmark are provided, and further researches should replicate these 
findings for taking this result as confirmed.  
Table 28 - Random intercepts policy model. Source of data Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
  POLICY ATTRIBUTES 
MODEL 
Interdependence  Gov. Spending Social-model       
EU 
Competences 
[1 = YES, 0 = NO] 
[from 0 = None, 
to 1 = Very high] 
[1 = YES, 0 = 
NO] 
[from 0 = None, to 
1 = Very high] 
Country 
dummy 0.56* -2.38* 0.15* -0.68* 
Belgium 0.38* -1.76* 0.06 -0.36* 
Denmark 1.53* -2.16* 0.09 0.95* 
Germany 1.41* -3.11* 0.44* 0.05 
Greece 0.09 -2.6* 0.24* -1.32* 
Spain 0.93* -2.75* 0.35* -0.78* 
France 0.73* -2.93* 0.3* -0.61* 
Italy 0.18* -3.63* 0.4* -1.45* 
Portugal 0.57* -1.73* 0.38* -0.69* 
UK 1.25* -4.49* 0.69* -1.18* 
Estonia 0.25* -3.05* -0.6* -2.02* 
Hungary 0.78* -2.47* 0.41* -0.84* 
Poland 0.18* -3.44* -0.01 -1.47* 
Slovakia 0.56* -2.75* -0.36* -0.78* 
Slovenia 0.44* -2.18* 0.26* -0.76* 
Bulgaria 0.74* -3.38* 0.01 -0.93* 
Note: Coefficients significant at p<= 0.05 (two-tails) are marked in bold type and with the sign * 
The third effect is that of functional interdependence. Higher support for EU governance is 
expected for policies that should - normatively speaking - be decided at the supranational level. This 
hypothesis is confirmed (HpInterdependence) by the pooled model (country dummies) as well as by 
separated country models (but the effect is not significant in Greece). This support the idea that 
citizens are receptive to normative arguments, and favour EU governance when it is necessary to 
effectively pursue policy goals.  
The last policy characteristic is the one with the smallest effect and where the country level 
variation is remarkable. The social-model hypothesis (Hpsocial-model) prescribes that support is higher 
when policy integration would produce a social Europe that corrects market and globalisation failures 
with European level policies. The pooled model supports this hypothesis, although the effect is 
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decisively low. Decomposing global effect in country effects, it emerges that in nine out of fifteen 
countries this effect is small but positive and significant. In four countries (Belgium, Denmark, 
Poland, and Bulgaria) is not significant, and in the remaining two (Estonia, and Slovakia) the direction 
is even negative, contrasting with the expectations. Therefore, in eastern Europe, this hypothesis is 
much less convincing than in western Europe. This might depend on the different meaning that EU 
integration has in western and eastern Europe (adapting an intuition of Medrano 2003). 
Overall, these results shed light on the influence of policy characteristics on support for their 
integration. As shown, most of the influence derives from a simple spending logic: respondents want 
governance of high-spending policy remains within their national state borders. Hooghe (2003) 
maintains that this opposition originates from a willingness to preserve the status quo, which has its 
roots in societal conflicts already solved. I propose another explanation of why people do not support 
the integration of high-spending policies. My idea is in line with the subsidiarity principle. People are 
likely to prefer policy governance to be as close as possible to them. This is even more important in 
the case of large expenditure policies. People may want to change the status quo, but they can do it 
easily if policies are governed at the national or subnational level. In some policy areas, there is a 
trade-off between effectiveness and the national (or local) governance, and this generates higher (but 
not full) support for EU governance, but not in all of them. In the absence of this trade-off, the most 
rational choice is the national (or local) level. 
5. Testing macro-level hypotheses 
In the previous sections, micro and policy-level determinants were tested. At the micro level, 
‘European identification’ and ‘Output legitimacy’ drive support for EU governance of specific policy 
domains, while other citizens’ attitudes and characteristics have a secondary role. At the meso-level, 
respondents mainly support EU governance of policy sectors that have a low impact on country’s 
budget and for which the EU has, currently, low powers. This section surveys the literature on macro 
determinants, providing hypotheses and testing the effect of macro determinants on support for EU 
governance of the eight policy domains. The measurement strategy for each of the macro 
determinants included in the analysis is reported in the text footnotes. 
Macro-level mechanisms are more complex and less straightforward than micro-level. For 
instance, some studies demonstrate that macro determinants do not directly influence EU support 
(Gabel and Whitten 1997; Gabel 1998b), and recent studies show that more than having a direct 
effect, national contexts change the effect of individual-level determinants (Hobolt and de Vries 2017; 
see also Brinegar et al. 2004; Garry and Tilley 2009).  
However, Magalhaes (2012a) shows that the quality of national governance influences the support 
towards a generic EU policy governance, both directly – better national governance decreases 
respondent willingness to transfer policy competences to the EU – and indirectly – effects of micro-
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level attitudes vary according to the quality of the national governance. Unfortunately, the limited 
number of countries (fifteen) in the dataset here employed (Intune 2009) does not allow testing cross-
level effects for all the eight policy domains separately (see Stegmueller 2013), and for this reason, 
in relation to all these eight policies, only a direct effect of quality of governance88 will be tested 
(Hpgovquality). 
Furthermore, in the literature, a highly relevant contextual determinant is politicisation (de Wilde 
2011; Grande et al. 2016). The concept of politicisation is defined by Grande and his colleagues 
(2016) as the transfer of societal conflicts into the party system, and by de Wilde as “an increase in 
polarization of opinions, interests or values and the extent to which they are publicly advanced 
towards the process of policy formulation within the EU” (de Wilde 2011: 560).  
There are two opposite beliefs about the effects of politicisation: some see it as a fundamental 
driver of EU legitimacy (e.g. Follesdal and Hix 2006; Hix 2008), otherwise EU governance is simply 
“policy without politics” (Schmidt 2013); while others see politicisation as a product of Eurosceptic 
claims leaning to open room for further opposition (e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2009; Hooghe et al. 
2017).  
The results of the process of politicisation are visible in the party positions regarding the EU and 
its policy competences. In this chapter, three proxies are used to tap this party support in the fifteen 
national party systems: (1) the party system average of party support for European integration, (2) the 
party system average of party evaluation of benefit from EU membership, and (3) the party system 
average on party support of transferring competencies to the EU. The first two are measured using 
the Chapel hill expert survey 2010 (Bakker et al. 2015)89, and the third one with data from the 2009 
Euromanifesto study (Braun et al. 2010)90. It is expected a positive influence on support for EU 
governance of all three measures of party system positions, where the more is the party system 
support, the more likely is the respondents support for EU policy governance (Hppartysystem). 
Besides differences between party systems, national religious culture is within the set of macro-
level explanations that account for cross-country differences. Boomgaarden and Freire (2009) 
empirically test whether different religious traditions play a role in influencing support towards the 
                                                 
88 The measure of quality of national governance is taken from The Quality of Government OECD dataset and refers to 
the year 2008 (Teorell et al. 2017). 
89 Each party position is weighted for the relative salience of European integration for that party (adapting an intuition 
provided by Grande et al. 2016), and for the percentage of votes received in 2009 European Elections, or last general 
election when missing. 
90 An index of party system support for EU power is computed as follows: (1) for each party, I aggregate positive 
statements for competences delegated to the EU in general, the European Parliament, and the Commission; (2) I 
aggregate negative statements of the same categories; (3) following Lowe (et al. 2011) formula I compute the difference 
between natural logarithm of [total positive + 0.5], and natural logarithm of [total negative + 0.5]; (3) I weight party 
position for the percentage of party votes in 2009 European Elections, or last general election when missing; (4) I 
calculate the country average summing these weighted party polarizations separately for each country, and, then, 
dividing for the sum of votes for each national party. 
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EU. They find that Protestant and mixed religion countries are more Eurosceptic than Catholic and 
Orthodox. According to Boomgaarden and Freire (2009), this confirms that religious context and 
religious tradition influence attitudes on the EU and a supranational centralised authority. Their 
principal argument for this division resides in the fact that “[…] the project of European unification 
is based on Christian values such as charity, peace and social justice (see Madeley 2007)” 
(Boomgaarden and Freire 2009). Then, the hypothesis accounts for this difference in EU support 
between Protestant/mixed religion countries and Catholic/Orthodox countries91 (Hpreligion). 
Furthermore, there are six other hypotheses that are policy specific. The first one links country 
unemployment rate92 with preferences for EU governance of this policy field. The idea is that in case 
of high unemployment rate, EU citizens may support a transfer of competences towards the EU, 
expecting the EU to increase social security measure financing high spending policies (Hpunmployment). 
A similar mechanism is supposed for the case of Environmental policy. When environmental 
protection93 is loosely guaranteed by national governments, citizens can look to the EU for dealing 
with this issue (Hpenvironmental).  
Moreover, one can argue that when in a member country there is an important number of migrants 
claiming international protection (asylum seekers94), citizens are likely to ask the EU to manage (or 
finance the management of) this migration. Indeed, the Dublin regulation95 establishes that the 
Member States are responsible for examining migrants’ applications for international protection. 
Hence, EU rules oblige arrival countries to manage immigration, and when this becomes problematic, 
citizens can require more EU governance of this issue (Hpimmigration). In addition, the number of asylum 
seekers may have an impact on citizens’ support for a EU Foreign policy. Since the EU may 
collaborate with third states (i.e. Turkey, Libya or Egypt) to manage the immigration influx, citizens 
can support more EU competences to easily arrange this kind of agreements (Hpforeign).  
Furthermore, national public health care system has a valuable variability across EU countries, 
and, as part of the welfare state, it has already been related to EU support (see Brinegar and Jolly 
2005). In this analysis, it is supposed that when public expenditure for health care system96 is high, 
support for a EU governance of this domain is unlikely (Hphealth). Indeed, there are no incentives for 
                                                 
91 Country religious context is defined following Boomgaarden and Freire (2009).  Germany and Estonia are mixed 
religion countries, Denmark and the UK are Protestant, Greece and Bulgaria are Orthodox, and the others are Catholic. 
92 Unemployment rate is taken from The Quality of Government OECD dataset and refers to the year 2008 (Teorell et al. 
2017). 
93 Index of environmental protection is taken from The Quality of Government OECD dataset and refers to the year 2008 
(Teorell et al. 2017). 
94 Number of asylum seeker per country is taken from Eurostat data and refers to the year 2008: 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_asydcfsta&lang=en. (checked 30/09/2017) 
95 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN-IT/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013R0604&fromTab=ALL&from=EN (checked 
30/09/2017) 
96 Percentage of yearly public expenditure on health care system relative to government budget is taken from The Quality 
of Government OECD dataset and refers to the year 2008 (Teorell et al. 2017). 
109 
 
demanding a shift of authority. Conversely, when public investment is low, citizens can advocate an 
EU intervention in the field. 
Finally, the last hypothesis considers Agricultural policy. This field is one of the most integrated 
domains in the EU, and the EU devotes about 45% of its budget to the common Agricultural policy97. 
For this reason, it is expected that the more important is the Agricultural sector for the national GDP98, 
the higher is support for EU governance of this domain (Hpagriculture).  
Table 29 below reports the list of these hypotheses with the expected influence on support for EU 
policy governance. 
Table 29 - Direction of the expected influence of macro determinants 
MACRO EXOGENOUS DETERMINANTS EU governance legitimacy 
 Expected effect 
HPgovquality: Quality of national governance + (for all the eight policies) 
HPpartysystem: Party system EU support + (for all the eight policies) 
HPreligion: Catholic/Orthodox countries + (for all the eight policies) 
HPunmployment: Unemployment rate + (for Unemployment policy) 
HPenvironment: Environmental protection -  (for Environmental policy) 
HPimmigration: Number of asylum seekers + (for Immigration policy) 
HPforeign: Number of asylum seekers + (for Foreign policy) 
HPhealth: National public expenditure for health care system - (for Health care policy) 
HPagriculture: Importance of agricultural sector for the national GDP + (for Agricultural policy) 
Ten macro-level variables are used to test these hypotheses, and four additional control variables are 
included as well in the model: one that accounts for length of country EU membership, one for 
geographic location (northern, eastern, or southern Europe), one for GDP pro-capita, and another one 
that accounts for horizontal differentiation among countries (Schimmelfennig et al. 2015) dividing 
countries in Eurozone and not Eurozone members.  
The analysis proceeds as follows: this section tests the effects of macro determinants on support 
for EU governance of eight policy areas using data from the 2009 dataset; afterwards, in the next 
section pooling data from the 2016 EB survey, these effects are tested again for two policy areas 
(Immigration, and Foreign policies). Table 30a-b provides country values of macro variables for the 
years 2008 and 2015 - except data from Chapel hill expert surveys that refer to years 2010 (Bakker 
et al. 2015) and 2014 (Polk et al. 2017), and those from Euromanifesto study that refer to years 2009 
(Braun et al. 2010) and 2014 (Schmitt 2016). Variables that initially do not range between 0 and 1 
are rescaled to vary between this range99. Unfortunately, many macro data are missing for Bulgaria. 
                                                 
97 https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/cap-post-2013/graphs/graph1_en.pdf (checked 30/09/2017) 
98 Percentage of agriculture on country GDP is taken from The Quality of Government OECD dataset and refers to the 
year 2008 (Teorell et al. 2017). 
99 When variables are not dichotomic, or they do not have been measured with a scale that ranges from 0 to 1, variables 
are rescaled using this formula: (value – minimum) / (maximum – minimum). Index of party system support for EU 
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To limit this problem, and to deal with another potential bias that comes from the limited number of 
countries (see Stegmueller 2013) I decided to divide macro variables in three blocks: (1) party system 
(‘EU support’, ‘EU benefit’, and ‘EU powers’), (2) history and culture (‘length of membership’, 
‘location’, ‘Eurozone membership’, and ‘Catholic or Orthodox country’), and (3) society and 
economy (‘quality of governance’, ‘GDP pro-capita’, ‘unemployment rate’, ‘public health 
expenditure’, ‘GDP from agriculture’, ‘environmental protection’, and ‘asylum seekers’). Therefore, 
for each policy domain, three multilevel logit models with random intercept (see Rabe-Hesketh and 
Skrondal 2008) are run. For each model, the same micro-level exogenous and endogenous 
determinants are included (see Section 3), and only country-level variables differ. This design limits 
at most any variation of individual-level parameters, since they remain rather stable across the three 
different models, but allows testing all the hypotheses, which otherwise would not be possible. 
Table 31 displays the results for all the eight policy sectors in 2009100. Individual-level variables 
do not vary their effects from previous results (see Section 3), remaining stable when moving from 
fixed country intercepts to random intercepts modelling101.  Focussing on macro effects, looking at 
this table it emerges a very poor influence of country-level determinants, with a few, policy specific, 
exceptions. 
Within the cluster of history and culture, only religious traditions confirm their relevance in 
influencing support for European integration: support for EU policy governance is more likely in 
Catholic or Orthodox countries with regards to common Unemployment, Health care, Immigration, 
and Tax policies. Hence, Hpreligion is partly verified, although it is not valid for all the policy domains. 
Furthermore, the not significant effects of party system characteristics demonstrate that national 
party systems do not consistently influence policy governance preferences. It is true that party system 
position matters for Unemployment and Foreign policies, however, this effect is either modest (for 
Unemployment policy) or unclear (for Foreign policy). In this latter case, two indicators of party 
system position manifest divergent effects, resulting in an unclear pattern102. Moreover, for Tax 
policy, the effect of the party system is the opposite of what expected. All things considered, these 
results do not confirm the party system hypothesis (Hppartysytem).  
   
                                                 
power, length of membership, absolute number of asylum seekers, and GDP pro capita are all rescaled in this way. 
Therefore, the lowest value among the fifteen countries equals 0 and the highest value is 1. Unemployment rate, 
percentage of budget for public health system, percentage of GDP from agriculture, and index of environmental 
protection have a scale that ranges from 0 to 100 (%), and so their values are divided by 100. 
100 Effects are expressed in logit coefficients. 
101 Analyses are performed with Stata 14 using xtlogit command. Syntax in Appendix C. 
102 Since for this policy there are data available for both 2009 and 2016, I will return on this later. 
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Table 30a - Country values of macro variables 
COUNTRY 
Scale party 
system - EU 
support [0-1] 
Scale party 
system - EU 
benefit [0-1]  
GDP PRO 
CAPITA 
*normalized [0-
1] 
Lenght of 
membership 
*normalized 
[0,1] 
Location 
UNEMPL. 
RATE [0-1] 
BUDGET 
PUBLIC 
HEALTH 
SYSTEM [0-1] 
2010 2014 2010 2014 2008 2015 2009-2016 2009-2016 2008 2008 
BELGIUM 0.81 0.79 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.72 1.00 1 = North 0.07 0.15 
DENMARK 0.55 0.45 0.64 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.68 1 = North 0.03 0.17 
GERMANY 0.79 0.75 0.93 0.84 0.89 0.74 1.00 1 = North 0.08 0.19 
GREECE 0.66 0.60 0.83 0.63 0.56 0.24 0.52 2 = South 0.08 0.12 
SPAIN 0.86 0.87 0.92 0.87 0.69 0.41 0.42 2 = South 0.12 0.16 
FRANCE 0.72 0.48 0.77 0.54 0.75 0.64 1.00 1 = North 0.07 0.16 
ITALY 0.73 0.52 0.81 0.53 0.75 0.50 1.00 2 = South 0.07 0.14 
PORTUGAL 0.84 0.75 0.86 0.80 0.35 0.27 0.42 2 = South 0.08 0.15 
UK 0.31 0.36 0.41 0.43 0.87 0.80 0.68 1 = North 0.05 0.15 
ESTONIA 0.86 0.89 0.88 0.95 0.20 0.22 0.06 3 =East 0.06 0.12 
HUNGARY 0.72 0.44 0.73 0.61 0.12 0.12 0.06 3 =East 0.08 0.10 
POLAND 0.75 0.69 0.82 0.81 0.00 0.12 0.06 3 =East 0.07 0.11 
SLOVAKIA 0.72 0.70 0.89 0.85 0.25 0.20 0.06 3 =East 0.10 0.16 
SLOVENIA 0.82 0.87 0.85 0.87 0.51 0.30 0.06 3 =East 0.04 0.14 
BULGARIA 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.86 0.00 - 0.00 3 = East - - 
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Table 30b - Country values of macro variables 
COUNTRY 
Scale party 
system - EU 
powers 
normalized [0-1] 
QUALITY OF 
GOV INDEX 
[0-1] 
ABS NUMB OF 
ASYLUM 
SEEKERS 
rescaled [0,1] 
Eurozone 
Catholic or 
Orthodox 
country 
GDP FROM 
AGRICULT. 
2008 [0-1] 
INDEX OF 
ENVIROMENT 
PROTECTION 
2008 [0-1] 
2009 2014 2008 2015 2008 2015 2009-2016 2009-2016 2008 2008 
BELGIUM 0.79 0.96 0.81 0.86 0.41 0.08 1 = Yes 1 = Yes 0.01 0.90 
DENMARK 0.46 0.30 0.97 0.97 0.04 0.05 0 = No 0 = No 0.01 0.98 
GERMANY 0.54 0.47 0.89 0.89 0.61 1.00 1 = Yes 0 = No 0.01 0.93 
GREECE 0.93 0.44 0.61 0.64 0.93 0.04 1 = Yes 1 = Yes 0.03 0.91 
SPAIN 1.00 0.52 0.75 0.72 0.16 0.01 1 = Yes 1 = Yes 0.02 0.97 
FRANCE 0.34 0.20 0.81 0.78 1.00 0.31 1 = Yes 1 = Yes 0.02 0.95 
ITALY 0.52 1.00 0.57 0.57 0.64 0.29 1 = Yes 1 = Yes 0.02 0.82 
PORTUGAL 0.81 0.27 0.75 0.75 0.00 0.00 1 = Yes 1 = Yes 0.02 0.96 
UK 0.00 0.00 0.86 0.89 0.75 0.15 0 = No 0 = No 0.01 0.97 
ESTONIA 0.40 0.77 0.60 0.65 0.00 0.00 0 = No 0 = No 0.03 0.86 
HUNGARY 0.42 0.22 0.64 0.64 0.03 0.01 0 = No 1 = Yes 0.04 0.88 
POLAND 0.55 0.22 0.64 0.69 0.13 0.01 0 = No 1 = Yes 0.03 0.76 
SLOVAKIA 0.37 0.65 0.61 0.64 0.01 0.00 1 = Yes 1 = Yes 0.04 0.88 
SLOVENIA 0.63 0.62 0.66 0.69 0.00 0.00 1 = Yes 1 = Yes 0.02 0.93 
BULGARIA 0.32 0.30 - - 0.02 0.02 0 = No 0 = Yes - - 
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Table 31 - Random intercepts macro model. Source of data Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
MICRO LEVEL DETERMINANTS Health Unemploy. Agriculture Crime Immigrat. Environm. Tax Foreign 
OUTPUT LEGITIMACY 0.49* 0.48* 1.2* 0.4* 0.93* 1.1* 0.67* 1.64* 
EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION 1.14* 1.26* 0.89* 0.69* 0.44* 0.22 1.33* 0.97* 
EU DEMOCRACY 0.33 0.1 0.42* 0.09 0.22 0.45* 0.45* 0.49* 
Gender female 0.15* 0.15* 0.21* 0.06 0.02 0.17* 0.15* 0.15* 
Age -0.53* 0.22* 0.36* 0.49* -0.28* -0.29* 0.66* 0.76* 
SES: Socio-economic status -0.37* -0.15 -0.08 -0.19* 0.01 -0.03 -0.31* -0.15 
Knowledge of the EU -0.14* 0.04 0.21* 0.25* 0.29* 0.44* 0.02 0.39* 
Education -0.26* -0.02 0.19* 0.12 0.33* 0.57* -0.12 0.32* 
Exclusive national identification -0.1 -0.15* -0.29* -0.2* -0.33* -0.24* -0.21* -0.22* 
Trust in the national Government -0.26 -0.21* -0.25* -0.02 -0.08 -0.09 -0.27* 0.03 
National attachment -0.64* -0.36* -0.46* -0.24* -0.3* -0.12 -0.44* -0.14 
Left/right self-placement -0.79* -0.9* -0.34 0.06 -0.30 -0.47 -0.28 1.07* 
Left/right self-placement squared 0.61* 0.68* 0.10 -0.29 -0.12 0.06 0.11 -1.14* 
MACRO LEVEL DETERMINANTS                 
Scale party sytem EU support -0.55 -0.17 -1.96 -1.44 0.80 -0.71 -0.31* -0.36 
Scale of party system eval.of EU memb. benefit 1.98 1.37 3.19 5.60 0.94 1.00 3.60 4.58* 
Index of party system support for EU power  0.39 1.02* 0.30 -0.13 0.23 0.47 -0.09 -0.91* 
                  
Lenght of membership 0.10 -0.09 -0.38 -0.48 0.27 -0.54 1.69* 0.87 
Location (ref= north)                 
South -0.51 -0.01 -0.97 -0.77 -0.05 -0.78 0.76* 0.85* 
East -0.19 -0.09 -0.75 -0.18 -0.02 -0.98 1.74* 1.72* 
Eurozone member 0.37 0.48 0.41 0.92* -0.04 0.15 0.15 0.15 
Catholic or Ortodox country 0.67* 0.55* 0.37 0.52 1.11* 0.62 0.71* -0.22 
                  
QUALITY OF GOV INDEX 2008 -0.28 -0.06 3.52* 1.64 -0.55 2.61 -3.68* -1.58 
GDP PRO CAPITA 2008 -0.40 -0.19 0.19 -0.82 -0.41 -0.15 0 -0.58 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 2008 - 11.90 - - - - - - 
% OF GDP FOR PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEM 
2008 
5.11 - - - - - - - 
% OF GDP FROM AGRICULTURE - - 30.08 - - - - - 
INDEX OF ENVIROMENT PROTECTION 
2008 
- - - - - -0.5 - - 
NUMBER OF ASYLUM SEEKERS - - - - 0.23 - - -0.24 
                  
Rho null model 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.15 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.06 
Note: Coefficients significant at p<= 0.05 (two-tails) are marked in bold type and with the sign * 
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The quality of governance is the only determinant within the cluster of society and economy 
drivers that exerts a significant effect at least in two policy domains: Agricultural, and Tax policies. 
Hpgovquality sustains that the higher the quality of country democracy, the less likely is the support for 
EU governance. This mechanism is active only for Tax policy, showing that support for fiscal 
integration derives from a poor quality of national institutions. This is particularly interesting since 
this is an area where the EU has very limited competences, and there is no pressure for integration 
from normative prescription (no functional interdependence). Hence, when national governance is 
ineffective, a common EU tax governance is welcome. However, the relation between quality of 
national democracy and support for EU governance is the opposite for Agricultural policy, and 
support is higher where national institutions perform better. Therefore, no ultimate answers are found, 
and further researches on these policy domains should be carried on.  
Overall, the influence of country-level determinants is far from being clear. Only religious 
tradition exerts a consistent effect, at least across four policy areas. The other determinants have 
policy-specific effects, but even in those cases, findings are sometimes counter-intuitive (see ‘quality 
of democracy’ for Agricultural policy, and party system indicators for Foreign policy and Tax policy). 
To conclude, these results do not provide support for most of the macro level hypotheses provided 
above. This poor performance may originate from many sources of bias, at the theoretical as well as 
at the methodological level. In the next section, pooling data from the year 2016, two sources of bias 
are addressed: limited time span, and limited variation among macro variables. 
6. From 2009 to 2016: different explanations? 
Up to here, we concentrated on data from the year 2009. This focus depended on data availability. 
However, for two policy sectors, there are highly comparable data collected in November 2016 
(Eurobarometer 86.2: European Commission 2017). To make them fully compatible, measurement 
of ‘Output legitimacy’, ‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’ must be changed, since there 
are not enough indicators to measure them as latent dimensions of EU support. For this reason, one 
proxy variable is used for ‘Output legitimacy’, one for ‘European identification’, and an index of 
three variables is created for ‘EU democracy’. The operationalisation is reported in Table 57 in 
Appendix B.  
The analytical strategy is the same of Section 5: thirty country-year samples are pooled together103, 
and three sets of macro determinants104 are tested with three separate models using multilevel logit 
models with random country intercepts105. One dummy variable corresponding to 2016 is included in 
                                                 
103 There are two surveys for each of the fifteen countries included in the Intune 2009 data. 
104 For macro level data regarding the year 2015, the data sources are the same as for 2008 data, except for party system 
data: to measure 2015 party system average Chapel hill expert survey 2014 (Polk et al. 2017) and Euromanifesto study 
2014 (Schmitt et al. 2016) are used. 
105 Analyses are performed with Stata 14 using melogit command. Syntax in appendix C. 
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the model, and it accounts for a time effect. Micro-level variables are included as well106. This strategy 
gives comparability of results between 2009 and 2009-2016 data: column 2 and 4 of Table 32 reports 
results for 2009-2016 pooled dataset, while column 1 and 3 displays 2009 data only (already provided 
in Table 31 of Section 5).  
Table 32 - Random intercepts macro model 2009/2016. Source of data Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) and EB 86.2 (European 
Commission 2017) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
MICRO LEVEL DETERMIINANTS 
2009 
immigration 
2009-2016 
immigration 
2009           
foreign 
2009-2016 
foreign 
OUTPUT LEGITIMACY (model 1) | 
OVERALL EU MEMBERSHIP 
EVALUATION (model 2) 
0.93* 0.5* 1.64* 0.63* 
EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION (model 1) | 
ATTACHMENT TOWARDS EUROPE 
(model 2) 
0.44* 0.31* 0.97* 0.66* 
EU DEMOCRACY factor (model 1) | INDEX 
OF EVAL. EU DEMOCRACY (model 2) 
0.22 1.00* 0.49* 1.36** 
Gender female 0.02 0.01 0.15* 0.06 
Age -0.28* 0.00 0.76* 0.68* 
SES: Socio-economic status 0.01 0.13 -0.15 -0.02 
Knowledge of the EU 0.29* 0.49* 0.39* 0.59* 
Education 0.33* 0.2* 0.32* 0.21* 
Exclusive national identification -0.33* -0.34* -0.22* -0.27* 
Trust in the national Government -0.08 -0.08 0.03 -0.01 
National attachment -0.3* -0.29* -0.14 -0.08 
Left/right self-placement -0.30 -0.20 1.07* 0.99* 
Left/right self-placement squared -0.12 -0.25 -1.14* -1.04* 
MACRO LEVEL DETERMIINANTS         
Scale party sytem EU support 0.80 2.21* -0.36 0.81 
Scale of party system evaluation of EU memb. 
benefit 
0.94 -1.69 4.58* 0.50 
Index of party system support for EU power 
trasfer  
0.23 -0.04 -0.91* -0.32 
          
Dummy year [0=2009 1=2016] - 1.08*   -0.13 
Lenght of membership 0.27 -0.17 0.87 0.46 
Location (ref= north)         
South -0.05 0.39 0.85* 0.57* 
East -0.02 -0.06 1.72* 1.00* 
Eurozone member -0.04 0.10 0.15 0.33 
Catholic or Ortodox country 1.11* 0.28 -0.22 -0.13 
          
QUALITY OF GOV INDEX 2008 -0.55 -0.93 -1.58 -0.87 
GDP PRO CAPITA 2008 -0.41 0.06 -0.58 -1.38* 
NUMBER OF ASYLUM SEEKERS 0.23 1.2* -0.24 1.31* 
          
Rho null model 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.06 
Note: Coefficients significant at p<= 0.05 (two-tails) are marked in bold type and with the sign * 
                                                 
106 Micro-level effects remain stable across the three models. 
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Two fundamental findings emerge. First, from 2009 to 2016 the effect of evaluation of ‘EU 
democracy’ becomes five times higher than in 2009 for Immigration policy, and almost three times 
for Foreign policy. Concurrently, those of ‘Output legitimacy’ and ‘European identification’ decrease 
substantially. These results are important because they can be interpreted as a profound change in the 
drivers of support for EU governance. After nine years from the beginning of the economic crisis, the 
role played by the issue of political representation within the EU dramatically increased. This gives 
more importance to the debate about the ‘democratic deficit’ within the EU (Follesdal and Hix 2006; 
Hix 2008), since this perceived ‘deficit’ hampers support for more EU policy governance, blocking 
the path towards a political Union.  
The second element that emerges from this analysis is that macro variables have a different impact 
on EU support compared with 2009. National party systems become significant determinants of 
attitudes towards a common Immigration policy: as national political parties become pro-EU, citizens 
within that nation increase their support as well. However, this mechanism does not hold for support 
for EU governance of Foreign policy. Indeed, party system effects disappear when pooling 2016 data. 
Moreover, comparing 2016 to 2009 level of support (by way of the year-dummy variable), 
respondents have significantly increased their support for EU governance of Immigration policy, but 
not that of Foreign policy.  
Furthermore, there is another difference between 2009 and 2016, which can be related to the so-
called Refugees crisis. For both policy domains, there is a positive influence of the number of asylum 
seekers on the probability to support EU governance. This proves that controlling for individual-level 
variability support for EU policy governance is more likely in countries that received a large number 
of immigrants from outside Europe asking international protection. The rationale for this is that the 
EU is expected to manage this issue, helping European countries to face growing immigration influx. 
Indeed, the EU is seen as a powerful actor able to deal with adverse national contingency, and citizens 
are likely to claim EU protection when managing this issue with national financial and institutional 
resources becomes problematic. 
7. Conclusions 
This chapter analysed support for EU governance of eight policy domains. Results show that support 
for EU governance is accounted for by individual-level mechanisms and policy domain 
characteristics, while macro level determinants exhibit a very limited influence (only religious 
traditions show a consistent cross-country effect). At the micro level, subjective utility (‘Output 
legitimacy’) and identity drivers (‘European identification’, and also ‘exclusive national 
identification’ even though its effect is smaller) are the most important determinants of support for 
EU policy governance, where ‘Output legitimacy’ mostly discriminates between supporters and 
rejecters of EU governance for policies with functional interdependence, while ‘European 
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identification’ for market-correcting (social-model) policies. These results suggest that these 
different mechanisms are strengthened or weakened by policy specific characteristics.  
A direct effect of policy attributes is tested in Section 4, and it emerges that large part of the cross-
policy variability is explained by the spending logic: EU citizens want high-expenditure policies to 
remain within their national states. In addition, they oppose EU governance in policy domains where 
the EU is already present holding vast competences: this means that EU citizens prefer a ‘spillback’ 
(see Schmitter 2004, cit. in Niemann and Schmitter 2009: 55) from former competence transfers, 
rather than further spillover. This is a problem if the argument of those supporting more policy 
integration is based on the alleged (public) consensus for the current EU policy governance. 
Moreover, comparing data from 2009 with those of 2009-2016 it becomes evident that the salience 
of two issues has dramatically increased: (1) political representation within the EU, and (2) the 
number of asylum seekers. Indeed, much more than in 2009 these issues lead support towards a 
common EU governance of Immigration, and Foreign policies. The EU must provide political 
representation solving the perceived ‘democratic deficit’, and it must deliver effective policies able 
to solve national problems. This confirms that the recent European crises have modified how 
European citizens view the EU, and why they support or reject policy integration: EU governance is 
supported when it can effectively provide answers to citizens’ needs.  
The findings of this chapter can also be read jointly with those of chapters 3 and 4. In those 
chapters, a unitary dimension of support for EU policy governance is found (‘EU governance 
legitimacy’) but the association between this dimension and the other three endogenous components 
of EU support (‘Output legitimacy’, ‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’) was very weak. 
Findings of this chapter, instead, shows that there is a strong association between ‘Output legitimacy’, 
‘European identification’ and ‘EU democracy’, and support for EU governance of specific policy 
domains. This indicates that pooling together these policies undermines the comprehension of the 
relationships among the dimensions of EU support. It is, thus, necessary to decompose generic 
support in policy specific support. This reveals that the influence of ‘Output legitimacy’, ‘European 
identification’ and ‘EU democracy’ varies across policies, and it is relevant for the understanding of 
support for EU governance. Moreover, this variability is explained by the characteristics of the policy 
domains.  
In Chapter 1 three models of support for EU governance are introduced. This chapter demonstrates 
that Model 1 is right in arguing that support for EU governance is likely for policies that involve 
strong international interdependence, even though is not the principal meso determinant of this form 
of EU support. While Model 2 does not provide meso and macro-level explanations, Model 3 
maintains that support for EU governance is influenced by the politicisation of the EU issue: from 
the analyses included in this chapter there is no ultimate evidence of this influence, and further 
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analyses with more recent data may report different results. Indeed, analyses with data from the period 
2009-2016 show contrasting results on the role of party systems.  
To conclude, this chapter showed that citizens differentiate among different policy domains and 
that studies on support for EU governance should address this fact, investigating what influences the 
policy by policy support. 
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CHAPTER 6 – MEANINGS OF NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY 
This thesis focusses on the role that national and European identities play in influencing EU support. 
Identity is an ‘umbrella’ term that can indicate either identification with a group or the meanings 
associated with a specific identity. Up to here, this work concentrated on identification, defined as a 
sense of belongingness to the national or European political community.   
National identification exerts a central influence on the four dimensions of EU support (‘Output 
legitimacy’, ‘EU governance legitimacy’, ‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’), but, in 
some cases, its influence is rather different across dimensions: a strong sense of ‘national attachment’ 
is positively associated with ‘European identification’, but at the same time holding a strong ‘national 
attachment’ decreases support for EU governance of specific policy domains (see chapters 4 and 5). 
This two-sided effect shows the importance of distinguishing separate objects of EU support. 
Furthermore, earlier analyses confirmed that - considering any of the four dimensions - ‘exclusive 
national identification’ hampers EU support, whereas the strength of ‘European identification’ is 
positively associated with support for EU governance of specific policy sectors. 
What still remains unclear is what it exactly means being national or European for EU citizens. What 
constitutes a national or European identity? Can these identities be decomposed in more precise 
identity-meanings? And can these meanings be measured and compared?  
There are studies in the literature that attempt to answer these questions, and this analysis starts 
with them. However, the purpose of this chapter is to relate these identity components to support for 
EU governance of specific policy domains, studying the influence of identity-meanings in the support 
for a competence transfer from national to European institutions.  
The analytical strategy involves three hierarchical and logical steps: the first defines identity 
components, drawing upon earlier theories and empirical studies (Section 1); the second measures 
these components using survey data for fifteen EU countries (Intune 2009 data); and the third step is 
hypotheses testing, where the relationships between identity components and support for specific EU 
policy governance is tested using SEM modelling (Bollen and Long 1993). The influence of identity 
components is expected to be mediated (Baron and Kenny 1986) by the strength of ‘national 
attachment’, and by ‘European identification’, as reported in Figure 22 at page 127. 
Results show that identity-meanings matter in driving support for EU policy governance, 
especially the components called ‘Civility’, that qualifies national and European identities as 
something embedded in ordinary social practices and traditional ways of life. On the contrary, 
identity-meanings deriving from ascribed (‘Ancestry’) or civic-political (‘Citizenship’) attributes 
have a marginal role in determining this form of EU support. 
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1. Identity components 
Studies on EU support often conceptualise identity as either a dichotomic construct (presence vs 
absence of identification) or a continuous construct (low to high identification) (see e.g. Hooghe and 
Marks 2004, 2005; McLaren 2007; Lubbers 2008). These constructs reduce identity to identification 
and correspond to two of the three conceptualisations of political identity provided by Citrin and 
Sides (2004) (see also Brewer 2001; Citrin et al. 2001): they maintain that the first one is cognitive, 
and it regards self-categorisation as group member; the second one is affective, and it defines the 
strength of the attachment towards the group; and the third one is normative, and it outlines the in-
group boundaries - in terms of criteria for inclusion in the group.  
This last conceptualisation is mainly employed in studies that look at group boundaries per se – 
thus mapping identity-meanings or components –  or when the dependent variable is one of the other 
two conceptualisation (cognitive or affective identifications) and the research question is what ideas 
on group-qualities ‘activate’ self-identification (e.g. Jones and Smith 2001; Shulman 2002; Bruter 
2003; Kunovich 2009; Reeskens and Hooghe 2010; Guglielmi and Vezzoni 2016; Segatti and 
Guglielmi 2016).  
The group-qualities differentiate between members and non-members, but they can have different 
‘discrimination powers’: i.e. physical traits may discriminate between members and non-members 
more than cultural traits, or vice-versa. Discrimination power is a function of the salience of a group-
quality, and this salience may vary across different groups and different individuals. Indeed, although 
group-qualities are collectively defined, group members can consider some group-qualities more 
salient among those available (Kunovich 2009). 
In the literature, there are micro-level studies that test macro-level theories (e.g. Jones and Smith 
2001; Shulman 2002; Bruter 2003; Kunovich 2009; Reeskens and Hooghe 2010; Guglielmi and 
Vezzoni 2016). The dichotomy between civic and ethnic identity is often the background for this 
approach. Kohn (1944) introduces this dichotomy more than seventy years ago. He maintains that in 
western Europe the identity-glue that unifies national citizens is a common political history, which 
produced laws and constitutions that are based on liberal values, while in eastern Europe identification 
is led by pre-political sources: culture and ancestry define the boundary of national identity. 
Following this dichotomy, there is a fundamental division between an inclusive, liberal, and 
universalistic civic identity, and an exclusive, ethnocultural, and essentialist ethnic identity. There are 
no in-between categories, and these concepts are fixed and mutually exclusive.  
This classification theory is contested, among the others, by Kymlicka (2001), who suggests 
dividing cultural from ethnic characteristics, by Brubaker (1992, 2004), who argues that these types 
are not mutually exclusive providing evidence of ethnic identity also in Germany, and by many 
individual-level research that analysing survey data show that the civic-ethnic distinction does not 
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fully match empirical findings (e.g. Jones and Smith 2001; Shulman 2002; Björklund 2006; Kunovich 
2009). 
An alternative typological model for comparative analysis of collective identity - not only national 
identities - is the one proposed by Eisenstadt and Giesen (1995). This model draws upon socio-
psychological insights (see Huddy 2001 for a review) on the constructed nature of identity. In their 
study, Eisenstadt and Giesen (1995) stress that identity is socially constructed and reconstructed by 
the interaction between in-group members and non-members. The authors maintain that identity 
boundaries are based on three symbolic codes (‘primordial’, ‘civil’, and ‘religious’107), and these 
codes convey messages in both directions, towards the in-group and the out-groups.  
The primordial code creates social distinction via physical (unchangeable) differences like gender, 
age, ethnicity, etc. The civil code is embedded in routines, traditions, constitutional order and 
institutional arrangements that govern the group life, and it generates self-identification via sharing 
common experiences: in this case, group-boundaries are the consequence of social practices. The 
third and last symbolic code is the ‘religious’ one. This code promotes in-group solidarity among 
people that trust in and commit to the religion of the group. Depending on social groups, religion may 
be substituted with other fundamental values or moral commitment that the group respects and 
consider as universally true (Eisenstadt and Giesen 1995).  
In a recent book edited by Westle and Segatti (2016), Guglielmi and Vezzoni (2016) investigate 
the Europeanization of national identity looking at how survey respondents define both the 
boundaries of their national identity and those of European identity. Their interest was understanding 
to what extent these identity-boundaries overlap, as a result of the Europeanization processes 
(Radaelli 2003; Graziano and Vink 2007). Their approach compares the empirical grounding of two 
models: one based on a revised version of Eisenstadt and Giesen (1995), and another one based on 
the achieved/ascribed dichotomy (see Jones and Smith 2001; Wright 2011) which maintains that 
group-qualities are perceived either as achievable through socialization processes, or as ascribed and 
fixed. 
Guglielmi and Vezzoni (2016) find that the Eisenstadt and Giesen’s (1995) (revised) model is 
more supported by the analysis of cross-national data. Their result unveils the presence of four 
symbolic codes labelled ‘Civility’ (identification via sharing routines, traditions, language, and law 
compliance), ‘Ancestry’ (identification via ius soli or sanguinis), ‘Christianity’ (via common 
religion), and ‘Citizenship’ (via exercising citizenship rights). The importance of each code varies 
across countries and respondents, but their presence is confirmed in all the national samples.  
                                                 
107 Eisenstadt and Giesen do not provide a consistent label for the third code of their typology. For sake of simplicity, I 
use the label ‘religious’ to indicate it. 
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These symbolic codes combine in defining meanings of national and European identity, and their 
study evidences that, to a large extent, a group-quality that is important in defining national identity 
often draws the boundaries of the European identity. This is the case for ‘Ancestry’, ‘Religion’, and 
‘Citizenship’ codes. This means that the normative requirements for being a national citizen or a 
European one are not so different. This support the so-called ‘marble cake’ metaphor in which “the 
various components constituting the dual identity (national and European) blend together” (Guglielmi 
and Vezzoni 2016: 144. See also Risse 2004).  
Conversely, the ‘Civility’ code has a different ‘behaviour’. The authors (Guglielmi and Vezzoni 
2016) report that respondents differentiate between a national and a European ‘Civility’ code: the 
former code result from daily and banal (see Billig 1995) national experiences that differ across 
European countries, whereas the latter code comes from sharing common experiences as Europeans. 
This means these two dimensions define a banal nationalism and a banal Europeanism (Guglielmi 
and Vezzoni 2016), as something rooted in the ordinary way of life (Billig 1995; Cram 2001; 
Guglielmi and Vezzoni 2016). Gugliemi and Vezzoni (2016), drawing upon Cram (2001), defines 
banal Europeanism as a form of implicit, contingent, and contextual identification “based on 
everyday low-involvement encounters with Europe’s procedures and symbols (flags, coins, free 
moving, etc.) that evoke and reinforce the feeling of belonging to a larger European community” 
(Guglielmi and Vezzoni 2016: 142). Moreover, within this “larger European community”, national 
cultural peculiarity may flourish without colliding with this form of banal Europeanism (Cram 2001). 
Following Guglielmi and Vezzoni (2016), Segatti and Guglielmi (2016) analyse how the identity-
components (or symbolic codes) relates to European identification. As already remarked, the 
importance of these components may vary across individuals, since these components are a collective 
‘raw material’ upon which individuals may base their identification. Segatti and Guglielmi (2016) 
find that those who emphasise the ‘Citizenship’ and ‘European Civility’ codes are likely to identify 
with Europe, whereas those who place great importance on ‘Ancestry’ and ‘National Civility’ codes 
tend to dismiss European identification108. This result demonstrates that identity-meanings matter in 
generating identification and might also matter in driving support for EU policy governance.  
Indeed, the hypothesis that guides this chapter is that opposition or support to transfer policy 
governance at the EU level depends on which meaning of identity is used to define national and 
European identities. Drawing upon Segatti and Guglielmi’s (2016) findings, support of EU 
governance is expected for those conceptualising identity in terms of democratic participation 
(‘Citizenship’ code) or sharing European cultural traditions and respecting EU institutions (‘European 
Civility’ code), since they already stress the political side of European identity (for the ‘Citizenship’ 
                                                 
108 Results for ‘Christianity’ are less clear-cut, since cross-country variability emerges. 
123 
 
component) or they recognize Europe as a plural cultural community whose values are embodied by 
EU institutions (for ‘European Civility’). On the contrary, those who conceptualise identity as simply 
a matter of ius soli or ius sanguinis (‘Ancestry’ code), or as a form of banal nationalism (Billig 1995) 
(‘National Civility’ code) are likely to reject EU governance. In the former case, for those who stress 
the ‘Ancestry’ code Europe is simply a pre-political and pre-cultural territory where European people 
live, and not a political project: Europe already exists, and there is no need to turn it into a political 
entity. In the latter case, opposition is driven by the importance placed on the national way of life and 
national culture (‘National Civility’ code), that would be altered by further European integration. 
Indeed, following Cederman (2001), increasing EU governance modifies identity-boundaries 
between national groups. Yet, the extent to which this happens varies across policy domains, since 
some sectors have greater impact on the way of life of citizens (i.e. welfare), and the integration of 
these sectors is seen as more problematic, while others are far from the day to day experiences of 
respondents (i.e. foreign policy). For this reason, it is expected that the influence of identity-meanings 
varies across policy domains.  
To conclude, five hypotheses are tested in the remaining of this chapter: 
Hp1: The more important is the ‘European Civility’ component, the more likely is support for EU 
governance. 
Hp2: The more important is the ‘National Civility’ component, the less likely is support for EU governance. 
Hp3: The more important is the ‘Ancestry’ component, the less likely is support for EU governance. 
Hp4: The more important is the ‘Citizenship’ component, the more likely is support for EU governance. 
Hp5: The influence of identity-components varies across policy domains. 
2. Data and method 
This chapter answers the question whether different meanings of national and European identities 
influence support for EU governance of specific policy domains. To address this question, the Intune 
2009 data (Cotta et al. 2009) are analysed using a path model within the framework of structural 
equation modelling (Bollen and Long 1993). This technique allows decomposing the influence of 
identity meanings in direct and indirect effects (I will return on this).  
Four components of identity are conceptualised drawing upon Guglielmi and Vezzoni’s study 
(2016): ‘European Civility’, ‘National Civility’, ‘Ancestry’, and ‘Citizenship’. Guglielmi and 
Vezzoni also defines the ‘Christianity’ component, but since there are no hypotheses concerning the 
influence of this component on support for EU governance, it is not considered here. These 
components are measured asking respondents to rate the importance of eight attributes for being 
considered a group member. Two item batteries are employed, one for national identity and the other 
one for European identity: 
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Q.1 People differ in what they think it means to be (NATIONALITY). In your view, how important is 
each of the following to be (NATIONALITY)?  
[Very important; Somewhat important; Not very important; Not at all important] 
1. to be a Christian;  
2. to share (nationality) cultural traditions; 
3. to be born in (our country); 
4. to have (nationality) parents; 
5. to respect (nationality) laws and institutions; 
6. to feel (nationality); 
7. to master (nationality) language or one of the official languages of (our country); 
8. to exercise citizens’ rights, like being active in the politics of (our country). 
 
Q.2 And for being European, how important do you think each of the following is…?  
[Very important; Somewhat important; Not very important; Not at all important] 
1. to be a Christian; 
2. to share European cultural traditions; 
3. to be born in Europe; 
4. to have European parents; 
5. to respect European laws and institutions; 
6. to feel European; 
7. to master any European language; 
8. to exercise citizens’ rights, like being active in the politics of the European Union. 
 
The four components are measured defining some a-priori indicators of these constructs. ‘European 
Civility’, ‘National Civility’, ‘Ancestry’, and ‘Citizenship’ are, respectively, measured as follows:  
 European Civility (4 indicators): ‘to share European cultural traditions’, ‘to respect 
European laws and institutions’, ‘to feel European’, and ‘to master any European language’. 
 National Civility (4 indicators): ‘to share (nationality) cultural traditions’, ‘to respect 
(nationality) laws and institutions’, ‘to feel (nationality)’, and ‘to master (nationality) 
language or one of the official languages of (our country)’. 
 Ancestry (4 indicators): ‘to be born in (our country)’, ‘to be born in Europe’, ‘to have 
(nationality) parents’, and ‘to exercise citizens’ rights, like being active in the politics of (our 
country)’. 
 Citizenship (2 indicators): ‘to exercise citizens’ rights, like being active in the politics of the 
European Union’, and ‘to have European parents’. 
Table 33 reports these indicators and provides their descriptive statistics. Each indicator is a battery-
item, and it ranges from 0 to 1109.  In terms of salience for respondents (measured by the mean score), 
the items that constitute ‘National Civility’ and ‘European Civility’ are those with higher importance 
for survey respondents110, and this emerges also looking at Table 34, where four indexes are computed 
                                                 
109 These ordinary variables are treated as continuous for simplicity and each answering-option is weighted as reported in 
the table. Missing data are excluded from the analyses. 
110 There are no remarkable country differences (see Table 58a-b in Appendix B) 
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averaging111 the indicator-scores112. Considering the pooled data, the order of importance is first 
‘National’ and ‘European’ Civilities, then ‘Citizenship’, and lastly ‘Ancestry’. This order is stable 
across western European countries (with a marginal variation in the UK), whereas in eastern Europe 
‘Ancestry’ tends to be slightly more important than ‘Citizenship’ (see Table 60 in Appendix B). 
Table 33 - Descriptive statistics of indicators of identity-components. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
European civility 
Indicator Coding Mean (SD) N. Cases N. Missing 
To share European cultural traditions 
0=Not at all; 0.33= Not very; 0.66= 
Somewhat; 1=Very important; 
0.66 (.28) 14730 360 
To respect European Union’s laws and 
institutions 
0=Not at all; 0.33= Not very; 0.66= 
Somewhat; 1=Very important; 
0.80 (.25) 14803 287 
To feel European 
0=Not at all; 0.33= Not very; 0.66= 
Somewhat; 1=Very important; 
0.70 (.29) 14773 317 
To master any European language 
0=Not at all; 0.33= Not very; 0.66= 
Somewhat; 1=Very important; 
0.80 (.26) 14880 210 
National civility 
Indicator Coding Mean (SD) N. Cases N. Missing 
To share national cultural traditions 
0=Not at all; 0.33= Not very; 0.66= 
Somewhat; 1=Very important; 
0.79 (.26) 14966 124 
To respect national laws and institutions 
0=Not at all; 0.33= Not very; 0.66= 
Somewhat; 1=Very important; 
0.89 (.20) 14978 112 
To feel (nationality) 
0=Not at all; 0.33= Not very; 0.66= 
Somewhat; 1=Very important; 
0.83 (.25) 14945 145 
To master (country language) 
0=Not at all; 0.33= Not very; 0.66= 
Somewhat; 1=Very important; 
0.89 (.20) 15034 56 
Ancestry 
Indicator Coding Mean (SD) N. Cases N. Missing 
To be born in (OUR COUNTRY) 
0=Not at all; 0.33= Not very; 0.66= 
Somewhat; 1=Very important; 
0.66 (.34) 14957 133 
To have (NATIONALITY) parents 
0=Not at all; 0.33= Not very; 0.66= 
Somewhat; 1=Very important; 
0.66 (.34) 14920 170 
To be born in Europe 
0=Not at all; 0.33= Not very; 0.66= 
Somewhat; 1=Very important; 
0.59 (.33) 14758 332 
To have European parents 
0=Not at all; 0.33= Not very; 0.66= 
Somewhat; 1=Very important; 
0.56 (.33) 14698 392 
Citizenship 
Indicator Coding Mean (SD) N. Cases N. Missing 
To exercise citizens' rights, like being 
active in the politics of (OUR COUNTRY) 
0=Not at all; 0.33= Not very; 0.66= 
Somewhat; 1=Very important; 
0.69 (.30) 14841 249 
To exercise citizens' rights, like being 
active in politics of the European Union 
0=Not at all; 0.33= Not very; 0.66= 
Somewhat; 1=Very important; 
0.63 (.30) 14682 408 
 
  
                                                 
111 Chrombach alpha for these indexes is, respectively, 0.70 for ‘European Civility’, 0.64 for ‘National Civility’, 0.83 for 
‘Ancestry’, and 0.67 for ‘Citizenship’. 
112 The structure of correlation among these component is reported in the Table 59 in Appendix B. 
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Table 34 - Identity-component indexes. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
Component Indicator [measurement scale] Mean (SD) N. Cases N. Missing 
European 
civility 
To share European cultural traditions [0-1] 
0.74 (0.19) 14419 671 
To respect European Union’s laws and institutions 
[0-1] 
To feel European [0-1] 
To master any European language [0-1] 
National 
civility 
To share national cultural traditions [0-1] 
0.85 (0.16) 14769 321 
To respect national laws and institutions [0-1] 
To feel (nationality) [0-1] 
To master (country language) [0-1] 
Ancestry 
To be born in (OUR COUNTRY) [0-1] 
0.62 (0.27) 14425 665 
To have (NATIONALITY) parents [0-1] 
To be born in Europe [0-1] 
To have European parents [0-1] 
Citizenship 
To exercise citizens' rights, like being active in the 
politics of (OUR COUNTRY) [0-1] 
0.66 (0.26) 14532 558 
To exercise citizens' rights, like being active in 
politics of the European Union [0-1] 
Having measured these components, they are included in eight path models113 (Blalock 1967) to 
assess their influence on support for EU governance of eight policy areas114: Unemployment, Fighting 
crime, Health care, Agricultural, Environmental, Immigration, Tax, and Foreign policies.  
Figure 22 displays the model where the four identity-components are all antecedents of support 
for EU governance, and their effect is expected to be mediated by respondent’s strength of ‘national 
attachment’115 and ‘European identification’116. Indeed, Segatti and Guglielmi (2016) demonstrate 
that ‘national attachment’ mediates the effects of identity-components on European identification, 
and I suppose a similar mechanism be operating on support for EU policy governance.  
Hence, the four components have a direct effect on ‘national attachment’ and ‘European 
identification’, and an indirect effect on ‘support for EU governance’ via ‘national attachment’ and 
‘European identification’. ‘National attachment’ has only a direct effect on ‘European identification’ 
                                                 
113 The author is aware of the fact that path modelling within the SEM framework considers all the variables as continuous, 
and it performs OLS analysis. This might be a problem when estimating dichotomic dependent variables, as in this case. 
However, since the research interest is to assess the influence of identity-components on support for EU governance 
testing the mediation of ‘national attachment’ and ‘European identification’ (see later in the text), I decided to rely on 
linear modelling.  
114 See Chapter 5 for operationalization and descriptive statistics. They are dichotomic variables where ‘0’ means a 
preference for a ‘National or sub-national’ policy governance, while ‘1’ means support for EU policy governance of 
that specific policy domain. 
115 See Chapter 4 for operationalization and descriptive statistics. 
116 ‘European identification’ is measured in Chapter 3 using MGCFA. Since this latent variable is not measured with a 
bounded scale, it is normalized to vary from 0 to 1 using this formula: (value – minimum) / (maximum – minimum). 
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and an indirect effect on ‘support for EU governance’ via ‘European identification’. Lastly, ‘European 
identification’ has a direct effect on ‘support for EU governance’. 
Figure 22 - Path model of support for EU governance: eight models for eight policy domains 
 
3. Results 
The eight models tested117 (one for each policy domains) fit data well (see Table 61 in Appendix B; 
for cut-off criteria see Bollen and Long 1993). Tables 35-36-37-38 report unstandardized total effects 
of the four identity components118, which are not constrained to be equal across countries.  
Given the fact that every independent variable varies between ‘0’ and ‘1’, regression coefficients 
are comparable. In addition, since the dependent variables are all dichotomic, coefficients can be 
immediately interpreted as the expected modification in the predicted probability of ‘supporting EU 
governance’ when moving from the lowest to the highest value of the independent variable.  
Moreover, when the total effect is significant, these tables also report the percentage of the total 
effect that is mediated by ‘national attachment’ and by ‘European identification’ (raw “% of the 
indirect effect out of the total effect” in the tables). 
  
                                                 
117 Syntax in Appendix C. 
118 Since the focus of this chapter is on the influence of the four identity components, in the text are only reported tables 
showing these effects. The total effects of ‘national attachment’ and ‘European identification’ are reported in Table 62 
in Appendix B. 
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Table 35 - Total effect - Unstandardized coefficients of path models: European civility. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
 
Note: Coefficients significant at p<= 0.05 (two-tails) are marked in bold type and with the sign * 
  
IDENTITY COMPONENT BELGIUM DENMARK GERMANY GREECE SPAIN FRANCE ITALY PORTUGAL UK ESTONIA HUNGARY POLAND SLOVAKIA SLOVENIA BULGARIA
European civility on Unemployment 0.2* 0.15 0.28* 0.17 0.32* 0.31* 0.43* 0.18 0.17* -0.01 0.02 0.22 0.09 0.06 0.15
% of the indirect effect out of the 
total effect^
30% 16% 30% 62% 34% 58%
European civility on Fighting crime 0.5* 0.29* 0.24* 0.14 0.25* 0.12 0.39* 0.32* 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.53* 0.17 0.05 0.4*
% of the indirect effect out of the 
total effect^
25% 38% 4% 14% 13% 24% 30% 4%
European civility on Health care 0.28* 0.2* 0.22* 0.05 0.31* 0.33* 0.27* 0.29* 0.1* 0.11 -0.07 0.29* 0.12 -0.04 0.02
% of the indirect effect out of the 
total effect^
24% 31% 0% 9% 41% 3% 13% 63% 50%
European civility on Agriculture 0.39* 0.44* 0.41* 0.22* 0.32* 0.47* 0.38* 0.21* 0.24* 0.12 0.08 0.27* 0.23* 0.03 -0.06
% of the indirect effect out of the 
total effect^
56% 55% 32% 51% 47% 53% 37% 22% 77% 52% 54%
European civility on Environment 0.39* 0.47* 0.47* 0.27* 0.39* 0.35* 0.45* 0.52* 0.42* 0.02 0.06 0.35* 0.33* 0.21* 0.21
% of the indirect effect out of the 
total effect^
41% 37% 40% 44% 38% 50% 41% 26% 57% 34% 13% 81%
European civility on Immigration 0.29* 0.38* 0.39* 0.31* 0.18 0.41* 0.52* 0.25* 0.28* 0.27* 0.12 0.33* 0.05 0.18 0.27*
% of the indirect effect out of the 
total effect^
43% 32% 59% 64% 49% 30% 19% 64% 13% 47% 3%
European civility on Foreign 0.32* 0.47* 0.33* 0.38* 0.44* 0.28* 0.55* 0.08 0.61* 0.11 0.37* 0.41* 0.27* 0.32* 0.44*
% of the indirect effect out of the 
total effect^
54% 51% 59% 62% 35% 93% 35% 47% 6% 39% 39% 31% 7%
European civility on Tax 0.43* 0.27* 0.21* 0.34* 0.37* 0.38* 0.39* 0.38* 0.47* -0.04 0.16 0.29* -0.04 0.28* 0.27*
% of the indirect effect out of the 
total effect^
36% 49% 45% 51% 35% 57% 26% 21% 46% 16% 33% 41%
^the percentage of indirect effect is shown only for significant effects
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Table 36 - Total effect - unstandardized coefficients of path models: National Civility. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
 
Note: Coefficients significant at p<= 0.05 (two-tails) are marked in bold type and with the sign * 
 
  
IDENTITY COMPONENT BELGIUM DENMARK GERMANY GREECE SPAIN FRANCE ITALY PORTUGAL UK ESTONIA HUNGARY POLAND SLOVAKIA SLOVENIA BULGARIA
National civility on Unemployment -0.28* -0.21* -0.12 -0.3* -0.11 -0.27* -0.43* -0.06 -0.27* 0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 0.07
% of the indirect effect out of the 
total effect^
0% 19% 7% 28% 12% 21%
National civility on Fighting crime -0.14 0.22 0.18 -0.22* -0.13 0.08 -0.36* -0.26 -0.28* 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.14 -0.05 -0.26
% of the indirect effect out of the 
total effect^
7% 4% 7%
National civility on Health care -0.17 -0.23* -0.34* -0.21* -0.17 -0.33* -0.45* -0.39* -0.33* -0.15 -0.19 -0.07 -0.24* 0.03 -0.08
% of the indirect effect out of the 
total effect^
11% 0% 8% 17% 1% 0% 11% 3%
National civility on Agriculture -0.28* -0.34* -0.56* -0.26* -0.35* -0.33* -0.43* -0.11 -0.35* 0.06 -0.22 -0.21 -0.21 0.06 0.14
% of the indirect effect out of the 
total effect^
1% 31% 6% 9% 9% 31% 11% 28% 73%
National civility on Environment -0.18 -0.29* -0.19 -0.51* -0.25* -0.10 -0.32* -0.18 -0.43* -0.26* 0.24 0.20 0.04 -0.13 -0.31*
% of the indirect effect out of the 
total effect^
25% 4% 12% 76% 18% 30% -24% 1%
National civility on Immigration -0.24* -0.5* -0.53* -0.22 -0.13 -0.43* -0.37* -0.18 -0.53* -0.3* -0.13 0.32* 0.06 -0.13 -0.21
% of the indirect effect out of the 
total effect^
0% 9% 12% 19% 15% 18% -13% 6%
National civility on Foreign -0.04 -0.03 -0.09 -0.21* -0.18* -0.21 -0.43* 0.00 -0.31* 0.34* 0.01 -0.06 -0.04 0.14 0.01
% of the indirect effect out of the 
total effect^
21% 14% 15% 48% 32%
National civility on Tax -0.14 -0.32* -0.27* -0.25* -0.23* -0.05 -0.43* -0.24 -0.5* -0.13 0.04 0.07 -0.17 0.11 -0.12
% of the indirect effect out of the 
total effect^
18% 9% 14% 11% 7% 24%
^the percentage of indirect effect is shown only for significant effects
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Table 37 -  Total effect - unstandardized coefficients of path models: Ancestry. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
 
Note: Coefficients significant at p<= 0.05 (two-tails) are marked in bold type and with the sign * 
  
IDENTITY COMPONENT BELGIUM DENMARK GERMANY GREECE SPAIN FRANCE ITALY PORTUGAL UK ESTONIA HUNGARY POLAND SLOVAKIA SLOVENIA BULGARIA
Ancestry on Unemployment -0.08 0.04 -0.12* 0.01 -0.11 0.01 -0.17* -0.16* -0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.06 -0.06
% of the indirect effect out of the 
total effect^
0% 13% 2%
Ancestry on Fighting crime -0.11 -0.14* 0.00 0.09 -0.09 -0.07 -0.13 -0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.06 -0.16 -0.07 -0.09 0.00
% of the indirect effect out of the 
total effect^
2%
Ancestry on Health care -0.08 0.03 0.01 0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.04 -0.11 0.03 0.03 0.13* 0.10 -0.09 -0.03 0.03
% of the indirect effect out of the 
total effect^
3%
Ancestry on Agriculture -0.16* -0.14* -0.02* -0.06 -0.02 -0.18* -0.13* -0.06 -0.16* -0.04 -0.02 0.09 0.01 0.02 -0.01
% of the indirect effect out of the 
total effect^
36% 5% 7% 27% 17% 13%
Ancestry on Environment -0.3* -0.23* -0.21* -0.01 -0.2* -0.29* -0.23* -0.21* -0.19* -0.02 -0.2* -0.21* -0.16* -0.21* -0.10
% of the indirect effect out of the 
total effect^
15% 3% 1% 8% 12% 13% 4% 15% 2% 24% 1% 5%
Ancestry on Immigration -0.26* -0.19* -0.2* -0.11 -0.15* -0.14* -0.27* -0.11 -0.16 -0.11 -0.07 -0.11 0.17* -0.16* 0.04
% of the indirect effect out of the 
total effect^
13% 2% 0% 10% 28% 7% 4% -6%
Ancestry on Foreign -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.08 -0.03 -0.17* -0.07 0.10 -0.10 0.01 -0.16* 0.02 0.02 -0.04 0.15
% of the indirect effect out of the 
total effect^
36% 1%
Ancestry on Tax -0.05 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.10 -0.14* 0.14* 0.02 0.04 0.17* 0.00 -0.14 0.26* 0.01 -0.06
% of the indirect effect out of the 
total effect^
29% 12% 2% 2%
^the percentage of indirect effect is shown only for significant effects
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Table 38 - Total effect - unstandardized coefficients of path models: Citizenship. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
 
Note: Coefficients significant at p<= 0.05 (two-tails) are marked in bold type and with the sign * 
  
IDENTITY COMPONENT BELGIUM DENMARK GERMANY GREECE SPAIN FRANCE ITALY PORTUGAL UK ESTONIA HUNGARY POLAND SLOVAKIA SLOVENIA BULGARIA
Citizenship on Unemployment 0.14* 0.15* 0.05 -0.04 -0.03 0.06 0.12 0.05 -0.02 0.02 0.13* 0.00 0.07 0.01 -0.03
% of the indirect effect out of the 
total effect^
12% 11% 17%
Citizenship on Fighting crime 0.00 -0.03 -0.08 0.02 0.03 0.15 0.17* 0.01 0.03 0.17* 0.08 -0.16 0.04 -0.08 -0.09
% of the indirect effect out of the 
total effect^
6% 3%
Citizenship on Health care 0.00 0.03 0.05 -0.02 -0.05 0.16* 0.11 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.10 0.09 -0.02 0.11
% of the indirect effect out of the 
total effect^
29%
Citizenship on Agriculture 0.13* 0.01 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.18* 0.04 0.01 0.09 0.03 -0.05 0.04 -0.07 0.01
% of the indirect effect out of the 
total effect^
50% 18%
Citizenship on Environment 0.06 -0.02 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.09 -0.02 0.03 0.00 0.05 -0.07 -0.07 -0.18* 0.14
% of the indirect effect out of the 
total effect^
8%
Citizenship on Immigration 0.16* 0.11 0.10 -0.06 0.05 0.05 0.12 -0.02 0.05 0.19* -0.07 -0.12 -0.10 0.06 0.15
% of the indirect effect out of the 
total effect^
22% 4%
Citizenship on Foreign 0.12* -0.15* 0.19* 0.03 0.05 0.15* 0.02 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.11* 0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.00
% of the indirect effect out of the 
total effect^
38% -26% 19% 68% 9%
Citizenship on Tax 0.09 -0.07 0.17* 0.09 0.15* 0.11 0.02 -0.05 0.10 0.03 0.07 -0.05 0.14* 0.00 0.12
% of the indirect effect out of the 
total effect^
10% 34% 9%
^the percentage of indirect effect is shown only for significant effects
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The first hypothesis under investigation regards the total effect of ‘European Civility’. A positive 
relationship with ‘support for EU governance’ was expected, and this positive relation is found across 
policy areas and countries, confirming Hp1. However, some further specifications are necessary.  
(1) In eastern Europe (except in Polonia) this component is less determinant than in western Europe 
since the effect is often not statistically significant: two remarkable cases of this divide are Estonia 
and Hungary, where the effect is only significant in one policy domain.  
(2) The ‘European Civility’ component tends to discriminate rejecters and supporters of EU 
governance more in the fields of Environmental and Foreign policies (greater average effects), and 
less in the fields of Health care and Unemployment policies (lower average effects). This indicates 
the existence of a cross-level effect between components of individual identities and characteristics 
of the policy domain – or, in other words, that the effect varies across policy areas (Hp5). Indeed, the 
former two are sectors characterised by a European functional interdependence (see Chapter 5), 
whereas the latter are policy domains extensively financed by national state budgets (see again 
Chapter 5). With these data and this modelling, it is not possible to test these cross-level effects, but 
these findings support this hypothesis. What is certain is that the effects differ when looking at various 
policy areas.  
(3) As last remark, it is evident that large part of the effect of the ‘European Civility’ component 
is an indirect effect that passes through ‘national attachment’ and ‘European identification’. As shown 
in Figure 23, ‘European Civility’ has a positive effect on ‘national attachment’ and ‘European 
identification’ (F1-F2), ‘national attachment’ has a positive influence on ‘European identification’ 
(F3) (see Chapter 4 for an explanation of this relationship), and ‘European identification’ has a 
positive effect on ‘support for EU governance’ (F4). It follows that the direction of the full indirect 
effect is positive119. In addition, Table 39 at page 135 demonstrates that this indirect effect is almost 
fully determined by ‘European identification’, which means that emphasising ‘European Civility’ 
increases ‘European identification’ which in turn enhances support for EU governance of these 
specific policy domains. 
                                                 
119 The formula for computing the full indirect effect is: (F1*F3*F4) + (F2*F4). Because all the effects are positive (+), 
the resulting full indirect effect is positive as well.  
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Figure 23 - Indirect effect of European civility via National Attachment & European Identification 
 
The second hypothesis regards the ‘National Civility’ component, and it argues that the importance 
placed on this component by survey respondents is negatively associated with support for EU 
governance, since this would alter the traditional ways of life. In this case too, this hypothesis hold 
(Hp2), but the influence of this component is less diffuse across policies and countries than that of 
‘European Civility’ (Table 36). Three aspects need to be commented. 
(1) The divide east-west emerges to a larger extent, since in eastern countries (plus Portugal) there 
is no effect of this component. Yet, even within western countries this effect deeply varies, and only 
in the UK, Italy, and Greece the influence is significant in all (or almost all) the policy domains.  
(2) As for cross-policy difference, the maximum effect is found in Immigration, Health care, and 
Agricultural policies. Comparing the magnitude of these effects with those of ‘European Civility’, 
‘National Civility’ has a weaker influence in all the policy domains (except in Health care).  
(3) Another point of divergence from ‘European Civility’ resides in the fact that when ‘National 
Civility’ exerts a significant influence, in most of the cases the effect is almost fully direct. This means 
‘European identification’ and ‘national attachment’ play a minor role in the association between 
‘National Civility’ and ‘support for EU governance’, and increasing EU competences directly contrast 
with the preferences of those that place great importance on the national culture and traditions. 
Overall, this component is surely essential in determining EU support, but its effect is limited to 
western European countries and it is relatively smaller than that of ‘European Civility’. 
The third hypothesis provided in Section 1 regards the effect of ‘Ancestry’. A negative influence 
on ‘support for EU governance’ was expected, and Table 37 shows that this hypothesis holds only in 
the cases of Environmental and Immigration policies. Indeed, in all the other policy domains the 
effect tends to be not significant. When the influence is statistically significant, the effect is mainly 
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direct. Overall, Hp3 is not confirmed since there is not a diffuse-European or cross-policy effect of 
this component: it is present only in a few policy domains. 
With regards to the fourth hypothesis (Hp4), the effect of the ‘Citizenship’ component is rather 
absent across policies and countries (Table 38). This undermines the idea that a political component 
of collective identities drives support towards EU policy governance. This is important because it 
shows that this dimension of EU support does not rest upon a civic involvement in the socio-political 
sphere (it is not a side effect of active citizenship). Reading this result in conjunction with the findings 
on ‘European Civility’, it gives the idea that support for EU governance is the result of a form of 
banal Europeanism (see also Westle and Segatti 2016 for similar findings on European identity). 
When people think of Europe as something embedded in social practices that represent common 
European values (i.e. respecting cultural plurality), then they are likely to support a political Union 
(more EU policy governance). On the other side, when individuals strongly conceive their national 
identities in terms of national idiosyncratic cultural elements, then – ceteris paribus – their support 
for EU governance is less likely since this competence transfer would affect national laws and 
institutions, and, in turns, their national identities.  
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Table 39 - Focus on European Civility. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
IDENTITY-COMPONENT Belgium Denmark Germany Greece Spain France Italy Portugal UK Estonia Hungary Poland Slovakia Slovenia Bulgaria 
European civility on Unemployment 0.2* 0.15 0.28* 0.17 0.32* 0.31* 0.43* 0.18 0.17* -0.01 0.02 0.22 0.09 0.06 0.15 
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect^ 30%   16%   30% 62% 34%   58%             
% of the indirect effect via EUROPEAN ID. 95%   95%   100% 96% 99%   97%             
European civility on Fighting crime 0.5* 0.29* 0.24* 0.14 0.25* 0.12 0.39* 0.32* 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.53* 0.17 0.05 0.4* 
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect^ 25% 38% 4%   14%   13% 24%       30%     4% 
% of the indirect effect via EUROPEAN ID. 95% 98% 95%   100%   99% 96%       97%     96% 
European civility on Health care 0.28* 0.2* 0.22* 0.05 0.31* 0.33* 0.27* 0.29* 0.1* 0.11 -0.07 0.29* 0.12 -0.04 0.02 
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect^ 24% 31% 0%   9% 41% 3% 13% 63%     50%       
% of the indirect effect via EUROPEAN ID. 96% 98% 95%   99% 96% 99% 95% 97%     98%       
European civility on Agriculture 0.39* 0.44* 0.41* 0.22* 0.32* 0.47* 0.38* 0.21* 0.24* 0.12 0.08 0.27* 0.23* 0.03 -0.06 
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect^ 56% 55% 32% 51% 47% 53% 37% 22% 77%     52% 54%     
% of the indirect effect via EUROPEAN ID. 96% 98% 94% 96% 100% 97% 100% 95% 97%     97% 99%     
European civility on Environment 0.39* 0.47* 0.47* 0.27* 0.39* 0.35* 0.45* 0.52* 0.42* 0.02 0.06 0.35* 0.33* 0.21* 0.21 
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect^ 41% 37% 40% 44% 38% 50% 41% 26% 57%     34% 13% 81%   
% of the indirect effect via EUROPEAN ID. 95% 99% 95% 98% 99% 96% 99% 95% 97%     97% 100% 95%   
European civility on Immigration 0.29* 0.38* 0.39* 0.31* 0.18 0.41* 0.52* 0.25* 0.28* 0.27* 0.12 0.33* 0.05 0.18 0.27* 
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect^ 43% 32% 59% 64% 77% 49% 30% 19% 64% 13%   47% 172% 63% -3% 
% of the indirect effect via EUROPEAN ID. 96% 98% 95% 96% 99% 96% 99% 95% 98% 91%   96% 98% 97% 96% 
European civility on Foreign 0.32* 0.47* 0.33* 0.38* 0.44* 0.28* 0.55* 0.08 0.61* 0.11 0.37* 0.41* 0.27* 0.32* 0.44* 
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect^ 54% 51% 59% 62% 35% 93% 35% 113% 47%   6% 39% 39% 31% 7% 
% of the indirect effect via EUROPEAN ID. 96% 98% 95% 96% 99% 96% 100% 94% 98%   88% 96% 96% 97% 94% 
European civility on Tax 0.43* 0.27* 0.21* 0.34* 0.37* 0.38* 0.39* 0.38* 0.47* -0.04 0.16 0.29* -0.04 0.28* 0.27* 
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect^ 36% 49% 45% 51% 35% 57% 26% 21% 46%     16%   33% 41% 
% of the indirect effect via EUROPEAN ID. 96% 98% 95% 96% 99% 97% 99% 95% 97%     97%   97% 96% 
^the percentage of indirect effect is shown only for significant effects  
Note: Coefficients significant at p<= 0.05 (two-tails) are marked in bold type and with the sign * 
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4. Conclusion 
This chapter addressed the question of whether and which components of national and European 
identities play a role in influencing the support for further European integration, in terms of support 
for EU governance of specific policy domains. Drawing upon Guglielmi and Vezzoni’s (2016) 
conceptualisation, four components (in their study called symbolic codes) of identity are defined and 
measured: ‘European Civility’, ‘National Civility’, ‘Ancestry’, and ‘Citizenship’.  
Using eight path models, their effects on eight policy domains are investigated, also looking at the 
mediating effect of ‘national attachment’ and ‘European identification’. The results of these analyses 
corroborate the hypothesis that identity-meanings matter in determining support for deepening and 
strengthening European policy governance. Indeed, transferring competencies to the EU is not a 
reasonable choice for people that conceive their national identity as something rooted in national 
cultural traditions, embedded in daily social practices as well as in laws and institutions (‘National 
Civility’ code).  
This component is distinguished from a ‘European Civility’ code, which refers to attributes that 
qualify a form of banal Europeanism (Cram 2001; Guglielmi and Vezzoni 2016). Similar to the 
concept of banal nationalism (Billig 1995), the ‘European Civility’ component defines ‘European 
identification’ as a matter of common and ordinary experiences as Europeans, which forms a 
European way of life. When people emphasise this component, ‘support for EU governance’ is far 
more likely. The remaining two components (‘Ancestry’ and ‘Citizenship’) are less relevant for 
respondents (lower general importance) as well as their influence on EU support is weaker. These 
findings evidence that both pre-political ('Ancestry’) and political (exercising ‘Citizenship’ rights) 
identity-meanings do not discriminate between supporters and rejecters of EU governance (except in 
a limited number of cases and policy domains). 
Chapter 2 argues that support for EU governance is a form of what Scharpf (1999) calls input 
legitimacy, that means legitimising the EU for what it represents for its citizens. Input legitimacy 
emerges when the EU is respectful of the ‘will of the people’. I believe that the EU has proper input 
legitimacy when EU citizens support its policy prerogatives. Subjective (input) legitimacy may 
overlap or not with normative legitimacy (Fuchs and Klingemann 2011), but the concept of the ‘will 
of the people’ is more linked with the subjective side. This chapter adds to this some empirical 
evidence, showing that in order to develop support for EU governance (current or future, depending 
on policy domains) is necessary holding an idea of Europeanness of something rather ordinary and 
traditional, very close to day to day life. On the contrary, conceiving Europeanness either as the act 
of voting every five years for the (distant) European Parliament (an example of the ‘Citizenship’ 
symbolic code) or as some inherited at birth do not lead to support EU governance. 
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Furthermore, this chapter suggests that policy domains vary in their association with the four 
components of national and European identities. This is in line with the third model of support for 
EU governance introduced in Chapter 1. This model maintains that policy domains have different 
linkages with collective identity, and this influences citizen support for EU level governance. The 
analyses included in this chapter do not provide clear findings that explain these linkages between 
respondent national and European identities and specific policy domain characteristics – further study 
with more policy domains are required to model cross-level effects between micro and meso level 
determinants (see Chapter 5 Section 4) – but they show that this is a promising field of research that 
may complement more normative studies (see Cederman 2001). 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Support towards the European Union has been declining over the last ten years in which severe crises 
(economic, public debt, and refugee) shattered attitudes and behaviours of many Europeans. This 
dissertation deals with mass support towards the EU, but it does not address the change through time, 
except in very limited sense. What it aims to provide is a detailed account of the structure of EU 
support in fifteen EU countries in 2009, comparing some aspects of this structure with support for 
EU policy governance in 2016. I do not claim that the structure has remained the same over the years, 
but I believe that variations of mass support are compatible in principle with a certain temporal 
resilience of the structure through which EU support is expressed.  
Approaching the structure of EU support has meant to start with an overarching research question: 
how many dimensions compose the concept of EU support according to prior studies? The literature 
remarks that the concept of EU support needs to be carefully analysed because it encapsulates 
different forms of support. Indeed, the concept of support towards the EU is multidimensional, and a 
minimal definition requires at least four dimensions that correspond to different forms of EU support 
(see Chapter 2): ‘Output legitimacy’ (EU support as subjective utility); ‘EU governance legitimacy’ 
(EU support as a preference for EU governance); ‘European identification’ (EU support as we-
feeling); and ‘EU democracy’ (EU support as political representation at the EU level). 
From the analyses included in this dissertation, it emerged that the four theorised dimensions of 
EU support are empirically tenable across fifteen European countries in 2009, and their measurement 
is also stable across different statistical methods (see Chapter 3 and Appendix A). Using as proxies a 
limited set of indicators, longitudinal findings suggest that the dimensions of EU support based on 
subjective utility (‘Output legitimacy’) and political representation (‘EU democracy’) are those most 
affected by the European crises (Economic, Eurozone, and refugee crises), since there is a general 
decrease of these forms of EU support after 2007. 
Having defined the dimensions of EU support, this thesis investigated what influences the 
development of these different forms of EU support. In the literature, EU support is explained by four 
sets of individual-level exogenous determinants: (1) Instrumental reasoning, (2) Confidence in 
national institutions, (3) National identification and attachment, and (4) Social-location and political 
values. The term exogenous indicates that they are external to the definition of the concept of EU 
support, and they are considered as its antecedents. Analyses with 2009 data included in Chapter 4 
demonstrated that among these sets of micro-level determinants, only ‘exclusive national 
identification’, strength of ‘national attachment’, ‘confidence in national institutions’, and ‘political 
values’ influence the different forms of EU support in a consistent way across EU countries.  
These results confirm some of the findings already in the literature, and this analysis can also be 
interpreted as a proof of the external validity of the measurement of EU support. However, the effects 
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of these determinants vary across the four dimensions, showing that results (and interpretation) differ 
when moving from one dimension of EU support to another. Moreover, only ‘exclusive national 
identification’ consistently influences a generic preference for EU governance, measured by the 
dimension of ‘EU governance legitimacy’.  
Further analyses tested the presence of a hierarchy among the four dimensions of EU support, 
where ‘Output legitimacy’, ‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’ come first in ‘causal’ 
chain, influencing ‘EU governance legitimacy’. Although the literature (mainly neo and post-
functionalism, and some empirical studies) suggests that this form of support is contingent upon 
subjective utility (‘Output legitimacy’), we-feelings (‘European identification’), and political 
representation (‘EU democracy’), findings do not confirm this hierarchical structure. However, as 
soon as the object of analysis is specific support for EU governance of distinct policy domains - rather 
than a generic preference for EU governance measured by ‘EU governance legitimacy’ - ‘Output 
legitimacy’ and ‘European identification’ turn out to be significant determinants of this form of 
support. This also corroborates the hypothesis that there are two types of support for EU governance: 
a generic preference for more EU governance and a specific support for EU governance that varies 
across policy sectors. 
Furthermore, there is a cross-policy variation in the influence of ‘Output legitimacy’ and 
‘European identification’, and this variation is accounted for by policy domain characteristics: 
‘Output legitimacy’ is more influential for policies where EU policy governance is more effective 
according to normative criteria, while ‘European identification’ is more discriminant for market-
correcting (social-model) policies.  
Policy attributes also directly influence the probability to support EU policy governance. Indeed, 
controlling for individual-level variability, survey respondents tend to dismiss EU governance of 
high-expenditure policy as well as for domains where the EU has already acquired extensive 
competencies. This last outcome casts serious doubt on the neo-functional spillover mechanism (see 
Haas 1958) since what emerges is, instead, a ‘spillback’ (Schmitter 2004, cit. in Niemann and 
Schmitter 2009: 55) from prior agreements on EU competencies. However, the analyses included in 
this dissertation do not corroborate the hypothesis that the determinant of this ‘spillback’ is the 
politicisation of the EU. In 2009 data, there is no evidence of the influence of different party systems 
on support for EU policy governance. Overall, country-level variables are very scant determinants of 
specific support for EU policy governance, and from this dissertation emerges that this specific 
support is mostly influenced by policy (meso) and individual (micro)-level characteristics. 
Finally, the strength of individual European and national identifications are undoubtedly within 
the set of traditional drivers of EU support, and some studies in the literature address the influence of 
identity-meanings on European identification, but there are no studies that relate identity-meanings 
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to support for EU policy governance. This was performed in Chapter 6, where European and national 
identities are unpacked in their constitutive components to investigate their influence on support for 
EU governance of eight distinct policy domains. Four components are defined: ‘European Civility’, 
‘National Civility’, ‘Ancestry’, and ‘Citizenship’. The analyses corroborated the hypothesis that the 
different meanings of national and European identity influence EU support. Indeed, those that 
strongly conceive their national identity as a matter of sharing national cultural tradition (‘National 
Civility’) are less likely to endorse EU governance, since these national values are also embedded in 
national laws and institutions, which would be affected by a competence transfer to the EU. At the 
same time, those who believe that the essence of being European (Europeaness) is a matter of 
common and ordinary experiences as Europeans tend to be more supportive of EU policy governance. 
The importance placed on a pre-political (‘Ancestry’) and a political (‘Citizenship’) component does 
not influence this form of EU support.  
To conclude, what do these findings say about the structure of citizen support for EU policy 
governance? In Chapter 1 three models of support for EU governance are provided. Model 1 
maintains that this form of support is not a unitary dimension and support varies across policy 
domains: it is more likely in domains characterised by policy externalities generated by international 
interdependence; Model 2 conceives support for EU governance as an attitude that cross-cuts policy 
domains: it is a unitary dimension that is not influenced by the characteristics of the policy domains; 
Model 3 holds that support for EU governance is not a unitary dimension, and it is influenced by the 
way each policy domain is related to political identities and by the degree of politicisation of the EU 
within national politics.The analyses included in this dissertation tested the elements that compose 
these models. In details, these elements are:  
HP1. Model 2: the assumption that support for EU policy governance is a unitary dimension 
(see Chapter 3); 
HP2. Model 2: support for EU policy governance is not contingent upon characteristics of 
the policy domains (see Chapter 5); 
HP3. Model 1: support for EU governance is more likely in policy domains characterised by 
functional interdependence (see Chapter 5); 
HP4. Model 3: the influence of political identities on support for EU governance varies 
across policy domains due to the different characteristics of the policy domains (see 
chapters 5 and 6); 
HP5. Model 3: support for EU policy governance is influenced by the degree of 
politicisation of the EU within national politics (Chapter 5). 
The analyses of Chapter 3 provided evidence supporting the presence of a unitary dimension of 
support for EU policy governance (HP1), namely an individual latent and generic disposition. 
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However, this generic latent attitude does not explain respondents’ preferences for EU governance of 
two policy domains (Foreign and Tax policies), and large part of the variability in the support for EU 
governance of other six policy domains is not accounted for by this latent dimension. There is 
something more, and this is found in the characteristics of the policy domains (and in other individual-
level determinants). 
Chapter 5 showed that policy attributes have a direct influence on support for EU governance. It 
follows that Model 2 is wrong (HP2), whereas Model 1 is right (HP3) in saying that support for EU 
governance is more likely in policy domains characterised by policy externalities generated by 
international interdependence. Moreover, chapters 5 and 6 demonstrated that the influence of political 
identities on support for EU governance differ across policy domains, suggesting that political 
identities are more determinant in some policy sectors and less in others (HP4). This can depend on 
the fact that some sectors are more important in defining and demarcating political identities than 
others. 
Lastly, there are not enough findings to accept the hypothesis (HP4) that politicisation is a 
determinant of support for EU policy governance, even though further research should be undertaken 
on this issue since 2016 data suggest that there might be an influence. 
To conclude, this thesis proposes a fourth model of support for EU policy governance, which 
combines the findings just presented. Hence, support for EU policy governance is structured with a 
core that consists of a generic disposition towards EU policy governance. However, this generic 
disposition is either activated or deactivated by the attributes of the policy sectors themselves. 
Moreover, political identities interact with the characteristics of the policy sectors and have a different 
influence across policy domains. This last point should be the object of further studies, with more 
policy domains, allowing modelling cross-level effects between political identities (a micro-level 
determinant) and meso-level determinants. This is a promising field of research that can complement 
more normative studies on the scope of EU policy governance. Indeed, this thesis demonstrated the 
importance of looking at the meaning of national and European identities to understand why European 
citizens support or reject EU policy governance. 
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APPENDIX A 
Table 40: Method Comparison 
Method Pros Cons 
Type of 
indicators 
Type of latent 
factor(s) 
PCFA 
Easy to run and interpret 
Each indicator freely loads to 
each factor  
Continuous Continuous 
Rule of thumb in 
choosing latent factor 
No statistical test for latent 
structure stability 
Role of thumb in 
identifying factor 
meaning 
No statistical test for cross-group 
invariance 
  
Assume indicators and latent 
factors as continuous 
MGCFA 
Easy to run and no limit 
to number of factors 
Assume indicators and latent 
factors as continuous 
Continuous Continuous 
Test confirmatory factor 
solution 
Risk of over-dimensionalising 
Statistical index of latent 
structure validity 
(goodness of fit)   
Statistical test for cross-
group invariance   
IRT 
Test confirmatory factor 
solution 
Computationally expensive 
Any Continuous 
Estimate latent factor for 
any type of indicators 
Limited number of latent factor in 
current statistical software 
Statistical index of latent 
structure validity 
(goodness of fit) 
Limited number of indicator per 
factor in current statistical 
software 
Statistical test for cross-
group invariance 
Limited number of ready to use 
goodness of fit indexes 
LCFA 
Test confirmatory factor 
solution 
Computationally expensive 
Any Ordinal 
Estimate latent factor for 
any type of indicators 
Limited number of latent factors 
Statistical index of latent 
structure validity 
(goodness of fit) 
Limited number of indicator per 
factor 
Statistical test for cross-
group invariance 
Limited number of ready to use 
goodness of fit index 
 
Item response theory (IRT) 
Item response theory is a family of statistical techniques employed for measuring a continuous latent 
dimension - called latent trait or ability - using survey items as indicators of this dimension (see van 
der Linden 2016). Compared with CFA, IRT does not assume that variables are interval level: IRT 
was developed for measuring latent trait of discrete variables, managing them according to their type 
(dichotomic, categorical, or ordinal) (Vermunt and Magidson 2016a). This means that normality is 
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not assumed, and analysts can model the relationship between the latent dimension and its indicators 
using the functional model that best fits theoretical assumption on the nature of the data: dichotomous 
data can be modelled with Rasch, 2-PL, or 3-PL models; ordinal data with, for instance, generalized 
partial credit, or rating scale models; and nominal data with nominal response model (Muraki 1992; 
de Ayala 2009). In most of the IRT models, the form of the function is always a variation of the 
logistic distribution (see de Ayala 2009). 
Here a parametric IRT model is used (de Ayala 2009; van der Linden 2016) to measure the 
dimensions of ‘EU governance legitimacy’, and ‘Output legitimacy’. Figure 24 graphically displays 
the measurement model, where the concept-indicator relationships remain the same as in MGCFA 
(see Chapter 3 Section 2): six policy areas define the F2 – ‘EU governance legitimacy’ latent trait, 
and three indicators of benefits define ‘Output legitimacy’. 
Figure 24 - Measurement model EU support (IRT and LCFA) 
 
Modelling an IRT parametric model means defining the types of indicators (either ordinal, nominal, 
or continuous) as well as the function that links the continuous latent factor with the manifest items. 
Indicators of ‘EU governance legitimacy’ are dichotomic variables120, the function employed is a 
simple logistic, and the IRT model is a 2PL (de Ayala 2009; van der Linden 2016); indicators of ‘EU 
governance legitimacy’ are ordinal variables, the function chosen is the adjacent-category logistic, 
and the IRT model is a generalized partial credit model (see Muraki 1992; de Ayala 2009; van der 
                                                 
120 A dichotomic variables can be defined as ordinal or nominal without any theoretical or practical difference. 
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Linden 2016). Since the two dimensions are uncorrelated, the unidimensionality assumption of IRT 
modelling (van der Linden 2016) still holds. 
Following the same analytical strategy employed for MGCFA, four models are compared: a simple 
model, run without controlling for the data clustered structure (Pooled model); one that places 
constraints on the configural invariance across countries (Configural model); a third one that 
constrains also equal slopes (Metric model); and the last one that adds a constraint for equal intercepts 
(Scalar model). The results of these IRT models are reported in Table 41121. According to p-values, 
the Pooled model, and the Scalar model do not fit data well. Conversely, Configural, as well as Metric 
equivalence models, have a good fit, and the value of their Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 
suggests that the Metric equivalence model performs better than the Configural one. Hence, this 
analysis confirms that cross-country comparison is possible once controlling for the offset created in 
the scale of groups by the fact that they reside in different countries (Davidov et al. 2012). 
Table 41 - Fit indexes IRT model of Figure 24. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
MODEL LL BIC(LL) Npar df p-value 
Pooled -64572 129361 23 1704 0.00 
Configural -61674 126177 301 11819 1.00 
Metric -62016 125941 203 11917 0.34 
Scalar -63165 127054 77 12043 0.00 
However, also using parametric IRT modelling, the problem of weak prediction power still remains 
(Table 42). Indeed, for each policy sector122 less than one-third of the total item variance is explained 
by the latent dimension, a result that is even worse than what emerges from MGCFA (see Chapter 3 
Section 2). 
Table 42 - Predictive power of 'EU governance legitimacy' (IRT). Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
Policy sector R^2 
Unemployment policy 0.33 
Immigration policy  0.26 
Environmental policy 0.31 
Fighting crime 0.27 
Health care policy 0.32 
Agricultural policy 0.31 
 
                                                 
121 IRT models are computed using Latent Gold 5.1. Sintax is provided in Appendix C. Listwise deletion. 
122 For ordinal and dichotomic variables the percentage of explained variance is computed by Latent Gold 5.1 using a 
linear approximation as described in Magidson and Vermunt (2004) and Vermunt and Magidson (2005, 2016b). 
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In this case too, this result may be driven by the statistical method used to measure latent dimensions. 
As the last checking, the next section measures ‘Output legitimacy’ and ‘EU governance legitimacy’ 
using a non-parametric IRT such as LCFA.  
 
Latent Class Factor Analysis (LCFA) 
Latent Class Factor Analysis (LCFA) is a measuring technique that models one or more latent ordinal 
dimensions using a set of indicators. The ordinal nature of the latent dimension allows speaking of a 
discretised latent trait (Heinen 1996; Vermunt 2001; Vermunt and Magidson 2005; Vermunt and 
Magidson 2016a) since the latent variable that summarises individuals’ latent ability has a limited 
number of levels. Moreover, it can be considered a nonparametric IRT, because the relationship 
between a latent dimension and its indicators is not defined by a specific parametric function (van 
Onna 2004), like in parametric IRT where this function is one of the logistic family. In parametric 
IRT for every value of the continuous latent trait, there is a corresponding probability of choosing 
each item-level category, and individuals vary in their latent trait position or value. As well, in LCFA 
each discrete latent trait level is associated to a fixed probability of choosing each item-level category, 
but, in this case, individuals vary in the probability to be assigned to each specific (discrete) latent 
trait level. 
Beside statistical differences, the analytical strategy is the same as for IRT modelling, and four 
models (Pooled, Configural, Metric, and Scalar equivalence) are compared to assess measurement 
equivalence of ‘Output legitimacy’, and ‘EU governance legitimacy’123. Every latent dimension is 
modelled as a latent ordinal variable with three levels (Low, Medium, High legitimacy). Table 43 
displays the goodness of fit indexes for the four models124, where is clear that combining p-value 
statistics and Bayesian information criterion (BIC), the Metric equivalence model is the best fitting 
model. 
Table 43 - Fit indexes LCFA model of Figure 24. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
MODEL LL BIC(LL) Npar df p-value Class.Err. 
Pooled -64459 129153 25 1702 0.00 0.1498 
Configural -61262 126050 375 11745 1.00 0.1378 
Metric -61440 125220 249 11871 1.00 0.1716 
Scalar -63145 127051 81 12039 0.00 0.1227 
 
                                                 
123 For the indicator-concept relations see Figure 24 at page 154. 
124 LCFAs are performed using Latent Gold 5.1 Sintax in Appendix C. Listwise deletion. 
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The fraction of explained variance is still limited, and about two-third of the item-level variance is 
not explained by an ordinal latent trait (Table 44). 
Table 44  - Predictive power of 'EU governance legitimacy' (LCFA). Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
Policy sector R^2 
Unemployment 0.35 
Immigration policy 0.29 
Environmental policy 0.37 
Fighting crime 0.34 
Health care policy 0.35 
Agricultural policy 0.32 
As articulated above, every respondent has a probability to be classified ‘Low’, ‘Medium’, and ‘High’ 
on a latent dimension. For instance, for the latent dimension of ‘Output Legitimacy’ respondent with 
ID = 1 has a probability of 12% of holding ‘Low’ legitimacy, 87% ‘Medium’, and 1% ‘High’; And 
for ‘EU governance Legitimacy’, it has 57% probability of ‘Low’ Legitimacy, 43% of ‘Medium’, and 
0% of ‘High’. From these variable categories, it is possible to compute an interval-level variable, 
which summarises the individual probability distribution, assigning to each category an equal distance 
score between 0 and 1 (Vermunt and Magidson 2016a). In this case, the first level (‘Low’) is equal 
to 0, the second (‘Medium’) is 0.5, and the last category (‘High’) is 1. The average score is calculated 
using this formula: (0*percentage of ‘Low’ + 0.5* percentage of ‘Medium’ + 1*percentage of 
‘High’)/100. Hence, the score for ID = 1 is 0.55 for ‘Output Legitimacy’, and 0.21 for ‘EU governance 
legitimacy’. This individual score mimics a parametric IRT latent trait ability, as well as a MGCFA 
latent factor score. These values are used to analyse the correlation between these scores and those 
resulting from MGCFA and IRT modelling (see Chapter 3 Section 2). 
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APPENDIX B 
Table 45a - Question wording. Source Eurobarometer data, and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
Concepts Indicator Intune (April-June) 2009 Eurobarometer 
Output legitimacy 
Overall EU membership 
evaluation 
Generally speaking, do you think 
that (your country's) membership 
of the EU is ... Answers: A good 
thing, A bad thing, or Neither 
good nor bad. 
Until 2012 Generally speaking, do you 
think that (your country's) membership 
of the EU is ...  
Answers: A good thing, A bad thing, or 
Neither good nor bad. After 2012 
After 2012 Please tell me whether you 
tend to agree or tend to disagree: (OUR 
COUNTRY) could better face the future 
outside the EU... 
Answers: Totally Agree, Tend to Agree, 
Tend to Disagree, or Totally disagree. 
National benefit from 
EU membership  
Taking everything into 
consideration, would you say 
that (OUR COUNTRY) has on 
balance 
benefited or not from being a 
member of the European Union? 
Answers: Has benefited, or Has 
not benefited. 
 
Personal benefit from 
EU membership  
And what about of people like 
you? Have people like you on 
balance benefited or not from 
(OUR COUNTRY)'s EU 
membership? 
Answers: Have benefited, or 
Have not benefited. 
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Table 45b - Question wording. Source Eurobarometer data, and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
EU 
governance 
legitimacy 
Unemployment In most European countries today, political decisions 
are made at three different levels of government: at 
the regional level, at the national level, and at the 
level of the European Union. In your opinion who 
should be responsible for each of the following 
policy areas? Fighting unemployment. 
Answers: Regional level, National level, or European 
Union level. 
Before 2011 For each of the following 
areas, do you think that decisions should 
be made by the (NATIONALITY) 
Government, or made jointly with the 
EU?  
The fight against unemployment. 
Answers: (NATIONALITY) Government, 
or Jointly with the EU. 
Environmental 
policy 
In most European countries today, political decisions 
are made at three different levels of government: at 
the regional level, at the national level, and at the 
level of the European Union. In your opinion who 
should be responsible for each of the following 
policy areas? Environmental policy. 
Answers: Regional level, National level, or European 
Union level. 
Before 2011 For each of the following 
areas, do you think that decisions should 
be made by the (NATIONALITY) 
Government, or made jointly with the 
EU?  
Protection of the environment. 
Answers: (NATIONALITY) Government, 
or Jointly with the EU. 
Fighting crime In most European countries today, political decisions 
are made at three different levels of government: at 
the regional level, at the national level, and at the 
level of the European Union. In your opinion who 
should be responsible for each of the following 
policy areas? 
Fight against crime. 
Answers: Regional level, National level, or European 
Union level. 
Before 2011 For each of the following 
areas, do you think that decisions should 
be made by the (NATIONALITY) 
Government, or made jointly with the 
EU?  
The fight against organised crime. 
Answers: (NATIONALITY) Government, 
or Jointly with the EU. 
Health care 
policy 
In most European countries today, political decisions 
are made at three different levels of government: at 
the regional level, at the national level, and at the 
level of the European Union. In your opinion who 
should be responsible for each of the following 
policy areas? Health care policy. 
Answers: Regional level, National level, or European 
Union level. 
Before 2011 For each of the following 
areas, do you think that decisions should 
be made by the (NATIONALITY) 
Government, or made jointly with the 
EU?  
Health and social welfare. 
Answers: (NATIONALITY) Government, 
or Jointly with the EU. 
Agricultural 
policy 
In most European countries today, political decisions 
are made at three different levels of government: at 
the regional level, at the national level, and at the 
level of the European Union. In your opinion who 
should be responsible for each of the following 
policy areas? Agricultural policy. 
Answers: Regional level, National level, or European 
Union level. 
Before 2011 For each of the following 
areas, do you think that decisions should 
be made by the (NATIONALITY) 
Government, or made jointly with the 
EU?  
Agriculture and fishing policy. 
Answers: (NATIONALITY) Government, 
or Jointly with the EU. 
Unified tax 
system 
Thinking about the European Union over the next ten 
years or so, can you tell me whether you are in 
favour or against the following?  
A unified tax system for the EU. 
Answers: Strongly in favour, Somewhat in favour, 
Somewhat against, or Strongly against. 
 
Immigration 
policy 
In most European countries today, political decisions 
are made at three different levels of government: at 
the regional level, at the national level, and at the 
level of the European Union. In your opinion who 
should be responsible for each of the following 
policy areas? Immigration policy. 
Answers: Regional level, National level, or European 
Union level. 
Before 2014 For each of the following 
areas, do you think that decisions should 
be made by the (NATIONALITY) 
Government, or made jointly with the 
EU? Immigration policy. 
Answers: (NATIONALITY) Government, 
or Jointly with the EU. 
After 2014 What is your opinion on each 
of the following statements? Please tell 
me for each statement, whether you are 
for it or against it: ‘A common European 
policy on migration’ 
Answers: For, or Against. 
Foreign policy Thinking about the European Union over the next ten 
years or so, can you tell me whether you are in 
favour or against the following?  
A single EU foreign policy toward outside countries. 
Answers: Strongly in favour, Somewhat in favour, 
Somewhat against, or Strongly against. 
What is your opinion on each of the 
following statements? Please tell me for 
each statement, whether you are for it or 
against it: ‘A common foreign policy of 
all Member States of the EU’ 
Answers: For, or Against. 
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Table 45c - Question wording. Source Eurobarometer data, and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
European 
identification 
Attachment towards 
Europe 
People may feel different 
degrees of attachment to their 
town or village, to their region, 
to their country or to Europe. 
Please tell me how attached you 
feel to Europe  
Answers: Very attached, Fairly 
attached, Not very attached, Not 
at all attached 
People may feel different degrees of 
attachment to their town or village, to 
their region, to their country or to 
Europe. Please tell me how attached you 
feel to Europe  
Answers: Very attached, Fairly attached, 
Not very attached, Not at all attached 
Cognitive identification: 
psychological centrality 
How much does being a 
European have to do with how 
you feel about yourself in your 
day to day life? 
Answers: A great deal, 
Somewhat, Not very much, or 
Not at all. 
 
Cognitive identification: 
interdependence 
How far do you feel that what 
happens to Europe in general has 
important consequences for 
people like you? 
Answers: A great deal, 
Somewhat, Not very much, or 
Not at all. 
 
 
Table 45d - Question wording. Source Eurobarometer data, and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
EU democracy 
Satisfaction with EU 
democracy 
On the whole, how satisfied are 
you with the way democracy 
works in the European Union? 
Are you…? 
Answers: Very satisfied, 
Somewhat satisfied, Somewhat 
dissatisfied, or Very dissatisfied. 
On the whole, are you very satisfied, 
fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not 
at all satisfied with the way democracy 
works in the European Union? 
Answers: Very satisfied, Fairly satisfied, 
Not very satisfied, or Not at all satisfied. 
Trust in the EU 
Commission 
Please tell me on a scale of 0 to 
10, how much you personally 
trust each of the following 
institutions. '0' means that "you 
do not trust an institution at all" 
and '10' means "you have 
complete trust": The European 
Commission 
Please tell me if you tend to trust it or 
tend not to trust it? The European 
Commission... 
Answers: Tend to trust, Tend not to trust. 
Trust in the EU 
Parliament 
Please tell me on a scale of 0 to 
10, how much you personally 
trust each of the following 
institutions. '0' means that "you 
do not trust an institution at all" 
and '10' means "you have 
complete trust": The European 
Parliament 
Please tell me if you tend to trust it or 
tend not to trust it? The European 
Parliament. 
Answers: Tend to trust, Tend not to trust. 
Trust in EU policy-
makers 
Those who make decisions in the 
European Union are competent 
people who know what they are 
doing? 
Answers: Strongly Agree, 
Somewhat agree, Somewhat 
disagree, or Strongly disagree 
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Table 46a - Country-averages of indicators of EU support. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
COUNTRY Output legitimacy 
Overall Evaluation National benefit Personal benefit 
BELGIUM 0.83 0.79 0.55 
DENMARK 0.75 0.79 0.61 
GERMANY 0.84 0.67 0.56 
GREECE 0.85 0.83 0.61 
SPAIN 0.88 0.83 0.67 
FRANCE 0.75 0.72 0.43 
ITALY 0.84 0.76 0.56 
PORTUGAL 0.79 0.79 0.57 
UK 0.56 0.48 0.36 
ESTONIA 0.81 0.82 0.61 
HUNGARY 0.56 0.42 0.32 
POLAND 0.82 0.78 0.46 
SLOVAKIA 0.80 0.83 0.59 
SLOVENIA 0.78 0.75 0.45 
BULGARIA 0.73 0.59 0.32 
Table 46b - Country-averages of indicators of EU support. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
COUNTRY 
EU governance legitimacy 
Fighting 
unemployment 
Immigration 
policy 
Environmental 
policy 
Fight against 
crime 
Health care 
policy 
Agricultural 
policy 
BELGIUM 0.34 0.56 0.56 0.52 0.33 0.43 
DENMARK 0.19 0.30 0.54 0.37 0.13 0.40 
GERMANY 0.27 0.48 0.69 0.61 0.21 0.45 
GREECE 0.28 0.42 0.39 0.25 0.22 0.24 
SPAIN 0.34 0.61 0.57 0.57 0.19 0.28 
FRANCE 0.29 0.59 0.59 0.44 0.28 0.40 
ITALY 0.30 0.54 0.40 0.32 0.18 0.20 
PORTUGAL 0.44 0.57 0.49 0.45 0.27 0.30 
UK 0.10 0.25 0.32 0.09 0.09 0.16 
ESTONIA 0.13 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.10 0.14 
HUNGARY 0.30 0.52 0.58 0.51 0.21 0.28 
POLAND 0.28 0.52 0.41 0.43 0.24 0.29 
SLOVAKIA 0.32 0.58 0.44 0.66 0.25 0.37 
SLOVENIA 0.29 0.40 0.44 0.41 0.20 0.26 
BULGARIA 0.16 0.54 0.47 0.35 0.16 0.25 
Table 46c - Country-averages of indicators of EU support. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
COUNTRY 
European identification 
Attachment towards 
Europe  
Psychological Centrality  Interdependence  
BELGIUM 0.58 0.55 0.66 
DENMARK 0.64 0.53 0.65 
GERMANY 0.66 0.53 0.60 
GREECE 0.48 0.42 0.74 
SPAIN 0.53 0.54 0.71 
FRANCE 0.56 0.46 0.67 
ITALY 0.66 0.48 0.72 
PORTUGAL 0.60 0.59 0.78 
UK 0.45 0.34 0.70 
ESTONIA 0.52 0.47 0.67 
HUNGARY 0.73 0.43 0.73 
POLAND 0.63 0.48 0.54 
SLOVAKIA 0.59 0.46 0.67 
SLOVENIA 0.62 0.46 0.67 
BULGARIA 0.64 0.30 0.61 
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Table 46d - Country-averages of indicators of EU support. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
COUNTRY 
EU democracy 
Satisfaction with EU 
democracy 
Trust in EU 
Parliament 
Trust in EU 
Commission 
Trust in EU policy-
makers 
BELGIUM 0.55 0.53 0.53 0.60 
DENMARK 0.56 0.54 0.53 0.62 
GERMANY 0.50 0.45 0.44 0.50 
GREECE 0.49 0.47 0.46 0.55 
SPAIN 0.60 0.51 0.52 0.62 
FRANCE 0.49 0.46 0.46 0.52 
ITALY 0.56 0.53 0.54 0.56 
PORTUGAL 0.55 0.49 0.50 0.61 
UK 0.46 0.39 0.40 0.41 
ESTONIA 0.62 0.53 0.54 0.68 
HUNGARY 0.49 0.33 0.33 0.58 
POLAND 0.54 0.43 0.44 0.55 
SLOVAKIA 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.62 
SLOVENIA 0.58 0.50 0.51 0.60 
BULGARIA 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.76 
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Table 47 - Items correlation. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
 A B C D E F G H I L M N O P Q R 
A - Overall EU membership evaluation  1 .633** .480** .097** .150** .137** .089** .069** .146** .318** .282** .090** .369** .385** .391** .283** 
B - National benefit from EU membership    1 .539** .100** .126** .122** .080** .073** .133** .275** .276** .095** .341** .356** .354** .245** 
C- Personal benefit from EU membership     1 .082** .117** .145** .080** .053** .139** .282** .332** .184** .303** .332** .322** .208** 
D - Unemployment policy    1 .330** .287** .348** .382** .319** .091** .094** .073** .064** .067** .060** .037** 
E - Immigration policy      1 .342** .322** .249** .275** .114** .088** .064** .061** .096** .092** .062** 
F - Environmental policy       1 .360** .283** .368** .133** .091** .072** .079** .101** .098** .069** 
G - Fighting crime policy       1 .328** .302** .097** .091** .044** .053** .058** .059** .043** 
H - Health care policy         1 .342** .061** .066** .039** .038** .058** .052** .032** 
I - Agricultural policy          1 .125** .111** .057** .068** .103** .102** .072** 
L - Attachment towards Europe           1 .374** .175** .255** .283** .284** .240** 
M - Cognitive identification: psychological 
centrality  
          1 .202** .243** .256** .256** .169** 
N - Cognitive identification: interdependence             1 .105** .107** .109** .084** 
O - Satisfaction with EU democracy              1 .403** .399** .343** 
P - Trust in EU Parliament               1 .827** .359** 
Q - Trust in EU Commission                1 .365** 
R- Trust in EU policy-makers                 1 
**: Correlation is significant at p<= 0.01 (two-tails) 
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Table 48 - Group-level fit statistics model of Figure 15 (MGCFA). Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
COUNTRY N. OF CASES SRMR 
Belgium 809 0.06 
Denmark 777 0.07 
Germany 793 0.05 
Greece 605 0.06 
Spain 799 0.06 
France 861 0.07 
Italy 582 0.06 
Portugal 728 0.06 
UK 747 0.09 
Estonia 431 0.05 
Hungary 689 0.06 
Poland 483 0.06 
Slovakia 736 0.07 
Slovenia 635 0.06 
Bulgaria 516 0.07 
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Table 49 -  Survey question for micro determinants. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
VARIABLE QUESTION WORDING 
Socio-economic status (SES) 
To which of the following categories do you feel you belong?  
Answers: The upper class, the middle class, lower middle class, the working class. 
Trust in the national Government 
Please tell me on a scale of 0 to 10, how much you personally trust each of the following institutions.  
'0' means that "you do not trust an institution at all" and '10' means "you have complete trust": The (nationality) government 
Exclusive national identification Do you see yourself as…? (Nationality) only, (Nationality) and European, European and (Nationality), European only. 
National attachment 
People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or to Europe.  
Please tell me how attached you feel to (OUR COUNTRY) Answers: Very attached, Fairly attached, Not very attached, Not at all attached 
Knowledge of the EU (1) Can you tell me which of the following countries are members of the European Union (European Community)? The Netherlands 
Knowledge of the EU (2) Can you tell me which of the following countries are members of the European Union (European Community)? Malta 
Knowledge of the EU (3) Can you tell me which of the following countries are members of the European Union (European Community)? Croatia 
Knowledge of the EU (4) How many member states are there in the European Union nowadays? 
Education 
Which of the following best describes your level of education: Did not go to school, Completed primary (elementary) education, Completed 
basic secondary education (middle school), Completed secondary education with vocational qualifications, Completed secondary education 
with A-level qualifications 5, College, university or other degree, Still a student. 
Left/right self-placement 
In politics people sometimes talk of "left" and "right". Where would you place yourself on a scale from 
0 to 10 where '0' means "the left" and '10' means "the right", and '5' means "neither left nor right"? 
Gender female Gender: Male or Female. 
Age Could you please tell me the year in which you were born? 
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Table 50 - Average value of micro determinants per country. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
COUNTRY 
Instrumental 
reasoning 
Confidence 
in national 
institutions 
National identification and 
affectivity 
Social location and political values Controls 
Ses (0-1) Trust nat. Gov. 
(0-1) 
Excl. Nat. Id (0-
1) 
Nat. Attachment 
(0-1) 
Eu 
knowledge 
(0-1) 
Education 
(0-1) 
Left/right 
(0-1) 
Female 
(0-1) 
Age (0-1) 
BELGIUM 0.40 0.49 0.31 0.69 0.54 0.59 0.51 0.46 0.36 
DENMARK 0.40 0.62 0.33 0.91 0.50 0.56 0.53 0.52 0.37 
GERMANY 0.39 0.50 0.26 0.81 0.52 0.55 0.47 0.50 0.37 
GREECE 0.38 0.32 0.43 0.85 0.44 0.49 0.52 0.43 0.37 
SPAIN 0.24 0.45 0.24 0.71 0.40 0.47 0.44 0.53 0.33 
FRANCE 0.40 0.43 0.27 0.81 0.54 0.65 0.46 0.47 0.35 
ITALY 0.37 0.45 0.18 0.84 0.40 0.44 0.52 0.45 0.36 
PORTUGAL 0.28 0.35 0.35 0.82 0.43 0.38 0.48 0.45 0.35 
UK 0.22 0.42 0.70 0.78 0.40 0.62 0.52 0.46 0.34 
ESTONIA 0.29 0.43 0.46 0.86 0.42 0.59 0.53 0.43 0.33 
HUNGARY 0.17 0.34 0.57 0.86 0.39 0.42 0.58 0.41 0.36 
POLAND 0.27 0.33 0.46 0.86 0.38 0.47 0.57 0.47 0.36 
SLOVAKIA 0.30 0.50 0.43 0.78 0.54 0.37 0.48 0.38 0.34 
SLOVENIA 0.35 0.45 0.38 0.87 0.67 0.64 0.46 0.48 0.35 
BULGARIA 0.18 0.23 0.61 0.91 0.33 0.50 0.47 0.45 0.38 
 
Table 51 - Fit indexes models of Figure 16. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
MODEL X2 CFI RMSEA SRMR BIC DF 
METRIC INVARIANCE 7915 0.9 0.05 0.05 82054 3438 
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Table 52 - Group-level fit statistics model of Figure 16. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
COUNTRY N. OF CASES SRMR 
Belgium 729 0.05 
Denmark 698 0.05 
Germany 687 0.05 
Greece 542 0.05 
Spain 705 0.05 
France 773 0.05 
Italy 494 0.05 
Portugal 626 0.05 
UK 579 0.07 
Estonia 350 0.05 
Hungary 544 0.05 
Poland 327 0.05 
Slovakia 580 0.06 
Slovenia 535 0.04 
Bulgaria 405 0.06 
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Table 53 - Left/Right linear - total effect - standardized coefficients. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
 
Note: Coefficients significant at p<=0.05 (two-tails) are marked in bold type and with the sign * 
 
Table 54 - Fit indexes models of Figure 17. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
MODEL X2 CFI RMSEA SRMR BIC DF 
METRIC INVARIANCE 7915 0.901 0.048 0.051 117712 3438 
  
EXOGENOUS DETERMINANT ON DIMENSIONS BELGIUM DENMARK GERMANY GREECE SPAIN FRANCE ITALY PORTUGAL UK ESTONIA HUNGARY POLAND SLOVAKIA SLOVENIA BULGARIA
SES ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY 0.09* 0.13* 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.09* 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.18 0.15 -0.07 0.08 0.14 0.06
SES ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY -0.03 0.12* -0.08 0.06 0.1* -0.01 -0.01 0 -0.04 0 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 0.05 -0.33*
SES ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION 0.06 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.08* 0.07 0.23* 0.14* 0.18* 0.04 0.09 0.18*
SES ON: EU DEMOCRACY 0.02 0.07 0 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.11* 0.04 0.09 0.03 0 0.11* 0.12* -0.03
TRUST NAT. GOV. ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY 0.31* 0.21* 0.24* 0.15* 0.11* 0.24* 0.05 0.3* 0.22* 0.27* 0.37* 0.4* 0.09* 0.18* 0.29*
TRUST NAT. GOV. ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY 0.03 -0.05 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.05 -0.13* 0 0.08 0 0.12* 0.1 0.02 0.03 0.01
TRUST NAT. GOV. ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION 0.11* 0.12* 0.1* 0.16* 0.13* 0.21* 0 0.18* 0.12* 0.17* 0 0.27* 0.1* 0.03 0.16*
TRUST NAT. GOV. ON: EU DEMOCRACY 0.67* 0.49* 0.66* 0.48* 0.56* 0.59* 0.45* 0.59* 0.64* 0.58* 0.21* 0.55 0.58* 0.5* 0.48*
EXCL. NAT. ID ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY -0.34* -0.25* -0.33* -0.32* -0.38* -0.45* -0.31* -0.24* -0.3* -0.33* -0.1* -0.16* -0.25* -0.4* -0.36*
EXCL. NAT. ID ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY -0.27* -0.21* -0.22* -0.15* -0.12* -0.27* -0.18* -0.21* -0.26* -0.12* -0.13* -0.17* -0.06 -0.2* -0.05
EXCL. NAT. ID ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION -0.47* -0.4* -0.43* -0.53* -0.41* -0.48* -0.33* -0.3* -0.53* -0.39* -0.18* -0.35* -0.34* -0.54* -0.51*
EXCL. NAT. ID ON: EU DEMOCRACY -0.15* -0.22* -0.1* -0.29* -0.21* -0.23* -0.2* -0.21* -0.18* -0.13* -0.1* -0.12* -0.18* -0.25* -0.17*
NAT. ATTACHMENT ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY 0.02 0.01 0.13* 0.11* 0.1* -0.04 0.08 0.16* 0.08* 0.19* 0.07 0.02 0.11* 0.04 0.09
NAT. ATTACHMENT ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY -0.02 -0.04 -0.13* -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 0 -0.05 -0.15* 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.09
NAT. ATTACHMENT ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION 0.31* 0.24* 0.34* 0.22* 0.52* 0.22* 0.25* 0.39* 0.25* 0.42* 0.64* 0.27* 0.54* 0.38* 0.27*
NAT. ATTACHMENT ON: EU DEMOCRACY 0.02 -0.04 0.06 -0.01 0.09 0.02 0 0.11 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.07 -0.04 0.03 0.06
EDUCATION ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY 0.06 0.08 0.09* 0.06 0.1* 0.09* 0.09 0.12* 0.14* 0.04 0.06 0.04 0 -0.01 0.12*
EDUCATION ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY 0.14* 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.11* 0.09 0.08 0.07 -0.06 -0.06 0 0.03 0.01 0.16*
EDUCATION ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION 0.02 0.07 0.11* 0.15* 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.09* -0.02 0.07 -0.09 0 0.07 -0.04 0.07
EDUCATION ON: EU DEMOCRACY 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.03 -0.05 0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.05 0.05
FEMALE ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY 0.09* 0 0.06 0 -0.01 0.03 0.15* 0.14* -0.02 0.08 -0.05 -0.08 0.02 0.02 0.01
FEMALE ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY 0.14* 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.11* 0.17* -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.05 -0.04 0.05 -0.09 -0.01
FEMALE ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION -0.06 -0.04 -0.16* 0 0 -0.06 -0.15* 0.05 -0.05 0.07 -0.08 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04
FEMALE ON: EU DEMOCRACY -0.04 -0.13* -0.11* -0.02 -0.08* -0.17* -0.13* -0.08* -0.12* -0.07 -0.12* 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 0.02
KNOW. OF EU ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY 0.07 -0.03 0.12* 0.03 0.12* 0.04 0.05 0.13* 0.12* 0.16* -0.01 0 0.16* 0.2* 0
KNOW. OF EU ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY 0.05 0.04 0.1 -0.08 0.09 0.15* 0.09 0.01 -0.04 0.05 0.04 0.01 0 0.14* 0.05
KNOW. OF EU ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION 0.05 -0.04 0.1* -0.01 0.06 0.06 0.11* 0.11* 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.01
KNOW. OF EU ON: EU DEMOCRACY -0.02 0.02 -0.04 -0.03 0 -0.06* -0.07 -0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.1* -0.07 0.06 0.04 0.06
LEFT/RIGHT ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY -0.02 0.03 -0.08 0.18* -0.1* -0.06 -0.18* 0.11* -0.12* -0.03 -0.11* -0.09 0.11* 0.13* 0.17*
LEFT/RIGHT ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY -0.01 0.06 -0.11* -0.02 -0.1 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 0.02 -0.1* -0.02 -0.14* -0.05 0
LEFT/RIGHT ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION -0.05 0.02 0 0.1 -0.05 -0.09 -0.12* 0.07 -0.09* 0.01 -0.05 0.03 0.01 0.14* 0.09
LEFT/RIGHT ON: EU DEMOCRACY 0 -0.06 -0.04 0.1* 0.13* -0.11* -0.25* 0.09* -0.08* -0.01 -0.25* -0.01 0.07 0.21* 0.25*
AGE ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY -0.09* -0.15* -0.05 -0.02 0.08* -0.14* 0.07 -0.01 -0.16* 0.11* -0.05 -0.11 -0.06 0.08 -0.07
AGE ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY 0.06 0.06 0.1* -0.03 -0.05 0.13* 0.03 -0.04 -0.12* -0.19* -0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.02
AGE ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION 0.08* 0.1* 0.09* 0.1* 0.12* 0.01 0.1 -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.03 -0.03 0.14* -0.04
AGE ON: EU DEMOCRACY -0.08* -0.15* -0.08* -0.01 0.11* -0.05 -0.1* 0 -0.14* 0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.05
N. cases 729 698 687 542 705 773 494 626 579 350 544 327 580 535 405
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Table 55a - Fixed effect logit model religion. Source of data Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
 
Table 56b - Fixed effect logit model religion. Source of data Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
 
 
 
 
MICRO LEVEL DETERMINANTS Health
Catholic or 
orthodox 
Protestant or 
Mixed
Unemployment
Catholic or 
orthodox 
Protestant or 
Mixed
Agriculture
Catholic or 
orthodox 
Protestant or 
Mixed
OUTPUT LEGITIMACY 0.50 0.33 1.19 0.49 0.44 0.72 1.20 1.02 1.46
EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION 1.13 1.10 1.25 1.27 1.16 1.56 0.90 0.93 0.96
EU DEMOCRACY 0.33 0.37 0.18 0.11 0.10 0.33 0.42 0.30 1.02
Gender female 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.21 0.18 0.32
Age -0.53 -0.51 -0.52 0.22 0.18 0.43 0.36 0.44 0.17
SES: Socio-economic status -0.38 -0.30 -0.77 -0.16 -0.13 -0.30 -0.09 -0.16 0.13
Knowledge of the EU -0.15 -0.10 -0.44 0.03 0.07 -0.21 0.20 0.24 0.09
Education -0.26 -0.16 -0.71 -0.02 0.11 -0.13 0.19 0.19 0.23
Exclusive national identification -0.10 -0.10 -0.15 -0.14 -0.15 -0.14 -0.28 -0.28 -0.27
Trust in the national Government -0.25 -0.21 -0.39 -0.21 -0.17 -0.54 -0.26 -0.23 -0.47
National attachment -0.64 -0.54 -1.02 -0.36 -0.28 -0.63 -0.46 -0.33 -0.89
Left/right self-placement -0.79 -0.50 -2.33 -0.91 -0.77 -1.61 -0.35 -0.24 -0.66
Left/right self-placement squared 0.61 0.27 2.46 0.69 0.47 1.87 0.10 -0.03 0.56
MICRO LEVEL DETERMINANTS Crime
Catholic or 
orthodox 
Protestant or 
Mixed
Immigration
Catholic or 
orthodox 
Protestant or 
Mixed
Environment
Catholic or 
orthodox 
Protestant or 
Mixed
OUTPUT LEGITIMACY 0.40 0.18 1.05 0.93 0.89 0.97 1.10 0.96 1.30
EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION 0.68 0.79 0.45 0.44 0.25 1.01 0.22 0.18 0.46
EU DEMOCRACY 0.10 0.20 -0.30 0.21 0.16 0.72 0.45 0.45 0.48
Gender female 0.06 0.02 0.23 0.02 -0.03 0.21 0.17 0.18 0.16
Age 0.49 0.31 1.16 -0.28 -0.16 -0.70 -0.29 -0.10 -0.94
SES: Socio-economic status -0.19 -0.21 -0.17 0.01 0.04 -0.07 -0.04 -0.08 0.08
Knowledge of the EU 0.25 0.27 0.16 0.29 0.31 0.24 0.44 0.38 0.77
Education 0.13 0.15 -0.01 0.33 0.33 0.37 0.58 0.65 0.36
Exclusive national identification -0.20 -0.17 -0.28 -0.33 -0.32 -0.37 -0.24 -0.19 -0.38
Trust in the national Government -0.02 -0.01 -0.10 -0.07 0.02 -0.64 -0.09 -0.13 0.08
National attachment -0.24 -0.15 -0.63 -0.30 -0.13 -0.79 -0.12 0.01 -0.54
Left/right self-placement 0.06 0.00 0.34 -0.29 -0.13 -0.69 -0.47 -0.28 -1.26
Left/right self-placement squared -0.29 -0.30 -0.27 -0.13 -0.30 0.47 0.06 -0.13 0.86
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Table 56c - Fixed effect logit model religion. Source of data Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
 
 
Table 56- Operationalisation of EU support 2016 
CONCEPT INDICATOR 
Intune 
(April-June) 
2009 
EB 86.2 
(November) 
2016 
Output legitimacy Overall EU membership evaluation x x 
European identification Attachment towards Europe x x 
EU democracy (INDEX OF:) 
Satisfaction with EU democracy x x 
Trust in the EU Commission x x 
Trust in the EU Parliament x x 
  
MICRO LEVEL DETERMINANTS Tax
Catholic or 
orthodox 
Protestant or 
Mixed
Foreign
Catholic or 
orthodox 
Protestant or 
Mixed
OUTPUT LEGITIMACY 0.67 0.72 0.55 1.63 1.40 1.90
EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION 1.34 1.29 1.48 0.96 1.20 0.66
EU DEMOCRACY 0.44 0.26 1.11 0.48 0.26 1.24
Gender female 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.13
Age 0.66 0.67 0.66 0.77 0.90 0.50
SES: Socio-economic status -0.31 -0.36 -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 -0.22
Knowledge of the EU 0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.41 0.36 0.58
Education -0.12 -0.10 -0.13 0.32 0.36 0.22
Exclusive national identification -0.21 -0.21 -0.19 -0.22 -0.25 -0.21
Trust in the national Government -0.25 -0.12 -0.77 0.05 0.00 0.14
National attachment -0.44 -0.16 -1.14 -0.15 -0.21 0.03
Left/right self-placement -0.27 -0.01 -0.96 1.07 1.17 0.58
Left/right self-placement squared 0.10 -0.13 0.74 -1.15 -1.36 -0.24
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Table 57a - Country-averages of indicators of identity-components. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
 
Identity meaning Identity meaning 
European civility National civility 
COUNTRY 
To share 
European 
cultural 
traditions  
To respect 
European Union’s 
laws and 
institutions  
To feel 
European  
To 
master 
any 
European 
language  
To share 
national 
cultural 
traditions  
To respect 
national 
laws and 
institutions  
To feel 
(nationality)  
To master (country 
language) 
BELGIUM 0.65 0.79 0.64 0.83 0.69 0.86 0.71 0.89 
DENMARK 0.61 0.81 0.68 0.83 0.76 0.89 0.83 0.88 
GERMANY 0.65 0.78 0.64 0.85 0.70 0.87 0.64 0.94 
GREECE 0.62 0.76 0.65 0.73 0.84 0.85 0.87 0.83 
SPAIN 0.57 0.78 0.65 0.78 0.68 0.87 0.76 0.78 
FRANCE 0.56 0.79 0.66 0.77 0.69 0.91 0.80 0.87 
ITALY 0.71 0.86 0.76 0.86 0.84 0.94 0.88 0.87 
PORTUGAL 0.74 0.84 0.75 0.86 0.87 0.91 0.90 0.93 
UK 0.59 0.74 0.54 0.68 0.77 0.94 0.81 0.90 
ESTONIA 0.73 0.84 0.67 0.82 0.86 0.92 0.86 0.92 
HUNGARY 0.74 0.86 0.82 0.80 0.84 0.91 0.92 0.89 
POLAND 0.67 0.73 0.72 0.73 0.82 0.81 0.87 0.89 
SLOVAKIA 0.61 0.76 0.73 0.79 0.71 0.83 0.82 0.89 
SLOVENIA 0.73 0.82 0.71 0.85 0.89 0.90 0.87 0.94 
BULGARIA 0.75 0.85 0.82 0.78 0.86 0.91 0.92 0.93 
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Table 58b - Country-averages of indicators of identity-components. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
 
Identity meaning Identity meaning     
Ancestry Citizenship     
COUNTRY 
To be born 
in (OUR 
COUNTRY)  
To have 
(NATIONALITY) 
parents 
To be 
born in 
Europe 
To have 
European 
parents 
To exercise 
citizens' 
rights, like 
being active 
in the 
politics of 
(OUR 
COUNTRY) 
To 
exercise 
citizens' 
rights, like 
being 
active in 
politics of 
the 
European 
Union     
BELGIUM 0.54 0.52 0.54 0.51 0.58 0.55     
DENMARK 0.56 0.54 0.51 0.50 0.65 0.53     
GERMANY 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.49 0.74 0.62     
GREECE 0.69 0.76 0.54 0.51 0.75 0.69     
SPAIN 0.68 0.63 0.62 0.56 0.73 0.68     
FRANCE 0.52 0.48 0.50 0.47 0.73 0.61     
ITALY 0.76 0.74 0.69 0.65 0.79 0.75     
PORTUGAL 0.78 0.77 0.70 0.64 0.76 0.75     
UK 0.65 0.57 0.51 0.45 0.73 0.56     
ESTONIA 0.62 0.65 0.53 0.50 0.67 0.59     
HUNGARY 0.69 0.75 0.66 0.66 0.63 0.59     
POLAND 0.71 0.74 0.63 0.60 0.63 0.63     
SLOVAKIA 0.71 0.69 0.63 0.61 0.59 0.56     
SLOVENIA 0.64 0.64 0.57 0.53 0.63 0.60     
BULGARIA 0.85 0.84 0.72 0.70 0.78 0.72     
 
Table 58 - Correlation among the four identity-components. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
  European civility [0-1] National civility [0-1] Ancestry [0-1] Citizenship [0-1] 
European civility [0-1] - - - - 
National civility [0-1] 0.42 - - - 
Ancestry [0-1] 0.37 0.44 - - 
Citizenship [0-1] 0.34 0.28 0.21 - 
**: Correlations are all significant at p<= 0.01 (two-tails) 
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Table 59 - Identity-component indexes per country. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
COUNTRY 
Identity meaning 
European civility 
[0-1] 
National civility 
[0-1] 
Ancestry 
[0-1] 
Citizenship 
[0-1] 
BELGIUM 0.73 0.79 0.53 0.57 
DENMARK 0.74 0.84 0.53 0.59 
GERMANY 0.73 0.79 0.50 0.68 
GREECE 0.69 0.85 0.62 0.72 
SPAIN 0.69 0.77 0.62 0.70 
FRANCE 0.69 0.82 0.49 0.67 
ITALY 0.80 0.88 0.71 0.77 
PORTUGAL 0.80 0.90 0.72 0.75 
UK 0.64 0.86 0.54 0.65 
ESTONIA 0.77 0.89 0.57 0.63 
HUNGARY 0.81 0.89 0.69 0.61 
POLAND 0.72 0.85 0.67 0.63 
SLOVAKIA 0.72 0.81 0.66 0.57 
SLOVENIA 0.78 0.90 0.59 0.61 
BULGARIA 0.80 0.91 0.78 0.75 
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Table 60 - Fit indexes models of Figure 22. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
Policy X2 CFI RMSEA SRMR BIC DF 
Health 38 0.996 0.04 0.01 -26861 15 
Unemployment 29 0.998 0.03 0.01 -23922 15 
Agriculture 22 0.999 0.02 0.01 -23184 15 
Fighting crime 19 0.999 0.02 0.01 -21937 15 
Immigration 28 0.998 0.03 0.01 -21433 15 
Environment 24 0.999 0.03 0.01 -21075 15 
Tax 47 0.995 0.05 0.01 -21476 15 
Foreign 16 1.000 0.01 0.01 -26074 15 
 
Table 61 - Total effect - unstandardized coefficients of path models: National Attachment & European id. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) 
 
 
  
DETERMINANT BELGIUM DENMARK GERMANY GREECE SPAIN FRANCE ITALY PORTUGAL UK ESTONIA HUNGARY POLAND SLOVAKIA SLOVENIA BULGARIA
National att. on Unemployment 0.03 0.05* 0.02 0.04* 0.05* 0.06* 0.06* 0.02 0.04* 0.03 0.05* 0.04* 0.07* 0.02 0.01
National att. on Fighting crime 0.06* 0.05* 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.04* 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.09* 0.06* 0.03 -0.01
National att. on Health care 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.03* -0.01 0.04* 0.00 0.01 0.02* 0.01 0.04* 0.07* 0.05* 0.02 -0.01
National att. on Agriculture 0.1* 0.11* 0.06* 0.05* 0.08* 0.08* 0.05* 0.02 0.07* 0.03 0.06* 0.08* 0.1* 0.05* 0.01
National att. on Environment 0.07* 0.08* 0.08* 0.04* 0.08* 0.05* 0.08* 0.05* 0.08* 0.04* 0.04 0.06* 0.04 0.07* 0.00
National att. on Immigration 0.06* 0.05* 0.1* 0.08* 0.07* 0.06* 0.07* 0.02 0.06* 0.02 0.06* 0.09* 0.07* 0.06* 0.00
National att. on Foreign 0.08* 0.11* 0.08* 0.09* 0.08* 0.1* 0.07* 0.04* 0.1* 0.08* 0.02 0.1* 0.09* 0.04* 0.02
National att. on Tax 0.07* 0.06* 0.04 0.07* 0.07* 0.07* 0.04* 0.03 0.08* 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.07* 0.04* 0.06*
European ID. on Unemployment 0.15 0.22* 0.10 0.32* 0.29* 0.5* 0.39* 0.12 0.26* 0.21* 0.5* 0.21* 0.34* 0.18 0.06
European ID. on Fighting crime 0.33* 0.25* -0.02 0.22* 0.11 0.33* 0.13 0.18 0.09 0.10 0.01 0.41* 0.28* 0.24 -0.10
European ID. on Health care 0.17 0.14* 0.00 0.25* -0.08 0.35* 0.02 0.09 0.16* 0.08 0.33* 0.35* 0.24* 0.14 -0.07
European ID. on Agriculture 0.56* 0.55* 0.28* 0.31* 0.47* 0.64* 0.37* 0.11 0.48* 0.20 0.49* 0.35* 0.52* 0.38* 0.11
European ID. on Environment 0.42* 0.38* 0.41* 0.33* 0.46* 0.46* 0.48* 0.33* 0.62* 0.31* 0.36 0.31* 0.19 0.61* 0.04
European ID. on Immigration 0.32* 0.26* 0.5* 0.56* 0.44* 0.51* 0.43* 0.11 0.47* 0.18 0.54* 0.4* 0.38* 0.41* -0.06
European ID. on Foreign 0.45* 0.55* 0.43* 0.69* 0.48* 0.77* 0.5* 0.21* 0.74* 0.51* 0.21 0.44* 0.42* 0.37* 0.23*
European ID. on Tax 0.39* 0.29* 0.20 0.49* 0.4* 0.56* 0.27* 0.19 0.55* 0.16 0.33 0.13 0.35* 0.37* 0.66*
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APPENDIX C 
Syntax PCFA (SPSS) (TABLE 9 page 55) 
FACTOR  
/VARIABLES unemployment_2l immigration_2l environment_2l crime_2l health_2l agriculture_2l unifiedtax_2lnom 
foreignpolicy_2lnom trusteuparliament trusteucommission sateudemoc eupolmakcompetent_nom eugood eunatben3l 
eupersben3l Euday EU_attach EUconseq 
/MISSING PAIRWISE  
/ANALYSIS unemployment_2l immigration_2l environment_2l crime_2l health_2l agriculture_2l unifiedtax_2lnom 
foreignpolicy_2lnom trusteuparliament trusteucommission sateudemoc eupolmakcompetent_nom eugood eunatben3l 
eupersben3l Euday EU_attach EUconseq 
/SELECT=filter_15(1)  
/PRINT UNIVARIATE INITIAL CORRELATION SIG KMO EXTRACTION ROTATION  
/PLOT EIGEN  
/CRITERIA MINEIGEN(1) ITERATE(25) NOKAISER 
/EXTRACTION PC  
/CRITERIA ITERATE(25) DELTA(0)  
/ROTATION OBLIMIN  
/METHOD=CORRELATION. 
 
Syntax PCFA (SPSS) (TABLE 10 page 57) 
FACTOR  
/VARIABLES unemployment_2l immigration_2l environment_2l crime_2l health_2l agriculture_2l trusteuparliament 
trusteucommission sateudemoc eupolmakcompetent_nom eugood eunatben3l eupersben3l Euday EU_attach EUconseq 
/MISSING PAIRWISE  
/ANALYSIS unemployment_2l immigration_2l environment_2l crime_2l health_2l agriculture_2l trusteuparliament 
trusteucommission sateudemoc eupolmakcompetent_nom eugood eunatben3l eupersben3l Euday EU_attach EUconseq 
/SELECT=filter_15(1)  
/PRINT UNIVARIATE INITIAL CORRELATION SIG KMO EXTRACTION ROTATION  
/PLOT EIGEN  
/CRITERIA MINEIGEN(1) ITERATE(25) NOKAISER 
/EXTRACTION PC  
/CRITERIA ITERATE(25) DELTA(0)  
/ROTATION OBLIMIN  
/METHOD=CORRELATION. 
 
Syntax MGCFA (STATA) (TABLE 13 page 60) 
*POOLED 
sem (L1 -> eunatben3l, ) (L1 -> eupersben3l, ) (L1 -> eugood, ) (L2 -> unemployment_2l, ) (L2 -> immigration_2l, ) (L2 
-> environment_2l, ) (L2 -> crime_2l, ) (L2 -> health_2l, ) (L2 -> agriculture_2l, ) (L3 -> Euday, ) (L3 -> EU_attach, ) 
(L3 -> EUconseq, ) (L4 -> trusteuparliament, ) (L4 -> trusteucommission, ) (L4 -> eupolmakcompetent_nom, ) (L4 -> 
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sateudemoc, ) if country < 16, covstruct(_lexogenous, diagonal) latent(L1 L2 L3 L4 ) cov( L1*L3 L1*L4 L3*L4) 
nocapslatent 
*CONFIGURAL 
sem (L1 -> eunatben3l, ) (L1 -> eupersben3l, ) (L1 -> eugood, ) (L2 -> unemployment_2l, ) (L2 -> immigration_2l, ) (L2 
-> environment_2l, ) (L2 -> crime_2l, ) (L2 -> health_2l, ) (L2 -> agriculture_2l, ) (L3 -> Euday, ) (L3 -> EU_attach, ) 
(L3 -> EUconseq, ) (L4 -> trusteuparliament, ) (L4 -> trusteucommission, ) (L4 -> eupolmakcompetent_nom, ) (L4 -> 
sateudemoc, ) if country < 16, covstruct(_lexogenous, diagonal) group(country) ginvariant(none) latent(L1 L2 L3 L4 ) 
cov( L1*L3 L1*L4 L3*L4) nocapslatent means(L1@0 L2@0 L3@0 L4@0) 
*METRIC 
sem (L1 -> eunatben3l, ) (L1 -> eupersben3l, ) (L1 -> eugood, ) (L2 -> unemployment_2l, ) (L2 -> immigration_2l, ) (L2 
-> environment_2l, ) (L2 -> crime_2l, ) (L2 -> health_2l, ) (L2 -> agriculture_2l, ) (L3 -> Euday, ) (L3 -> EU_attach, ) 
(L3 -> EUconseq, ) (L4 -> trusteuparliament, ) (L4 -> trusteucommission, ) (L4 -> eupolmakcompetent_nom, ) (L4 -> 
sateudemoc, ) if country < 16, covstruct(_lexogenous, diagonal) group(country) ginvariant(mcoef) latent(L1 L2 L3 L4 ) 
cov( L1*L3 L1*L4 L3*L4) nocapslatent means(L1@0 L2@0 L3@0 L4@0) 
*SCALAR 
sem (L1 -> eunatben3l, ) (L1 -> eupersben3l, ) (L1 -> eugood, ) (L2 -> unemployment_2l, ) (L2 -> immigration_2l, ) (L2 
-> environment_2l, ) (L2 -> crime_2l, ) (L2 -> health_2l, ) (L2 -> agriculture_2l, ) (L3 -> Euday, ) (L3 -> EU_attach, ) 
(L3 -> EUconseq, ) (L4 -> trusteuparliament, ) (L4 -> trusteucommission, ) (L4 -> eupolmakcompetent_nom, ) (L4 -> 
sateudemoc, ) if country < 16, covstruct(_lexogenous, diagonal) group(country) ginvariant(mcoef mcons) latent(L1 L2 
L3 L4 ) cov( L1*L3 L1*L4 L3*L4) nocapslatent means(L1@0 L2@0 L3@0 L4@0) 
 
Syntax IRT (LATENT GOLD) (TABLE 41 page 155) 
*POOLED 
options 
   maxthreads=4; 
   algorithm  
      tolerance=1e-005 emtolerance=0,01 emiterations=250 nriterations=50 ; 
   startvalues 
      seed=0 sets=16 tolerance=1e-005 iterations=50; 
   bayes 
      categorical=1 variances=1 latent=1 poisson=1; 
   montecarlo 
      seed=0 sets=0 replicates=500 tolerance=1e-008; 
   quadrature  nodes=10; 
   missing  excludeall; 
   output       
      parameters=effect  betaopts=wl standarderrors profile probmeans=posterior 
      bivariateresiduals estimatedvalues=model loadings; 
variables 
   select country =  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15;   
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dependent eugood, eunatben3l, eupersben3l, unemployment_2l, immigration_2l, 
      environment_2l, crime_2l, health_2l, agriculture_2l; 
   latent 
      DFactor1 continuous,  
      DFactor2 continuous; 
equations 
   DFactor1 ; 
   DFactor2 ; 
DFactor1 <- 1; 
   DFactor2 <- 1; 
   eugood <- 1 + (1) DFactor1; 
   eunatben3l <- 1 + DFactor1; 
   eupersben3l <- 1 + DFactor1; 
   unemployment_2l <- 1 + (1)DFactor2; 
   immigration_2l <- 1+ DFactor2; 
   environment_2l <- 1 + DFactor2; 
   crime_2l <- 1 + DFactor2; 
   health_2l <- 1 + DFactor2; 
   agriculture_2l <- 1 + DFactor2; 
*CONFIGURAL 
options 
   maxthreads=4; 
   algorithm  
      tolerance=1e-005 emtolerance=0,01 emiterations=250 nriterations=50 ; 
   startvalues 
      seed=0 sets=16 tolerance=1e-005 iterations=50; 
   bayes 
      categorical=1 variances=1 latent=1 poisson=1; 
   montecarlo 
      seed=0 sets=0 replicates=500 tolerance=1e-008; 
   quadrature  nodes=10; 
   missing  excludeall; 
   output       
      parameters=effect  betaopts=wl standarderrors profile probmeans=posterior 
      bivariateresiduals estimatedvalues=model; 
variables 
   select country =  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15; 
 independent country nominal;   
dependent eugood, eunatben3l, eupersben3l, unemployment_2l, immigration_2l, 
      environment_2l, crime_2l, health_2l, agriculture_2l; 
   latent 
      DFactor1 continuous,  
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      DFactor2 continuous; 
equations 
   DFactor1 | country; 
   DFactor2 | country; 
DFactor1 <- country; 
   DFactor2 <- country; 
   eugood <- 1 + (1) DFactor1; 
   eunatben3l <- 1 | country  + DFactor1  | country ; 
   eupersben3l <- 1 | country  + DFactor1  | country ; 
   unemployment_2l <- 1 + (1)DFactor2; 
   immigration_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2  | country ; 
   environment_2l <- 1 | country  + DFactor2  | country ; 
   crime_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2  | country ; 
   health_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2  | country ; 
   agriculture_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2  | country ; 
*METRIC 
options 
   maxthreads=4; 
   algorithm  
      tolerance=1e-005 emtolerance=0,01 emiterations=250 nriterations=50 ; 
   startvalues 
      seed=0 sets=16 tolerance=1e-005 iterations=50; 
   bayes 
      categorical=1 variances=1 latent=1 poisson=1; 
   montecarlo 
      seed=0 sets=0 replicates=500 tolerance=1e-008; 
   quadrature  nodes=10; 
   missing  excludeall; 
   output       
      parameters=effect  betaopts=wl standarderrors profile probmeans=posterior 
      bivariateresiduals estimatedvalues=model loadings; 
variables 
   select country =  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15; 
 independent country nominal;   
dependent eugood, eunatben3l, eupersben3l, unemployment_2l, immigration_2l, 
      environment_2l, crime_2l, health_2l, agriculture_2l; 
   latent 
      DFactor1 continuous,  
      DFactor2 continuous; 
equations 
   DFactor1 | country; 
   DFactor2 | country; 
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DFactor1 <- country; 
   DFactor2 <- country; 
   eugood <- 1 + (1) DFactor1; 
   eunatben3l <- 1 | country  + DFactor1; 
   eupersben3l <- 1 | country  + DFactor1; 
   unemployment_2l <- 1 + (1)DFactor2; 
   immigration_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2; 
   environment_2l <- 1 | country  + DFactor2; 
   crime_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2; 
   health_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2; 
   agriculture_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2; 
*SCALAR 
options 
   maxthreads=4; 
   algorithm  
      tolerance=1e-005 emtolerance=0,01 emiterations=250 nriterations=50 ; 
   startvalues 
      seed=0 sets=16 tolerance=1e-005 iterations=50; 
   bayes 
      categorical=1 variances=1 latent=1 poisson=1; 
   montecarlo 
      seed=0 sets=0 replicates=500 tolerance=1e-008; 
   quadrature  nodes=10; 
   missing  excludeall; 
   output       
      parameters=effect  betaopts=wl standarderrors profile probmeans=posterior 
      bivariateresiduals estimatedvalues=model loadings; 
variables 
   select country =  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15; 
 independent country nominal;   
dependent eugood, eunatben3l, eupersben3l, unemployment_2l, immigration_2l, 
      environment_2l, crime_2l, health_2l, agriculture_2l; 
   latent 
      DFactor1 continuous,  
      DFactor2 continuous; 
equations 
   DFactor1 | country; 
   DFactor2 | country; 
DFactor1 <- country; 
   DFactor2 <- country; 
   eugood <- 1 + (1) DFactor1; 
   eunatben3l <- 1 + DFactor1; 
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   eupersben3l <- 1 + DFactor1; 
   unemployment_2l <- 1 + (1)DFactor2; 
   immigration_2l <- 1+ DFactor2; 
   environment_2l <- 1 + DFactor2; 
   crime_2l <- 1 + DFactor2; 
   health_2l <- 1 + DFactor2; 
   agriculture_2l <- 1 + DFactor2; 
 
Syntax LCFA (LATENT GOLD) (TABLE 43 page 156) 
*POOLED 
options 
   maxthreads=4; 
   algorithm  
      tolerance=1e-008 emtolerance=0,01 emiterations=250 nriterations=50 ; 
   startvalues 
      seed=0 sets=16 tolerance=1e-005 iterations=50; 
   bayes 
      categorical=1 variances=1 latent=1 poisson=1; 
   montecarlo 
      seed=0 sets=0 replicates=500 tolerance=1e-008; 
   quadrature  nodes=10; 
   missing  excludeall; 
   output       
      parameters=effect  betaopts=wl standarderrors profile probmeans=posterior 
      bivariateresiduals estimatedvalues=model; 
variables 
   select country =  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15; 
   dependent eugood, eunatben3l, eupersben3l, unemployment_2l, immigration_2l, 
      environment_2l, crime_2l, health_2l, agriculture_2l; 
   latent 
      DFactor1 ordinal 3,  
      DFactor2 ordinal 3; 
equations 
   DFactor1 <- 1; 
   DFactor2 <- 1; 
   eugood <- 1 + DFactor1 ; 
   eunatben3l <- 1 + DFactor1 ; 
   eupersben3l <- 1 + DFactor1 ; 
   unemployment_2l <- 1 + DFactor2 ; 
   immigration_2l <- 1 + DFactor2 ; 
   environment_2l <- 1 + DFactor2 ; 
   crime_2l <- 1 + DFactor2 ; 
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   health_2l <- 1 + DFactor2 ; 
   agriculture_2l <- 1  + DFactor2 ; 
*CONFIGURAL 
options 
   maxthreads=4; 
   algorithm  
      tolerance=1e-008 emtolerance=0,01 emiterations=250 nriterations=50 ; 
   startvalues 
      seed=0 sets=16 tolerance=1e-005 iterations=50; 
   bayes 
      categorical=1 variances=1 latent=1 poisson=1; 
   montecarlo 
      seed=0 sets=0 replicates=500 tolerance=1e-008; 
   quadrature  nodes=10; 
   missing  excludeall; 
   output       
      parameters=effect  betaopts=wl standarderrors profile probmeans=posterior 
      bivariateresiduals estimatedvalues=model; 
variables 
   select country =  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15; 
independent country nominal; 
   dependent eugood, eunatben3l, eupersben3l, unemployment_2l, immigration_2l, 
      environment_2l, crime_2l, health_2l, agriculture_2l; 
   latent 
      DFactor1 ordinal 3,  
      DFactor2 ordinal 3; 
equations 
   DFactor1 <- 1 | country; 
   DFactor2 <- 1 | country; 
   eugood <- 1 | country + DFactor1 | country; 
   eunatben3l <- 1 | country + DFactor1 | country; 
   eupersben3l <- 1 | country + DFactor1 | country; 
   unemployment_2l <- 1  | country+ DFactor2 | country; 
   immigration_2l <- 1  | country+ DFactor2 | country; 
   environment_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2 | country; 
   crime_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2 | country; 
   health_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2 | country; 
   agriculture_2l <- 1 | country  + DFactor2 | country; 
*METRIC 
options 
   maxthreads=4; 
   algorithm  
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      tolerance=1e-008 emtolerance=0,01 emiterations=250 nriterations=50 ; 
   startvalues 
      seed=0 sets=16 tolerance=1e-005 iterations=50; 
   bayes 
      categorical=1 variances=1 latent=1 poisson=1; 
   montecarlo 
      seed=0 sets=0 replicates=500 tolerance=1e-008; 
   quadrature  nodes=10; 
   missing  excludeall; 
   output       
      parameters=effect  betaopts=wl standarderrors profile probmeans=posterior 
      bivariateresiduals estimatedvalues=model; 
variables 
   select country =  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15; 
independent country nominal; 
   dependent eugood, eunatben3l, eupersben3l, unemployment_2l, immigration_2l, 
      environment_2l, crime_2l, health_2l, agriculture_2l; 
   latent 
      DFactor1 ordinal 3,  
      DFactor2 ordinal 3; 
equations 
   DFactor1 <- 1 | country; 
   DFactor2 <- 1 | country; 
   eugood <- 1 | country + DFactor1 ; 
   eunatben3l <- 1 | country + DFactor1 ; 
   eupersben3l <- 1 | country + DFactor1 ; 
   unemployment_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2 ; 
   immigration_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2 ; 
   environment_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2 ; 
   crime_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2 ; 
   health_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2 ; 
   agriculture_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2 ; 
*SCALAR 
options 
   maxthreads=4; 
   algorithm  
      tolerance=1e-008 emtolerance=0,01 emiterations=250 nriterations=50 ; 
   startvalues 
      seed=0 sets=16 tolerance=1e-005 iterations=50; 
   bayes 
      categorical=1 variances=1 latent=1 poisson=1; 
   montecarlo 
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      seed=0 sets=0 replicates=500 tolerance=1e-008; 
   quadrature  nodes=10; 
   missing  excludeall; 
   output       
      parameters=effect  betaopts=wl standarderrors profile probmeans=posterior 
      bivariateresiduals estimatedvalues=model; 
variables 
   select country =  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15; 
independent country nominal; 
   dependent eugood, eunatben3l, eupersben3l, unemployment_2l, immigration_2l, 
      environment_2l, crime_2l, health_2l, agriculture_2l; 
   latent 
      DFactor1 ordinal 3,  
      DFactor2 ordinal 3; 
equations 
   DFactor1 <- 1 | country; 
   DFactor2 <- 1 | country; 
   eugood <- 1 + DFactor1 ; 
   eunatben3l <- 1 + DFactor1 ; 
   eupersben3l <- 1 + DFactor1 ; 
   unemployment_2l <- 1 + DFactor2 ; 
   immigration_2l <- 1 + DFactor2 ; 
   environment_2l <- 1 + DFactor2 ; 
   crime_2l <- 1 + DFactor2 ; 
   health_2l <- 1 + DFactor2 ; 
   agriculture_2l <- 1  + DFactor2 ; 
 
Syntax FULL SEM (STATA) (TABLE 19 page 77) 
*METRIC INVARIANCE 
sem (L1 -> eunatben3l, ) (L1 -> eupersben3l, ) (L1 -> eugood, ) (L2 -> unemployment_2l, ) (L2 -> immigration_2l, ) (L2 
-> environment_2l, ) (L2 -> crime_2l, ) (L2 -> health_2l, ) (L2 -> agriculture_2l, ) (L3 -> Euday, ) (L3 -> EU_attach, ) 
(L3 -> EUconseq, ) (L4 -> trusteuparliament, ) (L4 -> trusteucommission, ) (L4 -> eupolmakcompetent_nom, ) (L4 -> 
sateudemoc, ) (female age_ordinal_n ses EU_know education trust_nat_gov excl_id nat_attachment  lr lr2 -> L1) (female 
age_ordinal_n ses EU_know education trust_nat_gov excl_id nat_attachment lr lr2 -> L2) (female age_ordinal_n ses 
EU_know education trust_nat_gov excl_id nat_attachment lr lr2-> L3)(female age_ordinal_n ses EU_know education 
trust_nat_gov excl_id nat_attachment lr lr2  -> L4) if country < 16, group(country) ginvariant(mcoef) latent(L1 L2 L3 
L4 ) cov(e.L1*e.L2 e.L1*e.L3 e.L1*e.L4 e.L2*e.L3 e.L2*e.L4 e.L3*e.L4 female*age_ordinal_n female*ses 
female*EU_know female*education female*trust_nat_gov female*excl_id female*nat_attachment female*lr 
age_ordinal_n*ses age_ordinal_n*EU_know age_ordinal_n*education age_ordinal_n*trust_nat_gov 
age_ordinal_n*excl_id age_ordinal_n*nat_attachment EU_know*ses education*ses education*EU_know 
trust_nat_gov*ses trust_nat_gov*EU_know trust_nat_gov*education excl_id*ses excl_id*EU_know excl_id*education 
excl_id*trust_nat_gov nat_attachment*ses nat_attachment*EU_know nat_attachment*education 
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nat_attachment*trust_nat_gov nat_attachment*excl_id lr*age_ordinal_n lr*ses lr*EU_know lr*education 
lr*trust_nat_gov lr*excl_id lr*nat_attachment lr2*female lr2*age_ordinal_n lr2*ses lr2*EU_know lr2*education 
lr2*trust_nat_gov lr2*excl_id lr2*nat_attachment) nocapslatent standardize 
 
Syntax PATH MODEL (STATA) (TABLE 21 page 85) 
*METRIC INVARIANCE 
sem (L1 -> eunatben3l, ) (L1 -> eupersben3l, ) (L1 -> eugood, ) (L2 -> unemployment_2l, ) (L2 -> immigration_2l, ) (L2 
-> environment_2l, ) (L2 -> crime_2l, ) (L2 -> health_2l, ) (L2 -> agriculture_2l, ) (L3 -> Euday, ) (L3 -> EU_attach, ) 
(L3 -> EUconseq, ) (L4 -> trusteuparliament, ) (L4 -> trusteucommission, ) (L4 -> eupolmakcompetent_nom, ) (L4 -> 
sateudemoc, ) (female age_ordinal ses EU_know education trust_nat_gov excl_id nat_attachment  lr lr2 -> L1) (L1 L3 
L4-> L2) (female age_ordinal ses EU_know education trust_nat_gov excl_id nat_attachment lr lr2 -> L2)(female 
age_ordinal ses EU_know education trust_nat_gov excl_id nat_attachment lr lr2 -> L3)(female age_ordinal ses 
EU_know education trust_nat_gov excl_id nat_attachment lr lr2 -> L4) if country < 16, group(country) 
ginvariant(mcoef) latent(L1 L2 L3 L4 ) cov(e.L1*e.L3 e.L1*e.L4 e.L3*e.L4 female*age_ordinal female*ses 
female*EU_know female*education female*trust_nat_gov female*excl_id female*nat_attachment female*lr 
age_ordinal*ses age_ordinal*EU_know age_ordinal*education age_ordinal*trust_nat_gov age_ordinal*excl_id 
age_ordinal*nat_attachment EU_know*ses education*ses education*EU_know trust_nat_gov*ses 
trust_nat_gov*EU_know trust_nat_gov*education excl_id*ses excl_id*EU_know excl_id*education 
excl_id*trust_nat_gov nat_attachment*ses nat_attachment*EU_know nat_attachment*education 
nat_attachment*trust_nat_gov nat_attachment*excl_id lr*age_ordinal lr*ses lr*EU_know lr*education 
lr*trust_nat_gov lr*excl_id lr*nat_attachment lr2*female lr2*age_ordinal lr2*ses lr2*EU_know lr2*education 
lr2*trust_nat_gov lr2*excl_id lr2*nat_attachment) nocapslatent standardize 
 
Syntax FIXED EFFECTS MODEL (STATA) (TABLE 26 page 101) 
 clogit unemployment_2l fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses 
EU_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment c.lr##c.lr, group(country) 
 clogit crime_2l fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses EU_know 
education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment c.lr##c.lr, group(country) 
 clogit health_2l fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses EU_know 
education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment c.lr##c.lr, group(country) 
 clogit agriculture_2l fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses EU_know 
education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment c.lr##c.lr, group(country) 
 clogit environment_2l fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses 
EU_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment c.lr##c.lr, group(country) 
 clogit immigration_2l fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses 
EU_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment c.lr##c.lr, group(country) 
 clogit foreignpolicy_2lnom fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses 
EU_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment c.lr##c.lr, group(country) 
 clogit unifiedtax_2lnom fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses 
EU_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment c.lr##c.lr, group(country) 
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Syntax POLICY-LEVEL (STATA) (TABLE 28 page 105) 
 melogit policy_val in_int gov_spe_n soc_mod act_com_n fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm 
fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses eu_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment lr lr2 
i.country || uniq_id: || policy:, difficult  
 melogit policy_val in_int gov_spe_n soc_mod act_com_n fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm 
fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses eu_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment lr lr2  if 
country == 1 || uniq_id: || policy: , difficult  
 melogit policy_val in_int gov_spe_n soc_mod act_com_n fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm 
fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses eu_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment lr lr2  if 
country == 2 || uniq_id: || policy: , difficult  
 melogit policy_val in_int gov_spe_n soc_mod act_com_n fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm 
fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses eu_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment lr lr2  if 
country == 3 || uniq_id: || policy: , difficult  
 melogit policy_val in_int gov_spe_n soc_mod act_com_n fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm 
fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses eu_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment lr lr2  if 
country == 4 || uniq_id: || policy: , difficult  
 melogit policy_val in_int gov_spe_n soc_mod act_com_n fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm 
fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses eu_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment lr lr2  if 
country == 5 || uniq_id: || policy: , difficult  
 melogit policy_val in_int gov_spe_n soc_mod act_com_n fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm 
fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses eu_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment lr lr2  if 
country == 6 || uniq_id: || policy: , difficult  
 melogit policy_val in_int gov_spe_n soc_mod act_com_n fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm 
fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses eu_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment lr lr2  if 
country == 7 || uniq_id: || policy: , difficult  
 melogit policy_val in_int gov_spe_n soc_mod act_com_n fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm 
fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses eu_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment lr lr2  if 
country == 8 || uniq_id: || policy: , difficult  
 melogit policy_val in_int gov_spe_n soc_mod act_com_n fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm 
fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses eu_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment lr lr2  if 
country == 9 || uniq_id: || policy: , difficult  
 melogit policy_val in_int gov_spe_n soc_mod act_com_n fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm 
fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses eu_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment lr lr2  if 
country == 10 || uniq_id: || policy: , difficult  
 melogit policy_val in_int gov_spe_n soc_mod act_com_n fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm 
fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses eu_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment lr lr2  if 
country == 11 || uniq_id: || policy: , difficult  
 melogit policy_val in_int gov_spe_n soc_mod act_com_n fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm 
fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses eu_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment lr lr2  if 
country == 12 || uniq_id: || policy: , difficult  
 melogit policy_val in_int gov_spe_n soc_mod act_com_n fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm 
fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses eu_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment lr lr2  if 
country == 13 || uniq_id: || policy: , difficult  
 melogit policy_val in_int gov_spe_n soc_mod act_com_n fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm 
fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses eu_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment lr lr2  if 
country == 14 || uniq_id: || policy: , difficult  
 melogit policy_val in_int gov_spe_n soc_mod act_com_n fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm 
fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses eu_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment lr lr2  if 
country == 15 || uniq_id: || policy: , difficult 
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Syntax MACRO 2009 (STATA) (TABLE 31 page 113) 
 xtlogit unemployment_2l if country < 16, i(country) re intpoints(30) 
 xtlogit unemployment_2l fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses 
EU_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment c.lr##c.lr position_p_norm eu_benefit_p_norm_p 
EU_powers_norm, i(country) re intpoints(30) 
 xtlogit unemployment_2l fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses 
EU_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment c.lr##c.lr duration_EU_norm i.location euro, i(country) 
re intpoints(30) 
 xtlogit unemployment_2l fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses 
EU_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment c.lr##c.lr icrg_qog_norm wdi_unemp 
wdi_gdpcappppcur, i(country) re intpoints(30) 
 
 xtlogit crime_2l if country < 16, i(country) re intpoints(30) 
 xtlogit crime_2l fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses EU_know 
education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment c.lr##c.lr position_p_norm eu_benefit_p_norm_p 
EU_powers_norm, i(country) re intpoints(30) 
 xtlogit crime_2l fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses EU_know 
education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment c.lr##c.lr duration_EU_norm i.location euro, i(country) re 
intpoints(30) 
 xtlogit crime_2l fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses EU_know 
education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment c.lr##c.lr icrg_qog_norm wdi_gdpcappppcur, i(country) re 
intpoints(30) 
 
 xtlogit health_2l if country < 16, i(country) re intpoints(30) 
 xtlogit health_2l fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses EU_know 
education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment c.lr##c.lr position_p_norm eu_benefit_p_norm_p 
EU_powers_norm, i(country) re intpoints(30) 
 xtlogit health_2l fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses EU_know 
education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment c.lr##c.lr duration_EU_norm i.location euro, i(country) re 
intpoints(30) 
 xtlogit health_2l fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses EU_know 
education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment c.lr##c.lr icrg_qog_norm wdi_exphpuge wdi_gdpcappppcur, 
i(country) re intpoints(30) 
 
 xtlogit agriculture_2l if country < 16, i(country) re intpoints(30) 
 xtlogit agriculture_2l fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses 
EU_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment c.lr##c.lr position_p_norm eu_benefit_p_norm_p 
EU_powers_norm, i(country) re intpoints(30) 
 xtlogit agriculture_2l fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses 
EU_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment c.lr##c.lr duration_EU_norm i.location euro, i(country) 
re intpoints(30) 
 xtlogit agriculture_2l fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses 
EU_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment c.lr##c.lr icrg_qog_norm wdi_gdpagr 
wdi_gdpcappppcur, i(country) re intpoints(30) 
 
 xtlogit environment_2l if country < 16, i(country) re intpoints(30) 
 xtlogit environment_2l fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses 
EU_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment c.lr##c.lr position_p_norm eu_benefit_p_norm_p 
EU_powers_norm, i(country) re intpoints(30) 
 xtlogit environment_2l fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses 
EU_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment c.lr##c.lr duration_EU_norm i.location euro, i(country) 
re intpoints(30) 
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 xtlogit environment_2l fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses 
EU_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment c.lr##c.lr icrg_qog_norm epi_eh wdi_gdpcappppcur, 
i(country) re intpoints(30) 
 
 xtlogit immigration_2l if country < 16, i(country) re intpoints(30) 
 xtlogit immigration_2l fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses 
EU_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment c.lr##c.lr position_p_norm eu_benefit_p_norm_p 
EU_powers_norm, i(country) re intpoints(30) 
 xtlogit immigration_2l fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses 
EU_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment c.lr##c.lr duration_EU_norm i.location euro, i(country) 
re intpoints(30) 
 xtlogit immigration_2l fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses 
EU_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment c.lr##c.lr icrg_qog_norm asylum2008_absolute 
wdi_gdpcappppcur, i(country) re intpoints(30) 
 
 xtlogit foreignpolicy_2lnom if country < 16, i(country) re intpoints(30) 
 xtlogit foreignpolicy_2lnom fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses 
EU_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment c.lr##c.lr position_p_norm eu_benefit_p_norm_p 
EU_powers_norm, i(country) re intpoints(30) 
 xtlogit foreignpolicy_2lnom fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses 
EU_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment c.lr##c.lr duration_EU_norm i.location euro, i(country) 
re intpoints(30) 
 xtlogit foreignpolicy_2lnom fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses 
EU_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment c.lr##c.lr icrg_qog_norm wdi_gdpcappppcur, i(country) 
re intpoints(30) 
 
 xtlogit unifiedtax_2lnom if country < 16, i(country) re intpoints(30) 
 xtlogit unifiedtax_2lnom fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses 
EU_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment c.lr##c.lr position_p_norm eu_benefit_p_norm_p 
EU_powers_norm, i(country) re intpoints(30) 
 xtlogit unifiedtax_2lnom fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses 
EU_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment c.lr##c.lr duration_EU_norm i.location euro, i(country) 
re intpoints(30) 
 xtlogit unifiedtax_2lnom fscore1_output_norm fscore3_id_norm fscore4_trust_norm female age_ordinal_n ses 
EU_know education excl_id trust_nat_gov nat_attachment c.lr##c.lr icrg_qog_norm wdi_gdpcappppcur, i(country) 
re intpoints(30) 
Syntax MACRO 2009-2016 (STATA) (TABLE 32 page 115) 
 melogit immigration_2l eugood EU_attach ev_eu_dem female age_ordinal_n ses EU_know education excl_id 
trust_nat_gov_3l nat_attachment lr lr2 position_p_n eu_benefit_p_n_p EU_powers_n dyear || country_year:, 
intpoints(30) 
 melogit immigration_2l eugood EU_attach ev_eu_dem female age_ordinal_n ses EU_know education excl_id 
trust_nat_gov_3l nat_attachment lr lr2 duration_EU_n i.location euro mreligion_cat dyear|| country_year:, 
intpoints(30) 
 melogit immigration_2l eugood EU_attach ev_eu_dem female age_ordinal_n ses EU_know education excl_id 
trust_nat_gov_3l nat_attachment lr lr2 icrg_qog totasylum_abs_n wdi_gdpcappppcur_n dyear || country_year:, 
intpoints(30) 
 melogit foreignpolicy_2l eugood EU_attach ev_eu_dem female age_ordinal_n ses EU_know education excl_id 
trust_nat_gov_3l nat_attachment lr lr2 position_p_n eu_benefit_p_n_p EU_powers_n dyear || country_year:, 
intpoints(30) 
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 melogit foreignpolicy_2l eugood EU_attach ev_eu_dem female age_ordinal_n ses EU_know education excl_id 
trust_nat_gov_3l nat_attachment lr lr2 duration_EU_n i.location euro mreligion_cat dyear|| country_year:, 
intpoints(30) 
 melogit foreignpolicy_2l eugood EU_attach ev_eu_dem female age_ordinal_n ses EU_know education excl_id 
trust_nat_gov_3l nat_attachment lr lr2 icrg_qog totasylum_abs_n wdi_gdpcappppcur_n dyear || country_year:, 
intpoints(30) 
Syntax IDENTITY-MEANINGS (STATA) (TABLES 35-36-37-38 pages 128-131) 
 sem (civility_eur civility_nat -> nat_attachment, ) (civility_eur civility_nat -> fscore3_id_norm, ) (civility_eur 
civility_nat -> fscore2_policy_norm, ) (nat_attachment -> fscore3_id_norm, ) (rights -> nat_attachment, ) (rights -> 
fscore3_id_norm, ) (rights -> fscore2_policy_norm, ) (fscore3_id_norm -> fscore2_policy_norm, ) (ancestry -> 
nat_attachment, ) (ancestry -> fscore3_id_norm, ) (ancestry -> fscore2_policy_norm, ) if country < 16, 
group(country) ginvariant(none) cov( civility_eur*ancestry rights*civility_eur rights*ancestry civility_nat*ancestry 
civility_nat*civility_eur civility_nat*rights) nocapslatent 
 sem (civility_eur civility_nat -> nat_attachment, ) (civility_eur civility_nat -> fscore3_id_norm, ) (civility_eur 
civility_nat -> unemployment_2l, ) (nat_attachment -> fscore3_id_norm, ) (rights -> nat_attachment, ) (rights -> 
fscore3_id_norm, ) (rights -> unemployment_2l, ) (fscore3_id_norm -> unemployment_2l, ) (ancestry -> 
nat_attachment, ) (ancestry -> fscore3_id_norm, ) (ancestry -> unemployment_2l, ) if country < 16, group(country) 
ginvariant(none) cov( civility_eur*ancestry rights*civility_eur rights*ancestry civility_nat*ancestry 
civility_nat*civility_eur civility_nat*rights) nocapslatent 
 sem (civility_eur civility_nat -> nat_attachment, ) (civility_eur civility_nat -> fscore3_id_norm, ) (civility_eur 
civility_nat -> crime_2l, ) (nat_attachment -> fscore3_id_norm, ) (rights -> nat_attachment, ) (rights -> 
fscore3_id_norm, ) (rights -> crime_2l, ) (fscore3_id_norm -> crime_2l, ) (ancestry -> nat_attachment, ) (ancestry -
> fscore3_id_norm, ) (ancestry -> crime_2l, ) if country < 16, group(country) ginvariant(none) cov( 
civility_eur*ancestry rights*civility_eur rights*ancestry civility_nat*ancestry civility_nat*civility_eur 
civility_nat*rights) nocapslatent 
 sem (civility_eur civility_nat -> nat_attachment, ) (civility_eur civility_nat -> fscore3_id_norm, ) (civility_eur 
civility_nat -> health_2l, ) (nat_attachment -> fscore3_id_norm, ) (rights -> nat_attachment, ) (rights -> 
fscore3_id_norm, ) (rights -> health_2l, ) (fscore3_id_norm -> health_2l, ) (ancestry -> nat_attachment, ) (ancestry -
> fscore3_id_norm, ) (ancestry -> health_2l, ) if country < 16, group(country) ginvariant(none) cov( 
civility_eur*ancestry rights*civility_eur rights*ancestry civility_nat*ancestry civility_nat*civility_eur 
civility_nat*rights) nocapslatent 
 sem (civility_eur civility_nat -> nat_attachment, ) (civility_eur civility_nat -> fscore3_id_norm, ) (civility_eur 
civility_nat -> agriculture_2l, ) (nat_attachment -> fscore3_id_norm, ) (rights -> nat_attachment, ) (rights -> 
fscore3_id_norm, ) (rights -> agriculture_2l, ) (fscore3_id_norm -> agriculture_2l, ) (ancestry -> nat_attachment, ) 
(ancestry -> fscore3_id_norm, ) (ancestry -> agriculture_2l, ) if country < 16, group(country) ginvariant(none) cov( 
civility_eur*ancestry rights*civility_eur rights*ancestry civility_nat*ancestry civility_nat*civility_eur 
civility_nat*rights) nocapslatent 
 sem (civility_eur civility_nat -> nat_attachment, ) (civility_eur civility_nat -> fscore3_id_norm, ) (civility_eur 
civility_nat -> environment_2l, ) (nat_attachment -> fscore3_id_norm, ) (rights -> nat_attachment, ) (rights -> 
fscore3_id_norm, ) (rights -> environment_2l, ) (fscore3_id_norm -> environment_2l, ) (ancestry -> nat_attachment, 
) (ancestry -> fscore3_id_norm, ) (ancestry -> environment_2l, ) if country < 16, group(country) ginvariant(none) 
cov( civility_eur*ancestry rights*civility_eur rights*ancestry civility_nat*ancestry civility_nat*civility_eur 
civility_nat*rights) nocapslatent 
 sem (civility_eur civility_nat -> nat_attachment, ) (civility_eur civility_nat -> fscore3_id_norm, ) (civility_eur 
civility_nat -> foreignpolicy_2lnom, ) (nat_attachment -> fscore3_id_norm, ) (rights -> nat_attachment, ) (rights -> 
fscore3_id_norm, ) (rights -> foreignpolicy_2lnom, ) (fscore3_id_norm -> foreignpolicy_2lnom, ) (ancestry -> 
nat_attachment, ) (ancestry -> fscore3_id_norm, ) (ancestry -> foreignpolicy_2lnom, ) if country < 16, 
group(country) ginvariant(none) cov( civility_eur*ancestry rights*civility_eur rights*ancestry civility_nat*ancestry 
civility_nat*civility_eur civility_nat*rights) nocapslatent 
 sem (civility_eur civility_nat -> nat_attachment, ) (civility_eur civility_nat -> fscore3_id_norm, ) (civility_eur 
civility_nat -> unifiedtax_2lnom, ) (nat_attachment -> fscore3_id_norm, ) (rights -> nat_attachment, ) (rights -> 
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fscore3_id_norm, ) (rights -> unifiedtax_2lnom, ) (fscore3_id_norm -> unifiedtax_2lnom, ) (ancestry -> 
nat_attachment, ) (ancestry -> fscore3_id_norm, ) (ancestry -> unifiedtax_2lnom, ) if country < 16, group(country) 
ginvariant(none) cov( civility_eur*ancestry rights*civility_eur rights*ancestry civility_nat*ancestry 
civility_nat*civility_eur civility_nat*rights) nocapslatent 
